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“Indeed, most of our fellow citizens believe that all is not well. 
Due regard for their view, as well as a prudent concern for the 
future, suggests that we should explore the sources of this 
democratic discontent.” (Pharr and Putnam 2000, 27) 
Democracy is all but a new concept in political science and the public debate, and it certainly 
is a popular term. After all, even North Korea officially calls itself a democracy (visible in its 
official name 'Democratic People's Republic of Korea'), and almost 90% of Chinese citizens 
find that democracy is working well in their country (Wang 2007). The Sydney Democracy 
Network found that there are currently 2'234 different ways to describe or label democracy.1 
At the same time, the notion that democracy is somehow threatened, under attack, or in crisis 
seems to enjoy similar success: Scholars, journalists and politicians alike have been warning 
since decades that there is a 'legitimacy crisis' in established democracies (Offe 1972; Crozier, 
Huntington, and Watanuki 1975; Merkel 2014; Armingeon and Guthmann 2014). These 
warnings usually identify citizens and their lack or decrease of support as the problem, 
arguing that citizens are more and more distrustful of democracy. A recent example are Foa 
and Mounk (2016, 16), who claim that "citizens of  democracies  are  less  and  less  content  
with  their institutions; they are more and more willing to jettison institutions and norms that 
have traditionally been regarded as central components of democracy; and they are 
increasingly attracted to alternative regime forms". Wilhelm Heitmeyer, in an interview about 
the 2017 German elections, speaks of a "deflation of democracy", where "the democratic 
apparatus works perfectly, but the substance of trust vanishes"2. Survey data, however, does 
not support these claims, but rather shows 'trendless fluctuations' of public support for 
democracy over time (Norris 1999, 5; see also Norris 2017 for recent data). 
At the origin of this debate is the growing availability of data: Since the 1970s, people all 
around the world have been surveyed about levels of support for their democracies, and by 
now there is data available for almost every single country in the world (according to 
Inglehart and Welzel 2005, the World Values Survey alone covers more than 80% of the 
world population). Support for democracy has become a very popular concept in the political 
                                                 
1http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/portfolio_page/many-names-democracy/ 
2Süddeutsche Zeitung: Soziologe zur AfD: Sozial Schwache sehen auf noch schwächere herab. 
http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/soziologe-zur-afd-erwachen-aus-wutgetraenkter-apathie-1.3687762-2 




science literature, and the body of publications is increasing each year: As Figure 1 shows, the 
year 2016 alone has seen almost 1500 publications on democratic support, more than in all the 
previous years. The interest has grown especially since 1990, when the so-called "third wave 
of democratization" (Huntington 1991) raised scholars attention to the "attitudinal 
consolidation of democracy" (Linz and Stepan 1996, 6ff), the development of democratic 
support amongst citizens of newly democratized, post-authoritarian countries. 
Figure 1: The growing interest of political scientists in democratic support. 
 
Notes: Number of scientific publications that match the search "support&democracy". Source: Web of Science. 
Given that there is already a considerable amount of research, why should we still study 
democracy and citizens' support for it at all? To begin with, although there might not be much 
empirical proof for the steep decline in public support for democracy that some have 
predicted, there are still signs that citizens in Western democracies are not as happy as their 
Chinese counterparts: Recent political developments such as the success of (right-wing) 
populism in established democracies (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2012; Kriesi and Pappas 
2015) and the resurrection of anti-liberal ideologies like nationalism, authoritarianism and 
identitarian movements show a certain level of popular dissatisfaction with the democratic 
status quo (see for example Norris and Inglehart 2016; Kriesi 2017). This points to another 




what do citizens expect from their democracies, what are they satisfied with, and what do they 
want improved? As Ferrín and Kriesi (2016a, 11) have remarked, most existing research on 
democratic support does not account for the views of citizens, and the question how 
individuals define a good democracy is both theoretically and empirically barely explored 
(some exceptions are Schedler and Sarsfield 2007; Canache 2012; Ferrín 2012; Welzel and 
Alvarez 2014; Ferrín and Kriesi 2016a).  
In this thesis, I want to find out what exactly European citizens want from their democracies. 
Why is that important? Because if we want to react to worrying trends like the increasing 
electoral success of right-wing populist parties, and find a way to make (or keep) democracy 
more popular and convincing than its illiberal ideological counterparts, we first need to 
understand citizens' views, ideas and expectations about democracy. If we know how and 
where democracy is failing its citizens, and how and where it is actually satisfying them, we 
can come up with strategies to fix its shortcomings. The populist case against liberal 
democracy, claiming that 'the elites' are ignoring the needs, grievances and will of 'the people' 
(Mudde 2004, 543) seems to increasingly attract voters, and democracies should take it 
seriously by asking how they could do better for their citizens. This is what the following 
dissertation does. I argue that to understand how democracies can ensure and improve their 
support amongst European citizens, we need to answer several questions: What do citizens 
expect from a democracy? How do they like their democracies? What makes them satisfied or 
dissatisfied? And are there differences between countries, and between groups of citizens?  
To begin with, I show that support for democracy is not unidimensional: Citizens' attitudes 
are structured by two dimensions, liberal and social democracy, and individuals differ in their 
position on these scales. I then develop a spatial model of democratic support based on three 
elements: Expectations from democracy, evaluations of the democratic reality, and 
satisfaction with democracy to understand what actually causes (dis)satisfaction. I further use 
literature on political socialisation and democratic learning (Almond and Verba 1963; 
Rohrschneider 1999; Mishler and Rose 2002; Fuchs and Roller 2006), democratization and 
modernization theory (Linz and Stepan 1996; Kitschelt 1999; Diamond 2008; Dalton and 
Welzel 2014), models of democracy (Lijphart 1999; Bochsler and Kriesi 2013), political 
participation (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Quintelier and Hooghe 2013; Quintelier 
and van Deth 2014) as well as relative deprivation and social dominance theory (Gurr 1970; 
Pettigrew 2002; Pratto, Sidanius, and Levin 2006) to understand the factors that explain 
varying levels of support. Both the democratic regime (defined as the democratic history, 




level systematically affect the way citizens understand, perceive, and evaluate their 
democratic system, which explains patterns of support across different groups of citizens and 
countries, and, consequentially, causes of dissatisfaction. I find that there are both good and 
bad news: On the one hand, liberal democracy - electoral freedom, competition, and 
transparency - is universally agreed upon in Europe, and there are little reasons to worry that 
these democratic principles are losing support. However, while citizens do express continuous 
support for diffuse principles of liberal democracy, the more specific realization of social 
democratic output criteria is a source of dissatisfaction, especially in Eastern and Southern 
Europe, and most strongly amongst those that feel disadvantaged in society. Particularly 
social justice, or the perceived lack of its realization, seems to compromise the legitimacy of 
democratic procedures for many Europeans. And most importantly, democracy is a matter of 
perceptions: Subjective status compared to other citizens substantially affects individual 
support. As a result, there is no such thing as an objectively good democracy for all citizens. 
People are socialized in different ways, they want different things from a democratic system, 
and they see different sides of democracy depending on who they are and where they grew up. 
Democracy, in other words, is not the same thing for each of its citizens. 
I contribute to existing research by (a) disentangling the attitudes that form democratic 
support and comprehending the linkages between them, (b) taking into account different 
dimensions of democracy, and (c) understanding the effect of the macro-level and micro-level 
context on support. Thereby, my contribution to the study of democratic support is both 
theoretical and empirical: Theoretically, I bring together the literature on political culture and 
socialization, political psychology, relative deprivation as well as democratic models to 
explain how citizens' democratic support is formed. Empirically, I develop a two-dimensional 
space of democratic support which structures citizens' attitudes and makes them comparable 
across countries. My research design is comparative and aiming to explaining variance in 
democratic support both across countries and across individuals. To be able to do that, I need 
data on individual support for democracy in different countries as well as data on country-
level democratic regimes. I focus on established European democracies for two reasons: First, 
European countries share a similar level of democratic quality, and fulfil standards of liberal 
democracy such as political freedom, political equality and vertical and horizontal control 
mechanisms, as Bühlmann et al. (2012) have established. And second, Europe nevertheless 
offers a wide range of countries with different democratic models and democratization 
histories, allowing me to compare their effects. On the individual level, I use data from the 




extensive items on citizens expectations from and evaluations of democracy in addition to the 
traditional measure on satisfaction with democracy. This data allows me to test my spatial 
model of democratic support. On the country level, I primarily use data from the Democracy 
Barometer (Merkel et al. 2016), which offers not just an aggregate measure of the democratic 
quality of established democracies, but also fine-grained measures on democratic functions 
that can be used to differentiate between different models of democracy. 
State of the art: What do we know about support for democracy? 
Since a long time, public support has been considered highly relevant for the legitimacy of a 
political system: Max Weber wrote in the early 20th century that “every system of domination 
attempts to instil in its subordinates the belief in its legitimacy” (Weber 1968, 213), implying 
that both the legitimacy claims of the rulers and the legitimacy beliefs of their subjects are 
worth studying (Hurrelmann, Schneider, and Steffek 2007, 6). Support for democracy is about 
the latter, legitimacy beliefs - as Thomassen (2007, 418) states, a democratic regime "almost 
by definition is a legitimate regime", as it is supposed to be based on the consent of the 
people. With the rise of political science as a discipline after the Second World War, citizens' 
support for their democracies became an important topic especially for American scholars: 
Lipset (1959) discussed the social prerequisites for democracy, Almond and Verba (1963) 
introduced the notions of civic culture as a crucial factor for the persistence of a democratic 
regime and David Easton (1957, 1965) originated the concept of political support. 
Democracies, as all of them agree, have to convince their citizens with politics that are both 
effective and legitimate to maintain their stability (Almond and Verba 1963, 230; Lipset 1959, 
86; Easton 1965, 119). As Campbell (2013, 1) has put it, "few claims of 20th-century political 
science have proved as enduringly relevant as the notion that stable democracy depends upon 
a concordant wellspring of supportive citizen attitudes". This points to two big challenges that 
research in this area faces: First of all, to conceptualize and measure support for democracy, 
and second, to understand the sources of this support across individuals, time, and countries. 
To begin with, there are different approaches to define what support is: Easton (1965, 267ff.) 
claims that political support can be conceptualized (and measured) on different levels, ranging 
from specific support for political actors (such as parties and courts) to diffuse support for the 
political regime and its principles. While the Eastonian concept of support is the most used 
and cited approach in the literature, it has also been persistently revised (see for example 
Norris 1999; 2011), and many scholars have questioned the division between diffuse and 




specific support, arguing that citizens do not distinguish between these concepts, which makes 
them difficult to use empirically (Zmerli, Newton, and Montero 2007, 44), and that the two 
are confusingly intertwined given that each political object might be subject to both specific 
and diffuse support (Ferrín and Kriesi 2016b, 9).  Most recent studies, however, agree on the 
conceptualization of different types or levels of support for democracy (Pharr and Putnam 
2000; Dalton 2004; Torcal and Montero 2006a). Shin (2007, 269) argues that support for 
democracy is a multi-layered phenomenon because "citizens simultaneously comprehend 
democracy as an ideal system and as a political system-in-practice", and distinguishes 
between normative and practical support for democracy. Normative support refers to a 
positive attachment to the idea of democracy, while practical support refers to favourable 
evaluations of the democratic structure and institutions. Similarly, Inglehart and Welzel 
(2005, 268ff) differentiate between instrumental and intrinsic support for democracy, where 
the latter is supposedly more widespread in advanced, post-industrial democracies (see also 
Bratton and Mattes 2001).  
Consequently, it also remains a matter of debate how support for democracy should be 
operationalized and measured. In advanced democracies, large majorities of respondents 
agree that "democracy is the best form of government" (in Europe around 90%, see Ferrín and 
Kriesi 2016b, 11). The expression of general support for democracy as a regime, at the same 
time, does not imply satisfaction with its functioning, or the necessary rejection of its 
alternatives (Ariely and Davidov 2011). The most commonly used indicator for democratic 
support, but also one of the most criticized ones, is satisfaction with democracy (see for 
example Linde and Ekman 2003; Ariely and Davidov 2011). Given that this indicator has 
been used to measure both 'diffuse' support for regime principles, and 'specific' support for the 
functioning of institutions, some authors recommend avoiding this indicator altogether 
(Canache, Mondak, and Seligson 2001). Other authors prefer to use preferences of democracy 
over its (non-democratic) alternatives as a measure for practical support (Shin 2007, 271), 
especially in non-democratic contexts. Further indicators such as political confidence and 
trust have indistinctly been labelled as support for regime institutions or support for political 
authorities (Dalton 2004; Norris 2011), although it remains unclear whether trust is a 
component of diffuse support or an independent variable explaining support for democracy 
(Ferrín and Kriesi 2016b, 10). 
The second challenge is finding out which factors explain support for democracy - or, in other 
words, what are the sources of citizens' legitimacy beliefs. Substantially, this research is based 




support democracy because they believe in its procedures, or because it delivers desired 
outcomes (Magalhães 2014; Wessels 2016)? Consequently, two main approaches can be 
distinguished in the respective literature: First, a democratic history and political culture 
approach which focuses on the ways in which different democratic (or authoritarian) 
experiences and concomitant political values affect support for the political system (Almond 
and Verba 1980; Mishler and Rose 1996; Anderson 1998; Hofferbert and Klingemann 1999; 
Fuchs and Roller 2006; Oskarsson 2010), and second, a system performance approach which 
claims that political and economic performance as well as institutional quality determines 
whether citizens are satisfied with their democracy (Finkel, Muller, and Seligson 1989; 
Clarke, Dutt, and Kornberg 1993; Aarts and Thomassen 2008; Magalhães 2014; Dahlberg and 
Linde 2016). Both approaches have some empirical leverage, but the results differ 
considerably due to the data and methods they build on (Wells and Krieckhaus 2006). The 
best explanatory power, however, seems to be reached with models that combine both factors 
(Wagner, Schneider, and Halla 2009). 
While both cultural and performance-based approaches traditionally focus on the macro-level 
to explain individual support, other authors have started to also take individual characteristics 
into account. Their findings suggest that individual factors such as being part of the political 
majority and a favourable individual economic situation lead to higher degrees of satisfaction 
with democracy (Anderson and Tverdova 2001; Curini, Jou, and Memoli 2012). In addition to 
such direct effects of individual-level conditions on support, these characteristics also interact 
with macro-level conditions: For instance, when it comes to government performance and 
institutional quality, several studies have found interaction effects with respondents' winner-
loser status  (Bernauer and Vatter 2012; Campbell 2013), as well as with socio-economic 
variables (Schäfer 2012). Similar results apply for political cultural and socialization effects, 
which interact for example with individual age and cohort effects (Pop-Eleches and Tucker 
2014) and with individual social status (Mishler and Rose 2001b). In sum, in addition to 
macro-level cultural and institutional factors, micro-level factors clearly have an impact on 
citizens' support from democracy as well. This effect can be both direct and in interaction 
with macro-level factors, pointing to the fact that both levels of analysis should be taken into 
account.  
Lastly, there is some disagreement about the interpretation of the results concerning those 
citizens that are dissatisfied with democracy: On the one hand, proponents of the crisis-
interpretation claim that citizens are increasingly alienated from democracy and its 




Huntington, and Watanuki 1975; Pharr and Putnam 2000; Petring and Merkel 2011; Foa and 
Mounk 2016). On the other hand, several scholars have argued that 'dissatisfied' or 'critical' 
citizens (Norris 1999, 2011) are actually a benefit for democratic regimes, as they help 
improving democracy: “The dissatisfied democrats can be viewed as less a threat to, than a 
force for, reform and improvement of democratic processes and structures” (Klingemann 
1999, 32; see also Klingemann 2014). Similarly, authors such as Welzel attest that we have 
shifted from an allegiant democratic culture to one of "assertive" citizens, which do not (just) 
defer to political elites, but challenge them (Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Welzel 2013; Dalton 
and Welzel 2014). While this literature supposes that dissatisfaction is caused by a 
combination of high expectations, postmaterialist values and critical outlooks on politics 
amongst citizens with above-average education and political interest, leading to high levels of 
electoral and non-electoral participation (Norris 1999, 21; Geissel 2008), the pessimistic 
approach, in contrast, assumes that dissatisfied democrats are not confident about or interested 
in politics, but “simply more alienated and confused” (Doorenspleet 2012, 287), and can 
rather be labelled as “disaffected democrats” (Montero, Günther, and Torcal 1997, 17ff.; 
Magalhães 2005; Torcal and Montero 2006b), given their low levels of participation and 
involvement in the political system.  
Conceptualizing support for democracy: Expectations, evaluations and satisfaction 
A first step in each analysis of democratic support, thus, should be to conceptualize what 
exactly support for democracy means, and how it is operationalized and ultimately measured. 
As the previous section has shown, most existing studies focus on either support for the ideal 
of democracy, or satisfaction with its functioning to conceptualize support for democracy. 
This dissertation, following Ferrín and Kriesi (2016a), attempts a more precise 
conceptualization. In accordance with Pippa Norris' observation that it is essential to 
distinguish "attitudes that operate at different levels rather than treat political support as 
though it is all of one piece" (Norris 2011, 241), I use three attitudes to conceptualize political 
support.  
The first component is expectations from democracy, which refer to the normative model of 
democracy favoured by an individual - in other words, what should democracy be like and 
what should it do for me? I assume that citizens, in a more a less precise way, have an idea in 
mind of how a good democracy should look like. Expectations are thus a normative concept; 




expectations what a democracy in general 'should do for me'.3 Secondly, evaluations of 
democracy express how citizens see their own democracy; they thus refer to the perceived 
performance of the respective democratic regime someone lives in. Finally, satisfaction with 
democracy (SWD), an often-used concept in the political support literature: "How satisfied are 
you with the way democracy works in your country?" This concept refers to an overall 
assessment of the functioning of the democratic regime in one's country - am I satisfied with 
what democracy has done for me lately? It captures citizens' general legitimacy beliefs. 
Figure 2: Support for democracy: Expectations, evaluations and satisfaction. 
 
How are these three components of support linked to each other? Common sense would 
propose that satisfaction is an outcome of what we want - expectations - and what we get - 
evaluations. Satisfaction, then, would be expectations minus evaluations. As Figure 2 shows, I 
indeed suppose that these three attitudes are linked in a systematic way: Satisfaction is a 
function of the distance between expectations and evaluations. What are the substantial 
arguments for this assumption? Expectations and evaluations, if we want to follow Eastons 
approach, are located on a specific level of support: Normative expectations, which I assume 
to be formed primarily, serve as a yardstick for evaluations of the reality. But in addition to 
that, both can take place in different dimensions of democracy: First of all, do I want 
democracy to be representative? Fair? Competitive? Participatory? Efficient? And, secondly, 
do I perceive democracy to be like that in reality? Satisfaction with democracy, which is a 
more diffuse form of support, should then be an outcome of the comparison of normative 
expectations with evaluations of the reality. Does the democracy I live in fit my yardstick(s) 
in different dimensions? If it does, that should make for a general sense of satisfaction with 
democracy. Chapter Three of this dissertation explains my conceptualization of satisfaction in 
more detail, and elaborates a spatial model of democratic support. A similar approach is taken 
by Ferrín and Kriesi (2016b), who assume that "it is the comparison between the democratic 
ideals and the actual functioning of democracy that makes for the judgment about the 
                                                 





legitimacy of a democratic regime". A comparable idea is also used by Norris (2011), who 
talks about a "democratic deficit".  
In sum, I define support for democracy as citizens' legitimacy beliefs: Do they consent to the 
democratic regime that they are subjected to? These legitimacy beliefs consist of the 
democratic expectations citizens hold, their evaluations of the democratic reality, and their 
judgment about the consistency of the two, expressed as satisfaction (or dissatisfaction) with 
democracy. Voicing satisfaction, then, is granting legitimacy to your democracy - expressing 
that you do believe in its legitimacy, given that your evaluations sufficiently match with your 
expectations. Notably, this model of democratic support is one that is targeted rather at 
existing developed democracies (whether young or old), and not at authoritarian or 
transitioning countries, in which it is more important to measure citizens' aspirations for 
democracy as compared to authoritarian alternatives, and their ability to define democracy as 
a concept (cf. Shin 2015). My model aims at citizens in democratic regimes, who are dealing 
with real-life democracy every day.  
After giving an overview of the state of the art in research on support for democracy, and 
explaining my concept of support, this section gives a first glance at the available data on 
democratic support to illustrate some of the empirical puzzles this dissertation addresses. My 
geographical focus, as previously explained, is on European democracies, which cover a wide 
range of democratic models and histories while having a comparable level of democracy, and 
to which the previously developed model of support applies. The Democracy Barometer data 
is available for all countries that are considered democratic4, while the European Social 
Survey 2012, my main individual-level data source, limits my dataset to 26 European 
democracies5. The first question that I address is: How and why does support for democracy 
differ across countries? An important factor, according to the literature cited in the previous 
section, is the quality of democratic institutions: In which way and how well are democratic 
principles put into place? Democracies differ in the way they realize democratic principles, as 
for example Bühlmann et al. (2012) show. Such differences in democratic performance could 
                                                 
4Meaning that they are rated as democracies since 1995 by both Polity IV and Freeedom House, see Bühlmann et 
al. 2012. 
5Albania (AL), Belgium (BE), Bulgaria (BG), Cyprus (CY), Czech Republic (CZ), Denmark (DN), Estonia (EE), 
Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany (DE), Hungary (HU), Iceland (IS), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Lithuania (LT), 
Netherlands (NL), Norway (NO), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), Slovakia (SK), Slovenia (SI), Spain (ES), Sweden 
(SE), Switzerland (CH), Ukraine (UA) and Great Britain (GB). The ESS 2012 sample includes three more 
countries (Israel, Russia, and Kosovo), which I exclude - Israel because it is not in Europe, Russia because it is 
not democratic, and Kosovo due to the almost total lack of country-level data. 




also explain variance in satisfaction. Figure 3 shows the distribution of citizens' average 
satisfaction with democracy as well as democratic quality in the 26 European democracies in 
my sample in one plot.6 As can be seen, mean levels of satisfaction do differ quite 
considerably across countries, ranging from a low of around 3 in Bulgaria to more than 7 in 
Switzerland, Norway and Denmark on an overall 10 point scale. Looking at the distribution of 
countries, low satisfaction seems more predominant in Southern and Eastern Europe, while 
Western Europe, especially Scandinavia, dominates the top ranks. Looking at the level of 
democratic quality, the picture of countries is similar: Many countries are actually on or close 
to the 45° line, implying that those with the most satisfied citizens are also those performing 
best in the Democracy Barometer. Yet, country-level democratic quality does not explain all 
the differences either, as some examples show: Switzerland has more satisfied citizens than it 
should have considering its democratic quality, and Bulgaria, Slovenia, Spain, Portugal and 
Italy should have higher levels of satisfaction given their democratic quality. 
Figure 3: Satisfaction with democracy and democratic quality in Europe (2012). 
 
Notes: Satisfaction with democracy measured on a scale from 0 to 10, depicted is the mean for all citizens of a 
country. Democratic quality measured on a scale from 0 to 100, rescaled to 0 to 10. Year: 2012. Data sources: 
European Social Survey (ESS 2012), Democracy Barometer (Merkel et al. 2016). Weighted with ESS post-
stratification and population size weights. Line=45°.  
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This picture is a static one though, that looks only at levels and not at changes. To understand 
whether changes in both variables are related to each other, I look at the development of 
satisfaction and democratic quality over time. I randomly selected 8 of the 26 democracies7, 
limiting the amount of figures and tables. Figure 4 shows the development of satisfaction with 
democracy and democratic quality in these selected countries over time. Levels of satisfaction 
change over time - in some cases they vary rather little (i.e. Italy with almost constant values 
since the 1970s) and in other cases quite a lot (i.e. Belgium with fluctuations between 3.5 and 
6). While some show an upward trend over time (Czech Republic), others follow a decreasing 
trend (Slovenia). At first sight, the common claim that support for democracy is strongly 
decreasing since the 1970s cannot be supported; we can rather confirm Norris' depiction of 
trendless fluctuations. But can the quality of democracy explain these fluctuations over time? 
If we look at the developmentof democratic quality to understand whether they can explain 
changes in satisfaction, the picture is rather mixed: In Italy, France and Czech Republic, there 
is a very similar trend in both lines. At the same time, Germany experienced a downturn of 
satisfaction in the 2000s followed by an increase since 2010, and Slovenia experienced 
strongly declining levels of satisfaction since 2008, despite stable democratic performances in 
both countries. Consequently, the quality of democracy, while contributing to citizens' 
satisfaction, is clearly not the only factor explaining its variation. 
  
                                                 




Figure 4: Satisfaction with democracy and democratic quality in Europe (1970-2014). 
 
 
Notes: Satisfaction with democracy is measured on a scale from 0 to 10, depicted is the mean for all citizens of a 
country. Democratic quality is originally measured on a scale from 0 to 100, which has been rescaled to 0 to 10. 
Data sources: European Social Survey (ESS 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014), Eurobarometer trend 
file (Schmitt and Scholz 2005), Democracy Barometer (Merkel et al. 2016). Weighted with ESS and 




As pointed out in Section 2, the literature on support for democracy has established that 
country-level factors are often conditional on individual-level dynamics. Hence, the deciding 
factor might not be how experts rate a democracy, but how citizens do. This brings us to a 
question which my conceptualization of democratic support in the previous section has raised: 
Is satisfaction a product of expectations and evaluations? Figure 5 shows data from the ESS 
2012 that provides some insights into the question of how exactly the different attitudes that 
form support for democracy are linked, and if staisfaction is a product of what citizens want 
from their democracy, and what they (believe to) get. While democratic expectations are 
rather high across all countries, evaluations seem to be more closely linked to levels of 
satisfaction. Interestingly though, the highest levels of expectations from democracy can be 
found in those countries that have the least satisfied citizens. Indeed, the distance between 
what 'should be' and what 'is' seems to explain variying levels of satisfaction in Europe. 
Figure 5: Support for democracy in Europe, 2012 (means per country). 
 
Notes: Expectations from, evaluations of and satisfaction with democracy are measured on a scale from 0 to 10, 
depicted is the mean for all citizens of a country. Data source: European Social Survey (ESS 2012). Weighted 
with ESS post-stratification weight. 
So far, these patterns all refer to country-level differences, but I also want to understand if and 
why individuals differ in their patterns of support. How does support for democracy vary 
across individuals? Figure 6 shows how the socio-economic status of individuals affects their 
support for democracy. Out of the three variables usually used to measure socio-economic 
status (income, education and occupation), I pick one indicator to illustrate its effects, the 




Figure 6: Support for democracy in different socio-economic groups (distributions). 
 
Notes: Expectations from, evaluations of and satisfaction with democracy are measured on a scale from 0 to 10. 
Low income: 1st to 5th decile, high income: 6th to 10th decile. The plots show minimum/maximum, first quartile 
to third quartile range, and the median of the distribution, the dots show outliers. Data source: European Social 




In the boxplots that illustrate the variable distributions, we can see that citizens' income levels 
influence the way they see democracy: In all countries, evaluations of and especially 
satisfaction with democracy are higher for persons with a high income - apparently, low-
income citizens evaluate their democracy more critical, and are also less satisfied. 
Expectations, though, do not differ considerably according to income. Further, it is interesting 
to see that the distribution differences between low- and high-income citizens are not the 
same in each country: In Germany and Italy, for example, satisfaction differs quiet 
substantially between the two groups, while the differences in Belgium, the Netherlands or 
France are less strong. 
In sum, support for democracy clearly does vary across countries and individuals, and a first 
look at the data raises some questions: Why does support differ across countries? How are 
expectations, evaluations and satisfaction linked to each other? And why do individuals 
conceive of democracy in different ways according to their status? In the following chapters, I 
try to find answers to those puzzles. The first step, however, is to define what democracy 
actually means, and how it is structured in the attitudes of citizens. This is what the next 
chapter does. 
Dimensions of democracy in theory and empirics 
From a normative point of view, the fact that “democracy” can mean different things has long 
been established - democratic theory offers plenty of different and often opposed conceptions 
of what 'government of the people, by the people and for the people' is supposed to mean and 
how it is to function. For proponents of the minimalist perspective, democracy is merely a 
means to elect skilled elites capable of making public decisions, and protecting individual 
liberties (Schumpeter 1943, 269; Dahl 1971, 23). In a participatory conception of democracy, 
involvement in politics is valued for its own sake and is considered the core of a democracy 
(Barber 1984, 153). A social democratic approach to democracy also considers political 
outcomes like social equality as essential for fair and meaningful democratic participation (cf. 
Held 1987, 274ff). According to scholars such as Fuchs (1999, 125ff.), the distinction 
between liberal and social(ist) democracy is the most important one when it comes to 
normative models of democracy. He sees the main difference between the two models in the 
emphasis of the organization principle of relationships between individuals: While in the 
liberal model this principle is competition, in the socialist model it is solidarity (ibid.: 128). 
Similarly, Thomassen (2007, 423ff) sees democratic models on a continuum between 




individualism and collectivism, where a libertarian and a socialist model oppose each other. 
The literature on varieties of democracy further assumes that also empirically, established 
democracies diverge in the way they realize democracy: They have implemented democratic 
principles through different formal institutional arrangements as well as informal practices 
and procedures. As Bochsler and Kriesi have put it, “they are all variations on a general 
theme” (2013, 69). Democracy, in this argumentation, consists of several dimensions, and 
existing democracies emphasize these dimensions differently. For instance, as Lijphart (1984, 
1999) has famously stated, some democracies rely more on majoritarian decision-making, 
whereas others emphasize consensus-oriented forms of power-sharing. Collier and Levitsky 
(1997) speak of democracies "with adjectives". 
Support for democracy, as previously established, is about legitimacy beliefs - based on what 
criteria do citizens believe their democracy is legitimate? These criteria have been analysed 
by Scharpf (1999, 7), who, based on Easton (1965, 199ff.), divides democratic legitimation 
into output legitimacy - the effectiveness of policy outcomes for the people - and input 
legitimacy - the responsiveness to citizen concerns as a result of participation by the people. 
Schmidt (2013) has added throughput legitimacy, which is judged in terms of the efficacy, 
accountability and transparency of governance processes along with their inclusiveness and 
openness to consultation with the people. Why does all this matter for my dissertation? It 
matters because this research shows that democracy is a multidimensional and multifaceted 
concept that researchers approach from different angles, and I argue that we should expect 
citizens to do the same. If researchers can make out differences between democratic models, 
and between sources of democratic legitimacy, they should matter for citizens, too. If we want 
to understand their attitudes towards democratic institutions and processes and their ideas 
about democratic legitimacy, we need to find out first how they conceive of democracy. 
Dimensions of democracy in citizens' attitudes 
Democracy should thus be treated as multidimensional also in citizens' attitudes. In order to 
analyse it in that way, data is needed that covers both different dimensions of democracy and 
different dimensions of support, as introduced in Section 2. Survey data which differentiates 
between types of support, and types of democracy, is not very common, but can be found in 
the 2012 round of the European Social Survey (ESS 2012). This dataset, accordingly, will 
build the main data source of my dissertation. On top of the traditional satisfaction with 
democracy indicator (SWD), it covers two other types of support along a wide range of 




from democracy in general. They all start with the wording: "And now thinking about 
democracy in general: How important do you think it is for a democracy…", followed by a 
democratic attribute such as "…that national elections are free and fair?”, and can be 
answered on a scale from 0 (not important at all) to 10 (very important). In total, there are 15 
items on different democratic characteristics8, ranging from input criteria such as the voting 
system to output criteria such as social policies (see Table 1).  




  “Please tell me how important you think it is for democracy in 
general that…” (Scale 0-10) 
1 Free and fair elections …that national elections are free and fair?  
2 Deliberation ...that voters discuss politics with people they know before 
deciding how to vote?  
3 Party alternatives: ...that different political parties offer clear alternatives to one 
another?  
4 Freedom of the opposition ...that opposition parties are free to criticize the government?  
5 Freedom of the press …that the media are free to criticize the government?  
6 Transparency: Media 
information function 
...that the media provide citizens with reliable information to 
judge the government?  
7 Minority rights ...that the rights of minority groups are protected?  
8 Direct participation: 
Referenda 
...that citizens have the final say on the most important political 
issues by voting on them directly in referendums?  
9 Inclusiveness of 
participation 
....that immigrants only get the right to vote in national elections 
once they become citizens?  
10 Rule of law ...that the courts treat everyone the same?  
11 Horizontal accountability ...that the courts are able to stop the government acting beyond 
its authority?  
12 Retrospective 
accountability (vertical) 
...that governing parties are punished in elections when they 
have done a bad job?  
13 Protection against 
poverty 
...that the government protects all citizens against poverty?  
14 Transparency of the 
government 
...that the government explains its decisions to voters?  
15 Equality: Redistribution ...that the government takes measures to reduce differences in 
income levels?  
Doing separate analyses for all these items would be possible, but also rather complex, 
especially if country-level variables are included as well. Furthermore, several items refer to 
similar functions of democracy (such as freedom, transparency, or accountability); hence, 
assuming that they can be reduced to common factors is evident. As mentioned before, the 
idea that democracy is multidimensional has been established both normatively and 
empirically. While I could use these established concepts of democracy to structure my 
                                                 
8The original questionnaire has another item referring to multilevel accountability, hence democracy on the 
supranational level, which I do not take into consideration as I only analyse national democracy. 




analysis, I am interested in the way citizens' reason about and make sense of democracy, and 
not in theoretical approaches. Therefore, I begin with identifying empirical dimensions of 
democracy on the level of citizens’ attitudes first, and try to understand their way of 
associating democratic attributes. As the question how individuals conceptualize democracy is 
theoretically and empirically barely explored, I base my analysis on an exploratory factor 
analysis. The goal of this analysis is to include the biggest possible subset of items in as little 
dimensions of democracy as possible - based on the data, and not on theoretical notions. I use 
the items measuring citizens' expectations from democracy (and not the ones referring to their 
evaluations), for two reasons: First of all, as explained previously in section 2, I suppose that 
citizens first form their ideas about how a democracy should be like, and then evaluate 
existing democracies based on these criteria. And secondly, from a more practical perspective, 
the items for expectations appear first in the questionnaire, implying that they give a more 
unbiased picture of citizens’ beliefs.  
Another option to uncover the structure of the same set of ESS 2012 items, as proposed by 
Kriesi, Saris, and Moncagatta (2016, 68), is a Mokken scaling analysis, assuming the items to 
have a hierarchical order. This approach has some shortcomings: First of all, Kriesi et al. pre-
select dimensions of democracy in which they test their scales based on theoretical 
considerations (liberal democracy, electoral democracy, social justice, and direct democracy), 
without knowing whether these dimensions also correspond to citizens' attitudes. Further, the 
scaling approach requires a dichotomized indicator, so that the authors recode all items into 
10=1, and 0-9=0 (ibid., 67). This approach, which seems to be based on the empirical fact that 
the support for all expectations items is very high, creates an unnatural dichotomy for which 
the indicators were not created, and could lead to blown-up differences between citizens. 
Lastly, the authors only show the aggregate results and do not report whether the scaling 
hierarchy is different across individual countries, but mention that there are only minor 
violations of scalability. Given that the aggregate model shows only very small differences 
between items' positions in the hierarchy (ibid., 73), I would assume that these positions are 
different across countries, making the use of an aggregate model problematic. In sum, this 
makes a factor analytical approach which does not rescale any items, or make previous 
assumptions about dimensions, a more appropriate way to understand the ESS 2012 items. 
My sample, as described before, consists of 26 European democracies. Given that these 
countries are quite different in their democratic, social, and economic performance, one could 
expect that the structure of their citizens' orientations towards democracy may differ as well. 




the 15 initial items, I exclude two for practical reasons.10 The 13 remaining items build two 
factors that have Eigenvalues higher than 1.11 As this solution still includes several items with 
rather low factor loadings, I then proceeded to exclude them one by one, to refine the factor 
solution. In steps, I exclude six items: Three of them (deliberation, minority rights, and rule of 
law) load on the first factor, but not strong enough (below 0.3). Government transparency 
loads on the second factor, but again not strongly. Two items, direct participation and vertical 
accountability, have low loadings on both factors. This results in a clear seven-item solution 
with loadings of above 0.35 for all items. Table 2 shows the pooled solution over all 
countries. While this solution only shows aggregate results that could hide country-level 
variance, I use it to illustrate the factor compositions, which are the same in each individual 
country.12 
Table 2: Principal component analysis, factors and factor loadings, pooled solution over all 
countries, reduced set of items. 
 
Variable Factor 1: Liberal Factor 2: Social 
Elections free and fair 0.4042 0.0498 
Party alternatives 0.3643 0.0683 
Opposition free 0.5153 -0.0869 
Media free 0.4964 -0.0813 
Transparency media 0.4082 0.0815 
Protection poverty -0.0131 0.6113 
Redistribution -0.0772 0.624 
Eigenvalue 3.98413 1.30181 
% Variance 39.05 27.02 
Notes: Varimax rotation. N=47956, Eigenvalues>1. Data source: European Social Survey (ESS 2012). 
Weighted with ESS post-stratification and population size weights.  
The two resulting factors are substantially interpretable and in line with existing arguments 
about dimensions of democracy, which often rely on a juxtaposition of a liberal and a social 
model of democracy (Fuchs and Roller 2006): Factor one includes typical dimensions of 
liberal democracy - fair elections, political freedom, party alternatives, transparency, and 
factor two assembles the items referring to the social components of democracy: Protection 
                                                 
10They only appear in the item list of expectations but not in the list of evaluations (inclusiveness of participation 
and horizontal accountability). 
11For a plot showing all Eigenvalues of the factor solution, see Figure 9 in the appendix. A possible third factor 
would only have split up factor 1, and has an Eigenvalue of just below 1. 
12For the pooled solution with the full set of items, see Table 6 in the appendix. For the same table with Promax 
(oblique) rotation, see Table 7 in the appendix. As the different rotation methods change the results only 





against poverty and redistribution. The two factors also correspond to Scharpfs (1999) and 
Schmidts (2013) concept of input, throughput, and output legitimacy: Input and throughput 
figure in the liberal dimension, and output in the social dimension. Another interpretation 
would be to see the liberal dimension as procedural democracy and the social dimension as 
democratic performance, or substantial democracy. But what about the items that were 
excluded during the factor analysis? Substantially, most of them fit in a liberal rather than a 
social model, and most of them also loaded rather on factor 1 - this applies to deliberation, 
minority rights, and the rule of law. Government transparency loaded slightly more strongly 
on social democracy, but substantially fits rather with the other transparency items in factor 
one. Generally, none of them represents a different dimension of democracy theoretically, or a 
different factor empirically, which justifies to not use them further in the analysis. From the 
two items that did not load clearly on any of the two factors, vertical accountability, again, is 
substantially part of liberal democracy, which already has an election and competition 
component, making its exclusion justifiable, too. The only item which actually represents a 
different democratic dimension, but got excluded because it did not make for an own actor 
empirically, is direct participation. 
Looking at the separate solutions for each country (Table 3), we can see that they show a very 
consistent structure also across countries. Each of the 26 countries has two factors composed 
of the same items as in the aggregate solution. The explained variance reaches a minimum of 
0.51, and a maximum of 0.75, which means that this solution explains between half and 75% 
of the variance across countries. Interestingly, the highest explained variance can be found in 
Eastern European, former communist countries such as Hungary, Lithuania and Slovakia. 
This could be interpreted as a sign that citizens of young democracies perceive democracy 
stronger along the contrast between procedural and performance-based democracies, while 
citizens in older democracies have either a more uniform, or an even more multidimensional 
view on democracy. Indeed, a possible third factor (although it never reaches Eigenvalues of 
more than 1) is stronger in established democracies. Factor loadings generally vary between 
0.3 and 0.6 for Factor 1, and between 0.5 and 0.7 for Factor 2. There are a few exceptions 
where factor loadings fall under 0.3 for Factor 1, notably in Germany, Iceland and Sweden. 
These all concern item 3 (the offer of policy alternatives by parties) an item that is part of the 
potential third factor in some established democracies. Yet, given that this factor is not strong 
enough to improve explanatory power in any of these countries, and that this item still loads 




Table 3: Results of principal component analysis in each country separately, Eigenvalues, 


















Albania 1.30 3.98 27 39 66 0.33-0.54 0.52-0.54 
Belgium 5.48 1.61 32 20 52 0.40-0.48 0.61-0.63 
Bulgaria 5.53 1.53 29 22 51 0.35-0.49 0.62-0.63 
Cyprus 4.72 1.30 34 23 57 0.41-0.50 0.53-0.60 
Czech Republic 6.35 1.45 45 24 69 0.39-0.46 0.64-0.69 
Denmark 3.89 1.82 32 23 55 0.42-0.52 0.57-0.62 
Estonia 6.42 1.44 41 27 68 0.39-0.50 0.63-0.64 
Finland 3.57 1.41 33 28 61 0.32-0.56 0.59-0.60 
France 5.24 1.49 38 23 61 0.40-0.48 0.59-0.65 
Germany 4.56 1.75 34 24 58 0.28-0.52 0.61-0.63 
Great Britain 6.03 1.31 37 27 64 0.33-0.52 0.57-0.64 
Hungary 7.21 1.43 43 31 74 0.36-0.52 0.59-0.60 
Iceland 4.58 1.62 34 25 59 0.26-0.51 0.60-0.61 
Ireland 7.09 1.10 40 28 68 0.38-0.51 0.54-0.63 
Italy 5.01 1.61 35 26 61 0.39-0.50 0.60-0.61 
Lithuania 7.77 1.17 43 32 75 0.39-0.54 0.59-0.61 
Netherlands 5.29 1.62 41 22 63 0.38-0.48 0.63-0.67 
Norway 4.43 1.79 36 25 61 0.32-0.50 0.59-0.60 
Poland 4.19 1.39 32 21 53 0.38-0.49 0.63-0.64 
Portugal 1.03 4.02 27 35 62 0.32-0.42 0.45-0.49 
Slovakia 7.06 1.49 42 31 73 0.38-0.50 0.60-0.61 
Slovenia 4.72 1.61 32 27 59 0.32-0.55 0.58-0.60 
Spain 1.43 5.72 28 30 58 0.34-0.59 0.52-0.56 
Sweden 4.49 1.75 36 24 60 0.26-0.52 0.61-0.62 
Switzerland 4.44 1.60 31 25 56 0.43-0.51 0.58-0.60 
Ukraine 1.48 6.22 31 34 65 0.31-0.61 0.55-0.57 
Notes: Varimax rotation. Eigenvalues >1. N(total)=47956. Data source: European Social Survey (ESS 2012). 
Weighted with ESS post-stratification weight. 
To finalize the analysis, I also conducted a confirmatory factor analysis for the full model 
(including all 13 items) as well as the reduced one in each country, to understand how well 
they fit the data. The two-factor model with all 13 items shows an RMSEA between 0.058 
and 0.072, which could not be improved by including further covariates. The reduced model, 
which includes only 7 items, brought a better fit (RMSEA between 0.041 and 0.056, and 




Table 4: Confirmatory factor analysis, goodness of fit statistics across countries. 
 
Fit Indexes 
(ranges across countries) 




(df)  2756.1***-3943.3*** 1789.2***-2128.8*** 
RMSEA 0.058 -0.072 0.041-0.056 
CFI 0.976-0.988 0.985-0.991 
TLI 0.962-0.969 0.970-0.975 
CD 0.961-0.971 0.981-0.989 
Notes: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. N(countries)=26, N(total)=47956. Data source: European Social Survey 
(ESS 2012). Weighted with ESS post-stratification weight. 
Given that the reduced two-factor model seems to fit the data best, I continue the analysis 
with this solution. I proceed by forming additive indices for the two factors, which express the 
mean of all five (respectively two) items for each respondent, measuring individual support 
for liberal and social democracy on a scale from 0 to 1013.  
A two-dimensional space of democratic support  
What does this mean substantially? The resulting factors - liberal, procedural democracy and 
social, performance-based democracy - are two dimensions which structure citizens' 
democratic support. I assume, in other words, that individuals vary in their ideas of a 'good' 
democracy, and that this variance can be captured on a scale along two dimensions. Not their 
idea of democracy per se is different, but their position in a two-dimensional space of 
democratic ideals. The development of this two-dimensional space with a factor-analytical 
approach allows me to compare citizens' democratic support across countries and to 
generalize my findings. Moreover, the two dimensions also refer to two substantially different 
ways to define democracy: A procedural and a substantial approach. In a liberal version, 
democracy is seen as merely a procedure and social justice rather as a prerequisite for or a 
potential outcome of these procedures. From a substantive perspective, social justice is seen 
as a substantial and intrinsic part of democracy. This finding is in line with scholars such as 
Thomassen (2007, 425ff.), who differentiate between freedom, characterized by individual 
liberties and competition, and (social) equality, characterized by solidarity and collectivism, 
as the main poles of democratic values. As the following chapters will show, the contrast 
                                                 
13Additive indices correlate highly with factors scores, especially when the loadings in each factor are similar. As 
Table 8 in the appendix shows, the correlation for my two factors is above 0.95. Factor scores are standardized 
weighted averages, which makes the interpretation difficult, while an additive index can be interpreted easily as 
a respondents' position on a scale (0=lowest possible expectations, 10=highest possible expectations). Based on 




between these two approaches is indeed fundamental if we want to understand how European 
citizens feel about their democracies.  
Figure 7: Dimensions of democracy in citizens' expectations. 
Notes: Expectations from democracy are measured on a scale from 0 to 10. Data source: European Social 
Survey (ESS 2012). Weighted with ESS post-stratification and population size weights. Line=45°. 
Figure 7 illustrate the scale - or space - of democratic support: On the left, we can see how 
citizens place themselves along the liberal democratic and the social democratic dimensions. 
Generally, expectations are high on both dimensions, but even higher for liberal democracy. If 
we look at the 45° line, we can see that some citizens value liberal democracy stronger than 
social democracy and some vice versa. More precisely, 37.45 percent of citizens value liberal 
over social democracy, and show above the 45° line, while 43.53 percent value social 
democracy higher than liberal and show below the line. 19.02 percent actually value both 
dimensions exactly the same. On the right, the aggregates of citizens' expectations per country 
are plotted, showing that also countries vary on the two scales. Some, such as Italy, Spain, 
Portugal, Slovenia and Ukraine, score higher on the social democratic scale than on the liberal 
one. Countries like Denmark, Norway, Czech Republic and the Netherlands on the other hand 
have a more liberal than social focus. In sum, citizens differ in their opinion on what a 
democracy should be like - mostly procedures, mostly substance, or both. The following 
chapters of this dissertation are using the two-dimensional democratic scale, and try to 
understand why citizens differ in their democratic expectations, and what these differences 
mean for their satisfaction with democracy. 
Lastly, as explained previously, from all the items excluded during the factor analysis, the 
item 'direct participation' represents a different model of democracy, but did not load strongly 
on any factor, and was hence excluded during the item reduction process. While all the other 
items that got excluded refer to aspects already covered by the liberal dimension, or at least 




shows the limits of an empirically driven procedure that does not take theoretical 
considerations into account. As direct participation is theoretically interesting though, because 
it refers both to a different type of input legitimacy (Scharpf 1999) and to a different 
democratic model (Vatter 2009), I decided to include it as a unitary item in my analysis to 
complement the two dimensions of democracy.   
The first issue I address in this thesis is the variance of democratic support across countries. 
Chapter Two starts from the question of democratic ideals: What do citizens actually expect 
from a democracy? Or, in other words, how does an ideal democracy look like for citizens? 
Based on the literature on democratic learning (Rohrschneider 1999; Hofferbert and 
Klingemann 1999; Mishler and Rose 2002; Fuchs and Roller 2006), I assume that such 
expectations are contingent upon the country one lives in - democracies, just as other political 
regimes, form their citizens (Rose 2008). I assume that the meaning of democracy, which 
ideas and values are linked to the very term, and which associations someone has in mind 
when hearing the word (for example in a survey) depend on the way citizens are socialized. 
Effects of national socialization on the meaning of political concepts have been established 
for example for left-right placement (Dinas and Northmore-Ball 2016; Dinas 2017). I show 
that regime-specific socialization differs according to democratic history, and affects 
democratic expectations: Citizens of established Western European democracies are more 
likely to have a procedural idea of democracy, where the perceived fairness of rules leads to 
support for democracy independently of its outputs, supporting findings for example by 
Huang, Chang, and Chu (2008) and Rothstein (2009). At the same time, Eastern European 
citizens are still influenced by their Communist socialization, implying that the state, and 
consequentially also democracy, is responsible for providing outputs like social justice, and 
(as we know from other research such as Brender 2007; Bochsler and Hänni 2015) economic 
growth. While differences in political attitudes between citizens in Eastern and Western 
Europe have been established in the literature for quite a while (Mishler and Rose 1997; 
Anderson 1998; Mishler and Rose 2001a; Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2014), I can show for the 
first time that these differences exist on the level of democratic ideals as well, and that 
socialization effects are persistent and do not substantially decrease over time. Supporting 
findings from Sack (2016) about reunited Germany, there is no convergence of values 
between Eastern and Western Europeans, and democratic expectations still differ substantially 
more than 20 years after the fall of the iron curtain. Further, these macro-level effects are 




independent of individual characteristics, and not affected by the length of or age during the 
socialization experience. Accordingly, rather than an interaction between macro and micro 
effects, socialization, in this case, is a direct macro-level phenomenon. 
Additionally, I extend the socialization approach to empirical models of democracy - the way 
democracy is realized in specific countries. Democratic models have found some attention 
when it comes to their impact on satisfaction with democracy, especially amongst winners 
and losers (i.e. Anderson and Guillory 1997; Aarts and Thomassen 2008), but their 
socialization effects on democratic values have not been investigated yet. I show that the term 
'democracy' is linked to different ideas depending on the type of democracy one grew up in: 
Citizens in majoritarian systems believe that democracy means two parties rather than a 
proportionally elected multiparty system, while those socialized in a consociational system 
link democracy to coalition governments. If citizens grow up in a purely representative 
democracy, they believe that democracy means representation, while growing up in a context 
that provides direct democratic institutions makes them more prone to see referenda as an 
essential feature of popular rule. These macro effects actually interact with micro-level 
conditions: Participating in democratic processes makes citizens more likely to orient their 
democratic expectations towards the regime they live in. Individual factors, therefore, 
moderate the macro-level effects, a factor that should be taken into account when analysing 
support for democracy across countries. Consequently, researchers should keep in mind that 
democracy can mean different things to survey respondents, depending on how and where 
they were socialized. 
Secondly, I deal with the question what exactly makes citizens satisfied or dissatisfied. I test 
the model of democratic support presented in Section 2, which defines satisfaction as an 
outcome of expectations and evaluations. Is satisfaction simply the distance between what 
citizens expect and what they (think to) get? Taking into account negative and positive 
distances, Chapter Three shows that satisfaction with democracy is indeed affected by both 
the size and the direction of the distance between expectations and evaluations. I also test 
whether a spatially defined distance is a better measure than the arithmetic gap, and find that 
indeed, distance is a better predictor of satisfaction with democracy. Yet, satisfaction is not 
simply a product of supply and demand matching, but dimensions of democracy matter as 
well: While liberal democratic criteria are a rather generally agreed upon concept amongst 
citizens which cannot be 'too much', democratic input dimensions like direct participation as 
well as output criteria like social justice are more disputed, and lead to dissatisfaction among 




complex than surveys imply: When we ask citizens about their 'satisfaction with the way 
democracy works' in their country, we do not just get a simple, one-dimensional answer that 
reflects the difference between two factors. Rather, dissatisfaction arises from different 
sources: First, through high expectations that are not met by reality. Second, through low 
democratic expectations in general, even when combined with higher evaluations. Finally, 
through living in the 'wrong' type of democracy; one that is too liberal, too social or too direct 
for some of its citizens.  
But why do individuals have such different expectations from and evaluations of their 
democracies? Chapter Two has established that the country-level context plays an important 
role in shaping democratic values, but this cannot explain individual-level differences. In 
Chapter Four, I first address the effects of social status on support for democracy, to then 
understand how it differs across countries. Based on the concept of perceived relative 
deprivation, I find that low-status citizens diverge systematically from higher status citizens: 
The former want democracy to be substantial rather than procedural, and they evaluate their 
own democracy more critically in all dimensions compared to their high-status counterparts. 
Perceived status, interestingly, matters more than objective socio-economic status. As a result, 
citizens who see themselves as losers in society have a substantially higher distance between 
expected and realized democracy, especially in the social dimension, which makes them more 
prone to dissatisfaction with democracy. Why is that the case? Socially dominant groups 
benefit from the status quo: They are more likely to have the (social) capital, influence, and 
knowledge to make their demands and needs heard in a political system, and are thus also 
more satisfied with its outcomes. Socially disadvantaged groups, or at least those that feel 
they are, do not benefit from the mostly liberal democratic status quo, and see democracy 
through the lens of societal losers: As something that does not work in their interest, does not 
take their opinions into account, and does not provide them with just outcomes.  
Taking the macro-level into the equation, I find that social status actually matters most 
strongly in Western European countries. Post-communist countries and countries affected by 
the Eurocrisis, on the other hand, show consistently higher levels of expectations (especial for 
social democracy), and lower levels of evaluations. Hence, while all citizens in Eastern and 
Southern Europe tend to have a more substantial view of democracy, and to be critical of their 
own democratic system, Western European citizens differ more strongly according to their 
status in what they want from a democracy. These findings also prove that taking into account 





What do these finding mean for the state of European democracies according to their citizens? 
There are both good and bad news: On the one hand, liberal democratic procedures show 
stable and high support amongst citizens in all parts of Europe. While Western Europeans 
show more support for liberal principles than their counterparts in former Communist 
countries, levels are generally high everywhere. Liberal democracy, in the sense of electoral 
freedom, competition, and transparency, is clearly universally agreed upon in Europe. At the 
same time, an important insight from this thesis is that democracy is not the same everywhere 
and for everyone - it is a multidimensional concept, in the conception of citizens as much as 
in political theory. Further, perceptions matter: How people 'feel' substantially affects their 
attitudes, and their view on reality. There is no such thing as an objectively good democracy, 
as people are socialized in different ways. They want different things from a democracy, and 
they see different sides of a democracy depending on who they are and where they grew up. 
Democracy, in other words, is not the same thing for each of its citizens. 
As a result, there are also different 'causes' of dissatisfaction - not having enough democracy, 
having the wrong type of democracy, or being unhappy with the outcomes it provides. Some, 
and as Chapter Four shows, especially citizens in the East and the South of Europe, evaluate 
their own democracy critically, and want 'more' democracy in a liberal sense of democratic 
quality. Others want not merely more, but mainly a different type of democracy - more inputs 
or more outputs. This is again especially the case in younger democracies in Eastern Europe, 
and in the crisis-affected Southern Europe. It is also disproportionally the case for those 
Western Europeans who feel marginalized in their society. For these citizens, it is the 
responsiveness that is lacking, not the responsibility. Substantially, this finding also brings us 
back to the distinction between democracy as a procedure and democracy as substance 
introduced in Section 4 of this chapter. Apparently, the two-dimensional space of democracy 
that structures citizens' attitudes is also relevant in explaining dissatisfaction: While the 
importance of democratic procedures is not challenged by most citizens and a perceived lack 
of procedural quality leads to dissatisfaction, the same is true for a perceived lack of 
substance. While one can argue theoretically whether substantial claims for social justice 
apart from procedural justice are part of democracy, empirically, many citizens do believe so, 
and citizens perceive that social inequality, and the states unwillingness (or inability) to tackle 
it, delegitimizes democracy (cf. Mair 2013).  
  




Figure 8 visualizes the content and structure of this dissertation: Paper One deals with the 
assumption that individual democratic ideals are systematically affected by the political 
system citizens live in; because collective and individual socialization experiences strongly 
shape the criteria we expect a democracy to fulfil. Paper Two then develops and tests a spatial 
model to understand the determinants of satisfaction with democracy in different dimensions 
of democracy, claiming that dissatisfaction is caused by under-, over- and misperformance of 
democracy. Paper Three, lastly, turns to the individual background of citizens by investigating 
how perceived as well as objective socio-economic status affects democratic support. 
Figure 8: Content and structure of the dissertation 
 
Paper 1: The making of democratic citizens: How regime-specific socialization shapes 
Europeans' expectations from democracy 
I start my analysis by asking what democracy actually means to citizens, and where such 
democratic values come from. Popular support is essential for the legitimacy of modern 
democracies, and citizens' views are important to assess the quality of a democratic regime. 
Yet, when analysing support for democracy, researchers tend to assume that 'democracy' is a 
concept that travels across countries. This paper, to the contrary, argues that individual 
democratic ideals are systematically affected by the political system that citizens experience. 




Democracy is thus not the same for every citizen in each context, because collective and 
individual socialization experiences strongly shape the criteria we expect a democracy to 
fulfil. Based on the theoretical and empirical literature on varieties of democracy, I argue that 
individual expectations from democracy differ across countries, and that they are influenced 
by two factors: The democratic history, consisting of age and quality of institutions as well as 
authoritarian legacies, and the prevalent democratic model. Hence, the specific democratic 
context in which a citizen lives matters - due to socialization and democratic learning, 
individuals acquire democratic preferences and value those dimensions more which they 
experience in their own democracy. Using individual-level data from the European Social 
Survey (ESS) as well as country-level data from the Democracy Barometer, I test how the 
national democratic context in 26 European democracies influences these individual 
democratic ideals. Indeed, I find evidence for both socialization and participation effects of 
the democratic context on citizens’ democratic ideals. 
Paper 2: Do citizens want too much? A spatial model approach to support for democracy 
In the next paper, I deal with the individual-level relationship of the different attitudes 
underlying democratic support. Satisfaction with democracy (SWD) is a commonly used 
indicator in political opinion research, and its determinants have been analysed extensively in 
the literature. But what does dissatisfaction with democracy substantially mean? This paper 
wants to understand if satisfaction is actually a coherent consequence of citizens considering 
democratic supply and demand. It departs from the simple idea that satisfaction equals the 
distance between what 'should be' and what 'is'; between democratic expectations and 
democratic reality. I capture this idea in a spatial model of democratic support, where the size 
and direction of the distance between citizens' expectations from and evaluations of 
democracy determines their levels of satisfaction. To test this model, I use data for 26 
countries from the European Social Survey 6. Taking into account both expectation-surplus 
and evaluations-surplus distances, I find that satisfaction is indeed affected by both the size 
and the direction of the distance between expectations and evaluations. Yet, satisfaction with 
democracy is not simply a product of supply matching demand. Dimensions of democracy 
matter as well: While liberal criteria of democratic quality are a generally agreed upon 
concept amongst citizens, democratic input dimensions like direct participation as well as 
output criteria like social justice are more disputed, and create dissatisfaction amongst those 
who want more of them as well as those that want less. Democracy, in other words, cannot 




Paper 3: Why perceived deprivation matters: Socio-economic background and support for 
democracy 
In the third paper of my dissertation, I pay a closer look to individual-level determinants of 
democratic support. Why do losers like democracy less than winners? The fact that social 
status has an impact on satisfaction with democracy is, while empirically established, often 
overlooked in the literature. This paper analyses the effects of subjective and objective social 
status on citizens' expectations from democracy and evaluations democracy. I argue that 
relative deprivation, defined as the notion of being left behind in society and disadvantaged by 
social inequality, systematically affects the way citizens judge their own democracy: The 
lower their status, the more they support substantive over procedural democracy, and the more 
critical they see their own democracies. Using data for 26 countries from the European Social 
Survey 6, I test whether citizens’ attitudes towards democracy are affected by perceived 
deprivation as well as objective socio-economic status. Results show that a low status leads 
citizens to value democratic dimensions differently - they prefer social justice over liberal 
criteria. Additionally, low status citizens also evaluate the performance of their own 
democratic system in all dimensions significantly more critical than their higher status 
counterparts. These two effects combined create a bigger 'distance' between low-status 
citizens' expectations and evaluations, especially in the social dimension, causing them to be 
more prone to democratic dissatisfaction. I further find differences across countries: Citizens 
in former communist countries and countries affected by the Eurocrisis generally have higher 
expectations from democracy, while simultaneously evaluating their own democratic systems 
more negatively. In Western Europe, on the other hand, social status affects citizens' attitudes 
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Table 5: Descriptive statistics and correlations. 
 Notes: N=47956. Data source: European Social Survey (ESS 2012). Weighted with ESS post-stratification and 
population size weights.   
Appendix 
Item Expectations Evaluations Distance (Exp – Ev) Correlation 
Exp*Ev Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Elections 8.949523 1.702014 6.95595 2.959624 1.977608 3.070281 0.2164* 
Deliberation 7.419647 2.510764 6.480478 2.519164 .9480088 3.113696 0.2236* 
Alt. Parties 7.968063 2.131868 5.521686 2.592031 2.439566 3.221178 0.0722* 
Opposition free 8.284824 2.07081 7.366821 2.493478 .9116504 2.757665 0.2751* 
Media free 8.228963 2.166624 7.227161 2.61433 .9961322 3.012013 0.2133* 
Transp. Media 8.733631 1.830343 5.895409 2.564048 2.832973 2.959166 0.1208* 
Minority rights 8.310089 2.100685 6.173339 2.682609 2.149264 3.227654 0.0898* 
Direct participation 8.267416 2.058519 4.875933 3.159092 3.369363 3.593515 0.0962* 
Inclusive participat. 7.874494 2.551331 - - - - - 
Equality of law 9.213778 1.569258 4.87601 3.212638 4.326183 3.517421 0.040 
Horizontal account. 8.773655 1.903972 - - - - - 
Vertical account. 8.379632 2.073795 5.453698 3.115248 2.920189 3.585131 -0.0875* 
Protection poverty 8.683792 1.913726 3.902401 2.937047 4.773775 3.639998 -0.0023 
Trans. government 8.835507 1.703983 4.592632 2.821769 4.232424 3.294763 -0.1423* 




Table 6: Principal component analysis, factors and factor loadings, pooled solution over all 
countries, complete set of items.  
 
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 
Elections free and fair 0.3547 -0.0019 
Deliberation 0.305 -0.0585 
Party alternatives 0.3408 -0.0185 
Opposition free 0.4749 -0.1498 
Media free 0.4466 -0.1325 
Transparency media 0.3377 0.0479 
Minority rights 0.2611 0.0826 
Direct participation 0.1941 0.2669 
Equality before the law 0.2483 0.1319 
Vertical accountability 0.1779 0.1923 
Protection poverty -0.1115 0.5461 
Transparency Government 0.0398 0.3087 
Redistribution -0.1639 0.5456 
Eigenvalue 5.84351 1.36334 
% Variance 29.88 21.52 
Notes: Varimax rotation. N=47956, Eigenvalues>1. Data source: European Social Survey (ESS 2012). 
Weighted with ESS post-stratification and population size weights. 
 
Figure 9: Screeplot of Eigenvalues after PCA, pooled solution over all countries, complete set 
of items (Full PCA see Table 6). 
 
 





Table 7: Principal component analysis, aggregate solution over all countries, complete set of 
items (Promax rotation). 
 
Variable Factor 1: Liberal Factor 2: Social 
Elections free and fair 0.3547 -0.0019 
Deliberation 0.305 -0.0585 
Party alternatives 0.3408 -0.0185 
Opposition free 0.4749 -0.1498 
Media free 0.4466 -0.1325 
Transparency media 0.3377 0.0479 
Minority rights 0.2611 0.0826 
Direct participation 0.1941 0.2669 
Equality before the law 0.1683 0.1319 
Vertical accountability 0.1779 0.1923 
Protection poverty -0.1115 0.5461 
Transparency Government 0.0398 0.4087 
Redistribution -0.1639 0.5456 
Eigenvalue 5.84351 1.36334 
% Variance 29.88 21.52 
Notes: Promax rotation. N=47956, Eigenvalues>1. Data source: European Social Survey (ESS 2012). Weighted 
with ESS post-stratification and population size weights. 
 
 
Table 8: Correlations between factor scores and additive indices. 
 
 Additive indices  
Factor scores Liberal democracy Social democracy 
Liberal democracy  0.9609* 0.4056* 
Social democracy 0.5401* 0.9618* 
Notes: N=47956. Factor scores calculated for each country individually after PCA, see Table 3. Data source: 










Chapter Two: The making of democratic citizens: How regime-specific 











Popular support is essential for the legitimacy of modern democracies, and citizens' views are 
important to assess the quality of a democratic regime. Yet, when analysing support for 
democracy, researchers tend to assume that 'democracy' is a concept that travels across 
countries. This paper, to the contrary, argues that individual democratic ideals are 
systematically affected by the political regime that citizens experience. Democracy is thus not 
the same for every citizen in each context, because collective and individual socialization 
experiences strongly shape the criteria we expect a democracy to fulfil. Based on the 
theoretical and empirical literature on varieties of democracy, I suppose that individual 
expectations from democracy differ across countries, and that they are influenced by two 
regime-specific factors: The democratic history, consisting of age and quality of institutions 
as well as authoritarian legacies, and the prevalent democratic model. Hence, the specific 
democratic context in which a citizen lives matters - due to socialization and democratic 
learning, individuals acquire democratic preferences and value those dimensions more which 
they experience in their own democracy. Using individual-level data from the European 
Social Survey (ESS) as well as country-level data from the Democracy Barometer, I test how 
the national democratic context in 26 European democracies influences these individual 
democratic ideals. Indeed, I find evidence for both socialization and participation effects of 




Democracy is not a simple thing to define: Collier and Levitsky (1997, 431) speak of the 
"hundreds of adjectives of democracy" to refer to the attempts of scholars to classify and 
identify diverse forms and subtypes of democracy. According to the Sydney Democracy 
Network and their database entitled "The many names of democracy", there are actually no 
less than 2'234 expressions of democracy in 2017 - from "Accountable democracy" to 
"Zionist democracy".1 But when researchers analyse if citizens are satisfied with “the way 
democracy works” in their country, or whether they support specific democratic institutions, 
they implicitly suppose that democracy means the same for individuals all over the world. 
This is a problematic assumption, given the many meanings, ideas and dimensions democracy 
can hold. In this paper, I argue that in order to be able to analyse support for democracy in a 
meaningful way, we need to take a step back and ask what democracy actually means to 
citizens, what they expect from a democracy, and how such expectations are formed. I 
propose that democracy is not the same for every citizen, but that collective and individual 
socialization experiences strongly shape the criteria they expect a democracy to fulfil. 
When it comes to explaining country-level differences in citizens' support for democracy, the 
literature is quiet broad (i.e. Anderson 1998; Mishler and Rose 1996; Oskarsson 2010; 
Anderson and Guillory 1997). Yet, rather little evidence is available that could answer the 
question what ordinary citizens think democracy is and what it should be about. Several 
studies imply that most people, even in authoritarian countries, identify democracy in terms of 
political rights such as freedom and civil liberties (Dalton, Shin, and Jou 2007; Huang, Chang, 
and Chu 2008). Cho (2014) even finds that the better citizens are able to conceptualise and 
understand democracy, the more they support it. But apart from that, no systematic analysis of 
citizens' expectations from democracy is available. Hence, although there is a large body of 
research on the political cultures of Western democracies, “little is known about what 
democracy actually means to average citizens […] or the relevance of these beliefs for 
understanding how satisfied people are with the operation of democracy in their country" 
(Kornberg and Clarke 1994, 557). In the light of this theoretical and empirical gap, research 
about citizens’ support for democracy is potentially misleading (cf. Canache 2012, 1150), 
given that it is based on the assumption that democracy is a clearly defined and thus 
internationally comparable notion. If we want to know more about the factors that explain 
individual support for democracy, we need to consider citizens' definitions of and 






expectations from democracy first. Otherwise it might well be that we measure different 
things across countries and across individuals when we try to capture support for democracy.  
In this paper, I contribute to the theory-building and the empirical knowledge in this under-
researched area by exploring what citizens expect from a democracy, and why they do so. 
Expectations from democracy, as explained in Chapter One, are defined as the normative idea 
of how a democracy in general should work, and what it should deliver. I suppose that every 
citizen - in a more or less precise way - has a picture in mind of how a good democracy 
should look like. In other words, citizens expect a democracy to fulfil specific criteria. Based 
on socialization and democratic learning theories, I then argue that these individual 
expectations from democracy are influenced by the democratic regime that citizens 
experience: First, the democratic history of a country, referring to the age and quality of its 
institutions as well as its authoritarian legacies. Second, the democratic model, designating the 
way democracy is realized in a specific country - referring to the literature on 'varieties' or 
'models' of democracy, I suppose that each country implements democracy in a different way 
by emphasizing some principles more than others. Democracies influence their citizens in 
distinctive ways - through regime-specific socialization, citizens interiorize those 
(democratic) principles they are exposed to, developing their democratic expectations 
accordingly. Democracy, thus, is a different ideal for each citizen depending on socialization 
experiences made during their lifetime. Using individual-level data from the European Social 
Survey Round 6 as well as country-level data from the Democracy Barometer, I test if and 
how citizens’ expectations are influenced by the democratic regime in their respective 
country. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In the next section, I discuss the notion of 
democratic regimes. Then, I explain my theoretical model of regime-specific socialization, 
and my hypotheses concerning the impact of democratic regimes on individual expectations. 
Further, I introduce the data and methodology I use to test these hypotheses empirically. 
Subsequently, I present and discuss the results, to then finish with a general conclusion.   
Democracy is not the same as democracy - as explained in Chapter One, political theory 
provides many different approaches of what government of the people, by the people, and for 
the people should mean, and the list of adjectives for democracy is long. This variety of 
democratic definitions is not just a theoretical, but also an empirical matter: Existing modern 
democracies have diverse historical legacies, political cultures and institutional arrangements. 




I assume that such democratic regimes influence citizens' expectations from democracy.  
To start with, European democracies have been democratized in different time periods, and 
following different histories of authoritarian regimes - Huntington (1991, 15ff) speaks of 
"waves of democratization", Dorenspleet (2000, 400) of "steps of democratization". 'Old' 
democracies such as Switzerland or the United Kingdom democratized in the early 'first wave' 
during the 19th century, and many other Western countries followed in the early 20th century. 
The end of World War Two brought democracy to countries like Germany and Italy, the 
1970ies to former military dictatorships in Southern European countries, and the end of the 
Soviet Union 1990 to Eastern Europe. The trajectories of democratization as well as the 
resulting democratic institutions, their strength and consolidation are the topic of an extensive 
literature (for example Diamond 1999; Przeworski et al. 2000; O'Donnell and Schmitter 
2013). Some of this literature focuses on what has been labelled "attitudinal consolidation of 
democracy" (Linz and Stepan 1996, 6ff): The development of democratic values amongst 
citizens of newly democratized, post-authoritarian countries. Within Europe, this literature has 
focused mainly on former communist countries, which show different democratic dynamics 
than their older democratic counterparts in Western Europe (Mishler and Rose 2002; Rose 
2008). But also communist legacies are not necessarily the same across countries: Kitschelt et 
al. (1999, 39) claim that the historical legacies of communist regimes have shaped the post-
communist democratic politics of these states. They argue that communist regimes differed 
largely in their bureaucratic apparatus as well as their strategies of repression and co-optation, 
leading to different institutional settings after their transition. Further, Southern European 
countries like Spain, Greece and Portugal share a different history of military dictatorships, 
which shapes their democratic cultures and has been shown to affect the citizens' attitudes 
(Dinas and Northmore-Ball 2016; Dinas 2017). In sum, authoritarian legacies, even decades 
after democratization, still matter for European citizens. 
How can we assess differences between democratic regimes, apart from measuring how long 
they have been democracies? Since the end of the third wave of democratization and with the 
realization that even when they are not autocratic anymore, not all democracies are the same, 
the literature on the quality of democracy (Altman and Pérez-Liñán 2002; Morlino 2004; 
Diamond and Morlino 2005) has tried to define what makes a democracy 'good' - the 
fulfilment of factors such as rule of law, accountability, responsiveness and freedom. The 
Democracy Barometer, based on the concept of “embedded democracy” (Merkel 2004), 
understands good democracy is as a combination of liberal and participatory elements which 




this approach, existing democracies can be ranked based on the quality of their institutions: 
Some of them fulfil liberal democratic principles better than others. But while democratic 
quality can be a useful tool to determine how well a country has realized central democratic 
principles, democracy is not just a unidimensional concept simply ranging from democratic to 
non-democratic.  
The literature on varieties of democracy assumes that established democracies also diverge in 
the way they realize democratic principles. Although they are all democratic, they have 
implemented different principles through formal institutional arrangements and informal 
practices and procedures. As Bochsler and Kriesi have put it, “they are all variations on a 
general theme” (2013, 69). Democracy consists of several dimensions, and existing 
democracies emphasize these dimensions differently. They approach the ‘general theme’, 
democracy, in different ways. The most famous typology of existing democracies is Lijphart's 
(1984, 1999) "patterns of democracy". He suggests that the variety of formal and informal 
democratic institutions and rules can eventually be reduced to a two-dimensional pattern 
based on the distinction between majoritarian and consensus-oriented forms of government. 
According to him, the majoritarian-consensual democratic space (measured on a vertical 
dimension between executive and legislative as well as on a horizontal dimension in form of 
federalism or unitarism) accounts for most of the variance among established democracies. 
This distinction also seems to play a role for citizens’ attitudes: As Anderson and Guillory 
(1997) as well as Anderson et al. (2005, 120ff) have found, living in consensus-oriented 
system attenuates differences between election winners and losers and increases satisfaction 
especially amongst losers. Although Lijpharts two-dimensional map has been criticized from 
many sides, it remains the most influential typology of modern democracies (Vatter 2009, 
126). Authors such as Hendriks (2010, 26ff) have argued that to improve Lijphart's typology, 
the distinction between direct and representative democracies should be added, including the 
role and power of citizens to act as veto players (Hug and Tsebelis 2002). Vatter (2009) 
linked Lijpharts dimensions both theoretically and empirically to the direct-representative 
dimension. The impact of this dimension on citizens has been analysed as well: Stadelmann-
Steffen and Vatter (2012) find a positive effect of using direct democratic institutions on 
satisfaction with democracy in general, and Bernauer and Vatter (2012) identify a negative 





After establishing that democratic regimes in Europe differ according to their democratic 
history, democratic quality and institutional setup, this section establishes why these 
differences also matter for citizens' expectations from democracy. Expectations from 
democracy, as defined in Chapter One, refer to the normative ideal of how a democracy in 
general should be like and which criteria it should fulfil, and are part of my concept of support 
for democracy. As described in that chapter, several authors who have analysed democratic 
expectations have found that these normative ideals differ across citizens (Schedler and 
Sarsfield 2007; Ferrín and Kriesi 2016b; Wessels 2016). I want to find out if democratic 
regimes on the country-level are linked to citizens' democratic expectations on the individual 
level, and can explain some of this variance. I consider two factors: First, the democratic 
history of a country, referring to the democratic quality, age of the democratic regime, and 
authoritarian past; and second the democratic model, designating the way democracy is 
realized in a specific country. 
In other words, I assume that there is interdependence between macro-level structures - the 
democratic regime - and individual attitudes. The idea of political structures interacting with 
individual behaviour has been present in the literature since the 1980s and 1990s (Anderson 
2007, 591). Already in the 1960s, Almond and Verba (1963) assumed that a "civic culture" 
contributes to the stability of democratic regimes, and in a later version (ibid. 1980, 29) 
specified that political culture should be treated as both a dependent and an independent 
variable that interacts with the political structure. Anderson et al. (2005, 139) argue that 
citizens "form attitudes about politics in systemic contexts whose institutional structures 
mediate preferences and define the choices that are available". They find that historical 
trajectories (ibid., 109) as well variance in democratic institutions (ibid., 122) matter for the 
way citizens experience democratic politics, and, in consequence, their attitudes toward 
democracy. This approach mostly presupposes that macro-contexts are exogenous and 
political behaviour the dependent variable - an assumption that, while considered "safe under 
many conditions" (Anderson 2007, 605), can still be put into question. One could also argue 
that citizens' preferences affect the political culture and regime, and those structures are not 
exogenous. I this paper, I find a macro-micro approach adequate for several reasons: First of 
all, while in younger democracies in Eastern and Southern Europe, citizens could actually 
have had an impact on the design of their country's democracy, this is not the case for long-
lasting liberal democracies with century-old democratic models such as Switzerland and the 




UK, where all the citizens in my sample have been born and raised in the same democratic 
system, making for a certain stability of context factors. The same holds true for authoritarian 
legacies, which are exogenous to the extent that few people in my sample predate those 
authoritarian regimes. And secondly, as Anderson (2007, 601) has argued, treating context-
level factors as not only direct, but also as contingent (moderating or interaction) effects can 
produce valid and novel insights. This is what I will do in this analysis - understanding the 
direct and indirect effects of context on behaviour. 
Learning democracy 
Citizens 'learn' democracy through socialization - that is, living under a democratic regime 
and adapting its values due to 'passive' exposure to the regime principles (Rohrschneider 
1999; Mishler and Rose 2002). More generally, social constructivist approaches in sociology 
assume that individual norms and values are generated in a process of social experiences and 
interactions (Berger and Luckmann 1966, 43ff.). Such processes can occur in micro-contexts 
such as families, schools or peer-groups as well as in macro-contexts - in a society or culture 
as a whole. As Fuchs (1999, 125) puts it, “ideas about what a democracy is and how it should 
look […] are instilled by primary and secondary socialization processes.” Whereas micro-
level socialization can lead to differing values among individuals of the same society, 
depending for example on their gender, class and education (Almond and Verba 1963, 380ff), 
macro-level socialization should have similar effects on all the members of a society or 
cultural sphere: “Everyone socialized into a culture is exposed to the same set of values 
supporting the regime and its basic rules of the game” (Mishler and Rose 2002, 7). Hence, 
democratic values are, at least partly, created through regime-specific socialization. This 
approach of system-internal learning (Rohrschneider 1999) assumes that value orientations 
towards democracy and civic virtues are transmitted through the institutional design of the 
political regime one lives in, as the practice of specific behaviour which is connected to 
specific values eventually causes an internalization of those fundamental values. 
Democratic history 
From the literature on the democratic culture in young democracies (Fuchs 1999; Mishler and 
Rose 1996; Fuchs and Roller 2006), we know that exposure to a democratic regime has an 
impact on individual attitudes towards democracy: The longer citizens have lived in a 
(functioning) liberal democracy, the higher their support for liberal democratic principles 
tends to be. Established democracies ideally dispose of a procedural legitimacy, where the 




2009). Over time, democracies build up a "reservoir of favourable attitudes or good will that 
helps members to tolerate or accept outputs to which they are opposed" (Easton 1965, 273), a 
diffuse support for democracy that is less affected by specific performance and political 
outputs. In younger democracies, on the other hand, support for democracy is more likely 
based on the output which democracy creates for its citizens, and rules and procedures are less 
crucial (Huang, Chang, and Chu 2008). Bochsler and Hänni (2015, 7) argue that there is a 
"life cycle effect" of the age of democratic regimes on the type of support of its citizens: The 
transition from performance-based support to procedural support for democracy is a matter of 
democratic experience, where new democracies first needs to build procedural support 
amongst its citizens. In a similar vein, Anderson et al. (2005, 90ff.) have argued that citizens 
of new democracies need to learn that the procedures can be trusted before they can accept to 
'lose' in elections. Further, in countries democratized in the 'third wave' starting in the 1970s 
(Huntington 1991) the concept of democracy was often linked to the idea of economic 
reforms and development in order to catch up with Western Europe and North America. This 
connection between economic wellbeing and democracy, according to Bochsler and Hänni 
(2015), led citizens of third wave countries to see political rights and better economic life 
conditions as two sides of the same medal, leading to a more performance-based support for 
democracy.  
More specifically, post-communist countries have been proven to have a long-lasting impact 
on the democratic attitudes of their citizens: Evidence from Germany shows that citizens in 
the former Eastern Germany, contrary to Western Germans, prefer socialist ideas of 
democracy over liberal principles (Sack 2016). While in the West an understanding of 
democracy near to the liberal model of democracy dominates, in the East the dominating 
understanding of democracy is one that corresponds to the socialist model of democracy. 
Other authors could confirm this result for additional post-communist states (Fuchs and Roller 
2006; Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2014). Hence, differences in democratic norms between 
Western Europe and former socialist regimes in a great part can be explained by diverging 
socialization experiences in these regimes (Fuchs 1999). Such differences in democratic 
values are attributed to the varying socialization in the former West and the former East, with 
socialization experiences in the latter being focused on socialist over liberal societal ideals: 
Communist socialization relies on notions of societal unity and solidarity, a penetration of the 
state into society and central role of the state in the economy (Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2014). 
Consequently, communist regimes gained their legitimacy mostly from policy outputs, in 




(2015) argue that even after transition to democracy, citizens will use these experiences under 
authoritarian regimes as a benchmark for the evaluation of the democratic regimes, so that 
citizens in post-communist democracies will expect their state to provide for social welfare.  
When it comes to the democratic history in a country, we can thus assume that exposure to 
liberal democratic institutions should enhance support for procedural democratic principles. 
On the other hand we can expect citizens of post-authoritarian democracies to have rather 
performance and output-based expectations from democracy. These effects are very likely to 
be dependent on the length of exposure to a specific regime, which goes along with stronger 
socialization effects: The durability of a democratic regime should have positive effects on a 
citizens' support for procedural democratic principles, while the length of exposure to 
authoritarianism should increase support for performance-based democracy amongst citizens. 
This leads to hypotheses H1 and H2: 
H1: Exposure to liberal democratic regimes leads to higher support for procedural 
democratic principles among citizens: The longer the exposure and the more developed the 
democracy, the stronger the effect. 
H2: Exposure to authoritarian regimes leads to higher support for performance-based 
aspects of democracy among citizens: The longer the exposure, the stronger the effect.  
Democratic models 
Further, as explained previously, democracies differ not only in their regime history, but also 
in the way they decided to realize democratic principles. Based on Lijphart (1999) and Vatter 
(2007), I use the two main types of democracy, which are majoritarian vs. consensual and 
direct vs. representative democracies. I assume that growing up in a specific democratic 
model also leads to favourable attitudes towards these aspects of democracy. Be it via the 
media, through formal education or in interaction with other citizens, the way democracy is 
realized in a specific country will have an impact on individual conceptions of democracy. 
Such a macro-micro effect can also be caused by the mere definition of the term democracy: 
In a country with strong direct democratic institutions, speaking about “democracy” will often 
imply direct democracy. Hence, a citizen of such a country might immediately think of direct 
participation when hearing the word democracy. A more specific way of socialization is the 
adaptation of democratic attitudes through active participation in democratic processes: 
Participatory approaches to democracy (Barber 1984; Mansbridge 1999) presume that 
political participation has an educational component. In other words, participation in 




are thus seen as something that is not endogenous to a person, but develops in the course of 
democratic processes. As Quintelier and van Deth (2014) have found, political behaviour 
affects political attitudes, and not (just) vice versa. Their findings indicate that it is much more 
likely that political participation strengthens political attitudes than that attitudes trigger 
participation. Institutionalized social contacts are thus seen as a ‘school of democracy’ where 
people learn and internalize political attitudes (ibid., 156). Hence, the type of democratic 
participation might also affect individual preferences from democracy. In addition to the 
passive socialization effect, there could thus also be a form of active (self)socialization. From 
a social psychology perspective, this means that people change their attitudes and emotions 
based on what they infer from their own (political) behaviour (Quintelier and Hooghe 2012). 
In other words, the democratic regime citizens experience in their political participation will 
have an effect on the democratic values they hold. In this context, we could speak of a 
procedural effect of democratic structures. Hence, citizens who actively participate in 
democratic processes should be more likely to orient their expectations from democracy 
towards the democratic regime that they currently experience. Someone who abstains from 
elections, referenda or other ways of democratic decision-making, on the other hand, is not 
subjected to a procedural effect of democratic participation. When it comes to democratic 
models, the most obvious example would again be direct democracy - someone who 
experiences direct participation in referenda themself might also develop positive attitudes 
towards this form of democracy, more than someone used to representative democratic 
elections. The same also applies for majoritarian and consensus-based democratic systems. 
Similar to the strength of authoritarian socialization being dependent on the length of 
exposure to the regime as described in the previous section, participation affects the strength 
of citizens' socialization into different democratic models. Yet, there is not just one form of 
participation: Traditionally, we distinguish between institutional - electoral - and alternative 
forms of participation, such as demonstrations or petitions. Given that electoral participation 
is very strongly linked to the democratic regime in place, while alternative forms of 
participation are a less institutionalized way of expressing political demands, I would expect 
electoral participation to have a stronger socialization impact. Citizens engaging in non-
electoral forms of participation might be more critical of their government, and have a 
different ideal than the democratic reality they experience. This leads to hypotheses H3 and 
H4: 
H3: Citizens tend to value those democratic principles more that they experience in their own 




H4: Active participation in democratic decision-making reinforces the effect of democratic 
models on citizens' democratic principles: Institutional participation has a stronger effect 
than non-institutional participation.  
Data and operationalization 
In order to analyse the effects of macro-level democratic regimes on individual attitudes 
towards democracy, data on two levels is needed. On the individual level, the European Social 
Survey Round 6 (ESS 2012), as introduced in Chapter One, contains a set of questions about 
citizens' expectations from democracy, and covers almost 50.000 respondents in 26 European 
democracies23. Some examples for these items are: 
“And now thinking about democracy in general rather than about democracy in [country]: 
How important do you think it is for a democracy in general… 
…that national elections are free and fair? 
...that different political parties offer clear alternatives to one another? 
Each question can be answered on an 11-point scale from 0 (not important at all) to 10 (very 
important). These items are used to capture citizens’ expectations from democracy - the 
importance they attribute to specific democratic features. The second data source, covering 
country-level data, is the Democracy Barometer (Merkel et al. 2016). It provides an aggregate 
measure for democratic quality, using more than 100 indicators to capture the fulfilment of 
liberal democratic standards. Further, it also allows to measure differences in the way 
democracies realize these standards in different models. 
Dependent variables: As described in Chapter One, the expectations items can be reduced to 
two substantial factors, or dimensions, of democracy: A liberal factor, defined by free and fair 
elections, political alternative, freedom of the opposition and the media and transparency. 
This factor thus captures procedural aspects of democracy. The other factor, consisting of 
citizens’ expectations concerning the protection against poverty and redistribution, stands for 
democratic output - in this case, social equality. For the two dimensions distinguishing 
democratic models, I use the item on direct participation (“How important do you think it is 
for a democracy that citizens have the final say on the most important political issues by 
                                                 
2Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Ukraine and United Kingdom. 
3Excluding respondents under 18 and non-citizens reduces the sample to just under 45.000. This is necessary 





voting on them directly in referendums?”) for the direct-representative dimension, and the 
item asking for government preferences (“The government in some countries is formed by a 
single party; in other countries by two or more parties in coalition. Which is better?”) to 
capture the majoritarian-consensual dimension.4 
Explanatory variables: For the 26 democracies in my sample, I measure the democratic 
history as well as the democratic models on the country level. Democratic history consists of 
different variables: Democratic quality, first, is measured with the overall score of the 
Democracy Barometer, with values ranging from 0 to 1005. The age of a democracy is 
measured by the years since the country's transition to democracy6.  Further, I code the 
country’s authoritarian past – their non-democratic history, in other words: Former 
authoritarian countries are coded as 1, non-authoritarian countries as 0. In Europe, this 
includes on the one hand former communist countries in Eastern Europe, and on the other 
hand former military dictatorships in Southern Europe. In my sample, 12 out of 26 countries 
have an authoritarian legacy: Albania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Ukraine. Further, Eastern 
Germany is coded as a former authoritarian country as well. Additionally, to account for the 
length of socialization effects, I use years of individual socialization under authoritarian 
regimes. The more time a citizen spent living in an authoritarian regime, the stronger should 
their socialization experience be. Following Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2014, I code exposure to 
authoritarianism into early (# of years between age 6-17 living under authoritarian rule) and 
adult (# of years aged 18 and up spent living under authoritarianism) exposure. For a detailed 
list of countries with an authoritarian past and their respective authoritarian time periods see 
Table 4 in the appendix. 
For the different models of democracy, I use two sets of variables from the Democracy 
Barometer: First of all, Lijpharts (1999: 5) distinction between majoritarian and consensus-
oriented democracies is composed by two dimensions, executives-parties and federal-unitary. 
Given that my dependent variable covers just the executives-parties dimension, I only 
operationalize this dimension. To measure the majoritarian-consensual dimension, I follow 
Bochsler and Kriesi (2013), and use several indicators: Electoral proportionality is measured 
by three variables, the reversed Gallagher Index, the mean district magnitude and the effective 
                                                 
4For a list of all items and their operationalization, see Table 2 and Table 3 in the appendix. 
5For each country, I take the mean of each variable over the time period covered by the Democracy Barometer 
(1990-2014). I use this approach because I want to measure stable institutional structures, as I assume that the 
perceptions and ideas citizens have about democracy are influenced by the experiences they make over a longer 
time period. I further recode them into a 0-10 scale. 




electoral threshold. Further, I use the effective number of parties and the cabinet composition 
(percentage of coalition governments compared to single-party governments). And lastly, I 
use union density to measure integration of interest groups into the political system. All six 
indicators are recoded to an additive index with a theoretical range from 0 to 10, where 10 is 
the most consensus-oriented system.  
To measure the direct-representative dimension, I use three indicators: first, constitutional 
provisions for direct democracy, consisting of one indicators for direct democratic institutions 
and one for participation quora, and second, the number of direct democratic votes per year as 
an indicator of effective use of direct democracy. All three indicators are transformed in an 
additive index ranging from 0 to 10, where 10 is the maximum level of direct democracy. To 
account for socialization into models of democracy, I use interaction effects between the 
country level-democratic model and individual level political participation. Participation is 
measured by two variables: Electoral participation is a dummy variable (1 = voted last 
election7), whereas non-electoral participation is a scale ranging from 0 (no non-electoral 
participation at all) to 7 (participation in seven different forms). 
Control variables. I control for GDP per capita as well as population size on the country 
level8, and for gender, age, education (in years), unemployment, left-right self-placement and 
being born in another country on the individual level. For descriptive statistics and coding of 
all variables see Table 1 in the appendix.  
Analysis 
As I test for the effect of macro-level variables on micro-level attitudes of citizens, I use 
cross-sectional hierarchical models where level-one units are citizens and level-two units are 
countries. Most of my dependent variables - citizens’ expectations from democracy - are 
continuous on a scale from 0 to 109. All data is weighted with the ESS post-stratification and 
population size weight, to make it comparable across population groups and countries. 
In addition, political sophistication is an important factor in determining individual patterns of 
support. For example, Zaller (1992, 43ff), who speaks of "political awareness", argues that 
better-informed people will tap into a more homogeneous set of considerations when 
answering survey questions and therefore will give more consistent answers than will their 
less-informed peers. More sophisticated people should thus generally be more able to state 
                                                 
7Elections refer to the country's legislative assembly; participation in referenda is not included. 
8Source for both: World Development Indicators (World Bank 2017). 
9The standard random-intercept model takes the form: Yij = αij + β1Xij + γi + ɛi. Intercepts (α) vary across 
countries, slopes (β) remain constant. The measure for government size however is a binary outcome variable, 




opinions that are ideologically consistent with their predispositions, they possess more 
political information, and are better able to relate their knowledge and preferences in a 
meaningful way to survey questions (ibid.). This is relevant for my analysis because I expect 
citizens to identify the democratic regime they experience, and to identify those items that 
best reflect their predispositions (for example, procedural or performance-based support). 
More politically sophisticated citizens should, in theory, be better able to do this and, as a 
result, show more consistent patterns of socialization through the democratic regime they 
experience.  The literature generally suggests that factual knowledge about politics is the best 
single indicator of sophistication (Luskin 1987; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1993). However, the 
ESS does not offer any knowledge measures. Authors such as Gabriel and Keil 2013: 167-
169ff) have argued that political interest (as measured in the ESS) differs considerably across 
European countries and can be seen as an adequate proxy for political sophistication. Luskin 
(1990) finds that political interest is strongly correlated with sophistication. Therefore, I also 
use political interest to measure sophistication at the individual level. The individuals are 
assigned to two groups: Low political sophistication = no/little interest in politics and high 
political sophistication = high/very high interest in politics. As a robustness check, I test my 
models in both groups to see whether sophistication changes the outcomes.  
Democratic history 
In a first step, I test the hypotheses dealing with the effect of democratic history on citizens 
expectations: I assumed that exposure to functioning liberal democratic institutions should 
increase support for procedural democracy (H1), while exposure to authoritarian socialization 
increases support for democratic performance criteria (H2). To do so, I test the impact of the 
country-level context on two dependent variables: Liberal and social expectations from 
democracy. Figure 1 shows the effects of democratic history. As for the expectations towards 
liberal democracy (left panel), there is a positive (though not significant) effect of democratic 
quality on the importance citizens attribute to this dimension for a democracy in general. The 
age of democracy shows no effect, contrary to H1. Living in a post-authoritarian country 
however has a significant and negative effect on support for liberal democratic norms, 
confirming H2. When it comes to exposure to authoritarianism, the effects are comparatively 
small: We see a negative effect of adult exposure, and surprisingly a positive effect for early 
exposure. Looking at the right panel, we can see that the main effects are partly inversed: 





democratic principles, while living in a post-authoritarian democracy significantly increases 
social democratic support. Authoritarian exposure effects remain small, with a negative effect 
of adult exposure and a positive effect for early exposure.  
Figure 1: The effects of democratic history. 
 
 
Notes: Plots of regression coefficients, non-standardized. Full table see Table 5 in the appendix. Data sources: 
European Social Survey (ESS 2012), Democracy Barometer (Merkel et al. 2016), WDI (World Bank 2017). 
Weighted with ESS post-stratification and population size weights. 
Given that the length of citizens' exposure to authoritarianism did not lead to significant 
results, I additionally pursue an exploratory analysis into the effects of different types of 
authoritarianism to see weather this can give us more insights. First of all, I distinguish 
between different ideologies: Communist regimes on the one hand, and right-wing military 
dictatorships on the other. Figure 2 shows that the effect of authoritarianism on citizens' 
expectations is mainly driven by former communist countries, while former military 
dictatorships actually not differ significantly from other democracies:  
Figure 2. The effects of democratic history, including types of authoritarianism. 
Notes: Plots of regression coefficients, non-standardized. Full table see Table 6 in the appendix. Data sources: 
European Social Survey (ESS 2012), Democracy Barometer (Merkel et al. 2016), WDI (World Bank 2017). 





As a next step, to differentiate the rather large group of former communist countries, I test 
only for communist socialization, but also account for the type of communist regime by using 
Kitschelt et al's (1999) distinction between patrimonial communism (Albania, Bulgaria, 
Estonia, Lithuania, Ukraine), national accommodative communism (Hungary, Poland, 
Slovenia) and bureaucratic-authoritarian communism (Czech Republic, Eastern Germany, 
Slovakia). Figure 3 shows the results: We can see that the effects remain largely the same as 
before - democratic quality is positively related to liberal values, and negatively to social 
democratic values, yet not significant. A (post)communist socialization tends to decrease 
citizens' liberal democratic expectations, and increases social democratic expectations. 
Kitschelt et al's types of communism also matter: While all three types show the same 
direction, the effects are strongest (and significant only) for bureaucratic-authoritarian 
communism.  
Figure 3. The effects of democratic history, including types of communism. 
Notes: Plots of regression coefficients, non-standardized. Full table see Table 7 in the appendix. Data sources: 
European Social Survey (ESS 2012), Democracy Barometer (Merkel et al. 2016), WDI (World Bank 2017). 
Weighted with ESS post-stratification and population size weights. 
This type of communism is the most open form of communist rule. Why are communist 
socialization effects stronger in these countries? On the one hand, living in a relatively open 
and modernized regime that allows for some degree of political pluralism, and an 
economically stronger and more educated society might make for a more efficient adaptation 
of socialist values than in other countries, and more appreciation of the advantages of that 
regime, especially compared to the liberal democratic regime that followed. On the other 
hand, bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes are also characterized by a strong organizational 
consistency and control of the ruling party, which hence had the power to repress the rather 
strong opposition movement instead of making concessions to their demands, and could retain 




until the 1980ies (Kitschelt et al 1999, 27). Together, these factors could explain why citizens 
in these countries support democratic outputs over democratic procedures more strongly that 
other post-communist citizens. 
In sum, the analysis of democratic history could partly confirm my initial hypotheses: The 
assumption that exposure to functioning liberal democratic institutions should increase 
support for procedural democracy amongst citizens (H1) was not confirmed, as age of 
democracy had no effects and democratic quality only non-significant effects on citizens 
expectations from democracy. H2 on the other hand was confirmed: Exposure to authoritarian 
socialization indeed significantly increases citizens' support for democratic outputs, and 
reduces support for procedural democracy. This effect takes place independently of the length 
of exposure, but is specific to some types of authoritarian regimes - post-communist countries, 
and amongst them especially those characterized by Kitschelt et al. as bureaucratic-
authoritarian. 
Democratic models 
In a next step, I test hypotheses 3 and 4, which assume that national democratic models have a 
direct influence on citizens' expectations from democracy (H3), and that these socialization 
effects are stronger for citizens who actively participate in democratic decision-making 
processes (H4). Figure 4 shows the results for the two types of democratic models that I use: 
Direct-representative democracy, and consensus-majoritarian democracy. 
Figure 4. The effects of democratic models. 
 
Notes: Plot of non-standardized regression coefficients (left), logged odds (right). Full table see Table 8 in the 
appendix. Data sources: European Social Survey (ESS 2012), Democracy Barometer (Merkel et al. 2016), WDI 
(World Bank 2017). Weighted with ESS post-stratification and population size weights. 
In the direct-representative dimension (left panel), there is no significant socialization effect 
of living in a country with direct democratic institutions on the importance citizens attribute to 




significant effect of the national democratic model on individual preferences: Citizens living 
in a more consensus-oriented democracy are more likely to find a consensual system better 
for democracy in general than those living in majoritarian democracies. Hypothesis 3 is thus 
supported, but only in one of the cases.  
Hypothesis 4 then assumes that socialization effects of the national democratic model should 
be reinforced for those citizens who actively participate in democratic processes, where 
electoral participation should have stronger effects that non-electoral participation10. In Figure 
4 we can see that there are significant interaction effects between the national democratic 
model and individual voting and non-electoral participation. To illustrate them better, Figures 
5 and 6 show marginal effects plots of these interaction effects. In Figure 5, we can see the 
interaction between direct democracy on the national level, and individual voting behaviour. 
Figure 5. Marginal effects of democratic models with voting. 
 
  
Notes: Average marginal effects for interaction terms from Figure 4. Full table see Table 8 in the appendix. 
Data sources: European Social Survey (ESS 2012), Democracy Barometer (Merkel et al. 2016). Weighted with 
ESS post-stratification and population size weights. 
As we can see in the left panel, the effect of direct democratic institutions on citizens' 
expectations towards democracy differs significantly between voters and non-voters, and is 
positive. Hence, respondents who participate in elections are more likely to orient their 
democratic ideals towards the democratic model they experience. The more direct democracy 
a country has, the bigger the difference. The same applies to consensus democracy (right 
panel): The effect of living in a country with consensus democracy is significantly different 
between voters and non-voters (but decreases for strongly consensual democracies). These 
results confirm hypothesis H4, participation in elections apparently reinforces the 
socialization effect of democratic models. Figure 6 displays the same interaction effect, but 
                                                 
10Of course citizens can participate both in elections and in non-institutional forms of participation, and the two 




for non-electoral forms of participation, such as demonstrations, petitions and political 
activism.  
Figure 6. Marginal effects of democratic models with non-electoral participation. 
Notes: Average marginal effects for interaction terms from Figure 4. Full table see Table 8 in the appendix. 
Data sources: European Social Survey (ESS 2012), Democracy Barometer (Merkel et al. 2016). Weighted with 
ESS post-stratification and population size weights. 
Both graphs show similar directions as the ones in Figure 5, so there are also significant 
differences between politically active citizens and non-active ones in the way the democratic 
model influenced their expectations. Yet, the effects are less strong than for voting (as we can 
see in the coefficient sizes on the y axis), and in the case of consensus democracy (right 
panel) even insignificant for countries with strong consensus democracy. This provides 
support for the assumption in H4 that non-institutional participation has a less strong 
socialization effect into democratic structures than electoral participation. 
In sum, I provide support for the assumption that citizens are socialized into a specific 
democratic model which affects their democratic ideals (H3), especially if they actively 
participate in political processes (H4). The results however raise the question why, other than 
consensus democracy, direct democracy shows no direct socialization effect on citizens' 
expectations. A possible reason for the non-significance of the positive effect of direct 
democracy is the fact that, especially in the last years, support for direct democracy has grown 
also in countries that have not (yet) included them in their political system, becoming a 
commonly supported ideal that is, rather than an alternative to representative democracy, a 
supplement to it. A majoritarian compared to a consensus-based government, on the other 
hand, is more of a trade-off, where a democracy can only realize one of the alternatives. 
Another possible interpretation is the phrasing of the questionnaire - while the direct-
democracy question has an 11-point scale, the consensus democracy question only has two 
options, forcing citizens to decide. A similar 0-1 coding might have made the effect on 





Lastly, as a robustness check, Tables 9 to 11 in the appendix show all analyses with separate 
models above for respondents with high and low sophistication. Generally, effects are 
stronger and more significant in the group with high sophistication: In Table 10, we can see 
that the interaction effects of participation and direct democracy are not significant in the low 
sophistication group. This result is confirmed in the second dimension, the type of 
government. As table 11 shows, the interaction effect of voting and government type is also 
only significant in the group of sophisticated respondents, while the direct effect remains in 
both groups. These findings are in line with theoretical expectations on the effects of political 
sophistication. An interesting finding are the effects of democratic history (Table 9), which 
remain strong also for less sophisticated citizens. Apparently, an authoritarian socialization 
has similar effects on all citizens, independent of their level of sophistication. In the group of 
sophisticated respondents, further, socialization in a military dictatorship has a significant 
positive effect on social democratic expectations, which was not the case for the whole 
sample.  
Public support has long been known to be highly relevant for the legitimacy of a political 
system. But what do citizens expect from a democracy, and how are these expectations 
formed? Answering these questions is crucial for the analysis of individual support for 
democracy. In this paper, I claim that citizens’ expectations from democracy are, at least 
partly, the result of regime-specific socialization. Based on the notion that democracy is not a 
unidimensional concept, but can take different forms, I suppose that citizens also conceive of 
democracy in variable terms, and expect it to fulfil different criteria. These criteria then are 
shaped by the democratic context they experienced during their lifetime. Indeed, my results 
support the hypothesis that national democratic structures affect citizens’ perceptions of how 
a democracy is supposed to be: As for democratic history, citizens are more likely to value 
social democracy, and less likely to support liberal democracy when they were socialized in a 
post-authoritarian, and specifically in a former communist country. Interestingly, however, 
this effect does not depend significantly on the duration of exposure to a communist regime. 
Further, effects are strongest for those citizens from countries which, according to Kitschelt et 
al. (1999) fall in the group of former bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes. When it comes to 
democratic models, citizens are more likely to expect from a democracy what they experience 





those citizens actively participating in democratic processes are more likely to align their 
expectations with the democracy they experience, both for the direct-representative and for 
the majoritarian-consensus dimension. 
How can these results be interpreted? First of all, they show that differences in citizens’ 
expectations from democracy - that is, their conception of how an ideal democracy is 
supposed to be like - are not only determined by individual-level factors, they also seem to 
systematically differ between countries, depending on their democratic regime. Citizens' 
expectations from democracy are apparently influenced by the real-world democracy they 
experience. Both regime-specific socialization and participation in democratic processes 
shape what citizens demand from a democracy, supporting the idea that learning effects of 
participation also apply to individual democracy perceptions. Hence, these findings imply that 
on the one hand, the democratic ideals citizens hold are influenced by the democratic history 
in their home country: In line with the theoretical expectations from the literature on 
democratic learning, citizens of young and especially those of post-communist democracies 
have a more performance-based view of legitimacy, and expect democracies to deliver 
outputs, not (just) procedures. The fact that the length of exposure to authoritarianism did not 
matter for this implies that rather than a (fading) generational socialization effect, we can 
speak of a consistent framing effect anchored in the political cultures of those regimes, which 
leads citizens of new democracies to a) compare democracy to the former regime in terms of 
outputs, and b) see democracy as a promise that is strongly intertwined with economic and 
social wellbeing. On the other hand, empirical varieties of democracy also matter for citizens, 
as they provide them with a ‘blueprint’ of how a democracy is supposed to function. Citizens 
ideas of how democratic principles should be implemented are apparently shaped by the 
democratic setting they experience: The dimensions of direct participation vs. representation 
(Vatter 2009), and majoritarian vs. consensual decision-making (Lijphart 1999), which are the 
most fundamental dimensions that distinguish established democracies. 
What does this imply for research on democratic support? Researchers should keep in mind 
that when we are asking citizens about 'democracy', if they support and how they evaluate it, 
their conception of democracy might differ systematically across countries, depending on the 
regime they  Given that also democracy researchers rarely agree on what a democracy is 
supposed to be like, these results are hardly surprising. Accordingly, including citizens’ ideas 
of democratic quality as well as the country-level democratic context in cross-sectional 
analyses of support for democracy is important. Of course, as it is usually the case when 




capture the reality. This does however not mean that we should not try to analyse them - only 
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Table 1: Summary statistics of all variables. 
 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Expectations from democracy (individual- level) 
Liberal democracy 42363 8.460954 1.513251 0 10 
Social democracy 43643 8.428454 1.861542 0 10 
Direct democracy 43492 8.291686 2.022645 0 10 
Consensus democracy 37814 .7657746 .4235193 0 1 
Democratic regime (country-level) 
Democratic quality 26 5.877004 .6914762 4.87662 7.304686 
Age of democracy (years) 26 53.21561 35.62039 21 164 
Direct democracy 26 2.158963 2.20655 0 9.174709 
Consensus democracy 26 6.152506 1.652362 1.492406 8.309596 
Authoritarian exposure, in years 
Early authoritarian exposure (6-17) 44966 3.852956 5.004039 0 11 
Adult authoritarian exposure (from 18) 44966 5.948895 10.89493 0 45 
Total authoritarian exposure (from 6) 44966 9.80185 14.5151 0 48 
Control variables 
Population 26 2.14e+07 2.48e+07 319000 8.17e+07 
GDP per capita 26 26243.63 9572.182 6365.21 46981.56 
Gender (1=male) 44949 .4576075 .4982052 0 1 
Age 44859 50.07613 17.96483 18 103 
Education  (years) 44966 12.58133 3.912896 0 20 
Unemployment (1=yes) 44702 .3034764 .4597643 0 1 
Political sophistication (1=high) 44785 .4545049 .4979314 0 1 
Voted last election (1=yes) 43420 .7821741 .4127732 0 1 
Non-electoral participation11 44325 .8273209 1.278782 0 7 
Left-Right scale (0 = left, 10=right) 38993 5.161362 2.306064 0 10 
Born in other country (1=yes) 44940 .0503115 .2185894 0 1 
Notes: Data sources: European Social Survey (ESS 2012), Democracy Barometer (Merkel et al. 2016). Weighted 
with ESS post-stratification and population size weights. 
  
                                                 
11 Consists of the following variables: “During the last 12 month, have you (1) contacted a politician, (2) worked 
in a political party or group, (3) worked in another organization, (4) worn a campaign badge/sticker, (5) signed a 
petition, (6) taken part in a lawful demonstration, (7) boycotted certain products?” Given that signing a petition 





Table 2: Operationalization of democratic expectations. 
 
Variable Items (ESS)  
Liberal/procedural …that national elections are free and fair? 
...that different political parties offer clear alternatives to one 
another?  
...that opposition parties are free to criticize the government? 
…that the media are free to criticize the government? 
...that the media provide citizens with reliable information to 
judge the government? 
Social/substance ...that the government protects all citizens against poverty? 
...that the government takes measures to reduce differences in 
income levels? 
Majoritarian-consensus The government in some countries is formed by a single party; in 
other countries by two or more parties in coalition. (Which is 
best?) 
Representative-direct ...that citizens have the final say on the most important political 
issues by voting on them directly in referendums? 
 
Table 3: Operationalization of the democratic regime 
 
Variable Items  
Democratic history  
Age of democracy Years of democracy (Marshall and Gurr 2016 and own coding). 
Quality of democracy Democratic quality (Merkel et al. 2016). 
Authoritarian past 
Democratic models 
Post-authoritarian country (own coding). 
 
Direct democracy Constitutional provisions for direct democracy (existence of 
direct democratic institutions and participation quora), number of 
direct democratic votes per year (Merkel et al. 2016). 
Consensus democracy Gallagher Index (reversed), mean district magnitude, effective 
electoral threshold, effective number of parties, cabinet 
composition (percentage of coalition governments compared to 









Table 4: Authoritarian legacies. 
 
Country Period Type of communism  
(Source: Kitschelt et al 1999, 39) 
Former communist   
Albania 1945-1992 Patrimonial communism 
Bulgaria 1945-1990 Patrimonial communism 
Czech Republic 1945-1990 Bureaucratic-authoritarian communism 
East Germany 1945-1990 Bureaucratic-authoritarian communism 
Estonia 1945-1990 Patrimonial communism 
Hungary 1945-1990 National accommodative communism 
Lithuania 1945-1990 Patrimonial communism 
Poland 1945-1990 National accommodative communism 
Slovakia 1945-1990 Bureaucratic-authoritarian communism 
Slovenia 1945-1990 National accommodative communism 
Ukraine 1945-1991 Patrimonial communism 
Former military dictatorship 
Spain 1939-1977  














Table 5: Authoritarian exposure effects (full tables to Figure 1). 
 
 Model 1: 
Expectations liberal 
Model 2:  
Expectations social 
 b/se b/se 
   
Democratic quality 0.144 0.0364 
 (0.167) (0.237) 
   
Age of democracy -0.00307 -0.00152 
 (0.00287) (0.00408) 
   
Former authoritarian country -0.276*** 0.411*** 
 (0.0642) (0.0803) 
   
Early authoritarian exposure 0.0151*** 0.00920* 
 (0.00338) (0.00416) 
   
Adult authoritarian exposure -0.00341* -0.000938 
 (0.00125) (0.00153) 
   
GDP per Capita -0.0000186 -0.00000205 
 (0.0000162) (0.0000230) 
   
Population size -1.18e-09 4.56e-09 
 (3.20e-09) (4.55e-09) 
   
Gender (male) 0.165*** -0.208*** 
 (0.0153) (0.0191) 
   
Age 0.00646*** 0.00668*** 
 (0.000552) (0.000686) 
   
Education (years) 0.0756*** -0.0230*** 
 (0.00218) (0.00272) 
   
Unemployed 0.0312+ 0.215*** 
 (0.0174) (0.0216) 
   
Left-right placement  -0.0227*** -0.113*** 
 (0.00348) (0.00433) 
   
Born in other country 0.00402 0.0949* 
 (0.0353) (0.0439) 
   
Constant 7.160*** 8.653*** 
 (0.769) (1.093) 
Var (Constant) -1.098*** -0.744*** 
 (0.150) (0.151) 
Var (Residual) 0.338*** 0.565*** 
 (0.00385) (0.00382) 
N Level 1 





AIC 118509.3 136029.6 













p<0.001. Data sources: European Social Survey (ESS 2012), Democracy Barometer (Merkel et al. 




Table 6: Authoritarian exposure effects, including type of authoritarianism (full tables to 
Figure 2).  
 
 Model 1:  
Expectations liberal 
Model 2:  
Expectations social 
 b/se b/se 
   
Democratic quality 0.143 0.0342 
 (0.166) (0.224) 
   
Age of democracy -0.00305 -0.000546 
 (0.00289) (0.00389) 
   
Former communist country -0.202*** 0.483*** 
 (0.0570) (0.0712) 
   
Former military dictatorship 0.0120 0.593 
 (0.258) (0.346) 
   
GDP per Capita -0.0000186 -0.00000117 
 (0.0000162) (0.0000217) 
   
Population size -1.25e-09 3.58e-09 
 (3.22e-09) (4.33e-09) 
   
Gender (male) 0.166*** -0.207*** 
 (0.0153) (0.0191) 
   
Age 0.00638*** 0.00688*** 
 (0.000465) (0.000577) 
   
Education (years) 0.0762*** -0.0225*** 
 (0.00218) (0.00271) 
   
Unemployed 0.0396* 0.219*** 
 (0.0173) (0.0215) 
   
Left-right placement  -0.0223*** -0.113*** 
 (0.00346) (0.00431) 
   
Born in other country 0.00226 0.0955* 
 (0.0352) (0.0438) 
   
Constant 7.161*** 8.532*** 
 (0.769) (1.033) 
Var (Constant) -1.100*** -0.803*** 
 (0.150) (0.151) 
Var (Residual) 0.338*** 0.565*** 
 (0.00385) (0.00382) 
N Level 1 





AIC 118531.1 136029.7 













p<0.001. Data sources: European Social Survey (ESS 2012), Democracy Barometer (Merkel et al. 









































































p<0.001. Data sources: European Social Survey (ESS 2012), Democracy Barometer (Merkel et al. 
2016), WDI (World Bank 2017). Weighted with ESS post-stratification and population size weights. 
 Model 1:  
Expectations liberal 
Model 2:  
Expectations social 
 b/se b/se 
Democratic quality 0.126 -0.0433 
 (0.171) (0.230) 
   
Age of democracy -0.00286 -0.000714 
 (0.00290) (0.00390) 
   
Patrimonial communism -0.265 -0.249 
 (0.321) (0.430) 
   
Bureaucratic-authoritarian communism -0.203*** 0.478*** 
 (0.0574) (0.0716) 
   
National accommodative communism -0.149 0.343 
 (0.271) (0.364) 
   
GDP per Capita -0.0000196 -0.0000193 
 (0.0000173) (0.0000256) 
   
Population size -1.10e-10 -6.84e-10 
 (3.02e-09) (4.45e-09) 
   
Gender (male) 0.166*** -0.207*** 
 (0.0153) (0.0191) 
   
Age 0.00638*** 0.00689*** 
 (0.000465) (0.000577) 
   
Education (years) 0.0762*** -0.0225*** 
 (0.00218) (0.00271) 
   
Unemployed 0.0396* 0.219*** 
 (0.0173) (0.0215) 
   
Left-right placement  -0.0223*** -0.113*** 
 (0.00346) (0.00431) 
   
Born in other country 0.00222 0.0955* 
 (0.0352) (0.0438) 
   
Constant 7.267*** 9.694*** 
 (0.887) (1.190) 
Var (Constant) -1.104*** -0.808*** 
 (0.150) (0.151) 
Var (Residual) 0.338*** 0.565*** 
 (0.00385) (0.00382) 
N Level 1 





AIC 119948.4 143854.9 










Table 8: The effect of democratic models (full tables to Figures 4, 5, and 6). 
 
Model 1:  
Expectations direct democracy 
Model 2: 
Expectations consensus democracy 
 b/se  b/se 
    
Direct democracy in country 0.0125 Consensus democracy in country 0.259* 
 (0.0371)  (0.112) 
    
Voting*Direct democracy 0.0329** Voting*Consensus democracy 0.0720*** 
 (0.0114)  (0.0208) 
    
Participation*Direct democracy 0.00706* Participation*Consensus democracy 0.00474 
 (0.00342)  (0.00776) 
    
GDP per Capita -0.0000205* GDP per Capita 0.0000245 
 (0.00000827)  (0.0000192) 
    
Population size 2.56e-09 Population size -9.89e-09 
 (3.80e-09)  (5.46e-09) 
    
Gender (male) -0.125*** Gender (male) -0.111*** 
 (0.0207)  (0.0289) 
    
Age -0.00107 Age  0.0449*** 
 (0.000658)  (0.00427) 
    
Education (years) -0.0171*** Education (years) 0.0450*** 
 (0.00306)  (0.00427) 
    
Experience unemployment 0.112*** Experienced unemployment 0.0329 
 (0.0232)  (0.0323) 
    
Voted last election 0.0498 Voted last election -0.400** 
 (0.0389)  (0.124) 
    
Non-electoral participation 0.0308** Non-electoral participation 0.0563 
 (0.0108)  (0.0385) 
    
Placement on left right scale -0.0152*** Placement on left right scale -0.0250*** 
 (0.00453)  (0.00617) 
    
Born in other country 0.0787 Born in other country -0.0361 
 (0.0446)  (0.0616) 
    
Constant 9.029*** Constant -1.261 
 (0.278)  (0.807) 
Var (Constant) -0.903*** Var (Constant) -0.214 
 (0.142)  (0.142) 
Var (Residual) 0.674***   
  (0.00371)    
 N Level 1 
N Level 2 
36448 
26 
N Level 1 
N Level 2 
32495 
26 
AIC 152734.1 AIC 29977.0 
BIC 152861.7 BIC 30094.4 
Chi2 167.6 Chi2 214.6 
ICC 0.04868 ICC 0.165326 
Notes: Linear Hierarchical Random-Intercept Regression (Model 1), Logistic Hierarchical Random-Intercept 






p<0.001. Data sources: European Social 
Survey (ESS 2012), Democracy Barometer (Merkel et al. 2016), WDI (World Bank 2017). Weighted with ESS 




Table 9: Robustness tests with high and low sophistication separately: Democratic history. 
 
 Sophistication high  Sophistication low  
 Model 1 Model 2  Model 1 Model 2  
 Expectations liberal Expectations social Expectations liberal Expectations social 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se  
     
Democratic quality 0.0698 -0.0906 0.104 0.182 
 (0.136) (0.203) (0.189) (0.227) 
     
Age of democracy -0.00335 -0.000440 -0.00412 -0.00120 
 (0.00237) (0.00354) (0.00332) (0.00398) 
     
Former communist 
country 
-0.137* 0.502*** -0.279* 0.299* 
 (0.0597) (0.0847) (0.105) (0.121) 
Former military 
dictatorship 
-0.0101 0.711* 0.0308 0.450 
 (0.213) (0.317) (0.296) (0.355) 
     
GDP per Capita -0.00000888 0.00000327 -0.0000243 -0.0000140 
 (0.0000133) (0.0000198) (0.0000185) (0.0000222) 
     
Population size -3.87e-10 1.75e-09 -3.28e-09 4.82e-09 
 (2.64e-09) (3.93e-09) (3.66e-09) (4.40e-09) 
     
Gender (male) 0.0917*** -0.269*** 0.129*** -0.168*** 
 (0.0187) (0.0264) (0.0245) (0.0280) 
     
Age 0.00294*** 0.00871*** 0.00443*** 0.00469*** 
 (0.000578) (0.000818) (0.000744) (0.000847) 
     
Education (years) 0.0544*** -0.0425*** 0.0672*** -0.00840* 
 (0.00261) (0.00369) (0.00369) (0.00421) 
     
Unemployed 0.0627** 0.211*** 0.0330 0.230*** 
 (0.0214) (0.0303) (0.0267) (0.0305) 
     
Left-right placement  -0.0328*** -0.143*** -0.00535 -0.0764*** 
 (0.00396) (0.00559) (0.00588) (0.00671) 
     
Born in other country -0.0142 0.145* 0.0414 0.0400 
 (0.0415) (0.0588) (0.0570) (0.0651) 
     
Constant 8.071*** 9.586*** 7.583*** 7.810*** 
 (0.635) (0.946) (0.889) (1.065) 
Var (Constant) -1.307*** -0.906*** -0.978*** -0.795*** 
 (0.153) (0.156) (0.151) (0.154) 
Var (Residual) 0.194*** 0.544*** 0.430*** 0.577*** 
 (0.00538) (0.00537) (0.00554) (0.00546) 
N Level 1 17298 17377 16331 16803 
N Level 2 26 26 26 26 
AIC 55918.3 68342.3 60492.3 67192.2 
BIC 56034.7 68458.8 60607.8 67308.1 
Chi2 551.8 1246.0 368.1 290.8 
ICC 0.04728 0.05214 0.05647 0.06048 






p<0.001. Data sources: European Social Survey (ESS 2012), Democracy Barometer (Merkel et al. 




Table 10: Robustness tests with high and low sophistication separately: Direct democracy.  
 
 Model 1: High 
sophistication only 
Model 2: Low 
sophistication only 
 b/se b/se 
   
Direct democracy in country 0.0309 0.0303 
 (0.0471) (0.0392) 
   
Voting*Direct democracy 0.0627** 0.0178 
 (0.0195) (0.0148) 
   
Participation*Direct democracy 0.0109* -0.00388 
 (0.00417) (0.00674) 
   
Voted last election -0.192* 0.115* 
 (0.0704) (0.0478) 
   
Non-electoral participation 0.00128 0.0972*** 
 (0.0136) (0.0198) 
   
GDP per Capita -0.0000210* -0.0000202* 
 (0.0000100) (0.00000869) 
   
Population size 2.72e-09 5.35e-10 
 (4.17e-09) (3.60e-09) 
   
Gender (male) -0.223*** -0.0407 
 (0.0297) (0.0291) 
   
Age -0.000253 -0.00141 
 (0.000960) (0.000925) 
   
Education (years) -0.0487*** 0.0149*** 
 (0.00427) (0.00450) 
   
Experience unemployment 0.169*** 0.0657* 
 (0.0340) (0.0315) 
   
Placement on left right scale -0.0209*** -0.00882 
 (0.00615) (0.00672) 
   
Constant 9.806*** 8.519*** 
 (0.346) (0.299) 
Var (Constant) -0.712*** -0.863*** 
 (0.155) (0.156) 
Var (Residual) 0.690*** 0.648*** 
 (0.00523) (0.00527) 
N Level 1 





AIC 77610.1 74730.2 
BIC 77727.4 74847.2 
Chi2 264.7 108.7 
ICC 0.05702 0.04648 






 p<0.001. Data sources: European Social Survey (ESS 2012), Democracy Barometer (Merkel et al. 2016), 





Table 11: Robustness tests with high and low sophistication separately: Consensus 
democracy. 
 
 Model 1: High 
sophistication only 
Model 2: Low  
sophistication only 
 b/se b/se 
   
Consensus democracy in country 0.287* 0.231* 
 (0.122) (0.109) 
   
Voting*Consensus democracy 0.0708* 0.0651 
 (0. 0.0264) (0.0365) 
   
Participation*Consensus democracy 0.00205 -0.0000838 
 (0.00785) (0.0125) 
   
Voted last election -0.419+ -0.341* 
 (0.217) (0.158) 
   
Non-electoral participation 0.0708 0.0761 
 (0.0472) (0.0757) 
   
GDP per Capita 0.0000214 0.0000187 
 (0.0000177) (0.0000163) 
   
Population size -8.71e-09 -8.81e-09 
 (7.54e-09) (6.92e-09) 
   
Gender (male) -0.198*** -0.0139 
 (0.0422) (0.0409) 
   
Age 0.00502*** 0.00344* 
 (0.00137) (0.00131) 
   
Education (years) 0.0357*** 0.0533*** 
 (0.00602) (0.00631) 
   
Experienced unemployment 0.0412 0.0103 
 (0.0477) (0.0443) 
   
Placement on left right scale -0.0335*** -0.0168 
 (0.00838) (0.00926) 
   
Constant -1.262 -1.231 
 (0.875) (0.791) 
Var (Constant) -0.161 -0.250+ 
 (0.144) (0.147) 
N Level 1 





AIC 14554.6 15357.5 














<0.001. Data sources: European Social Survey (ESS 2012), Democracy Barometer (Merkel et al. 2016), WDI 










Chapter Three: Do citizens want too much? A spatial model approach to 










Satisfaction with democracy (SWD) is a commonly used indicator in political opinion 
research, and its determinants have been analysed extensively in the literature. But what does 
dissatisfaction with democracy substantially mean? This paper wants to understand if 
satisfaction is actually a coherent consequence of citizens considering democratic supply and 
demand. It departs from the simple idea that satisfaction equals the distance between what 
'should be' and what 'is'; between democratic expectations and democratic reality. I capture 
this idea in a spatial model of democratic support, where the size and direction of the distance 
between citizens' expectations from and evaluations of democracy determines their levels of 
satisfaction. To test this model, I use data for 26 countries from the European Social Survey 6. 
Taking into account both expectation-surplus and evaluations-surplus distances, I find that 
satisfaction is indeed affected by both the size and the direction of the distance between 
expectations and evaluations. Yet, satisfaction with democracy is not simply a product of 
supply matching demand. Dimensions of democracy matter as well: While liberal criteria of 
democratic quality are a generally agreed upon concept amongst citizens, democratic input 
dimensions like direct participation as well as output criteria like social justice are more 
disputed, and create dissatisfaction amongst those who want more of them as well as those 






At least since the 1970s, people all around the world have been surveyed about their levels of 
support for their democracies. Especially the satisfaction with democracy question (SWD) has 
been included in most national and cross-national surveys, and by now there is data for almost 
every single country in the world - even the non-democratic ones (Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 
1). Citizens' satisfaction with their democracy, often used as a proxy for regime support in 
general, has become one of the most commonly used survey indicators in comparative 
research (Linde and Ekman 2003, 391). Consequentially, the amount of studies trying to find 
the determinants of satisfaction with democracy is numerous too: We know that the quality of 
institutions and regime performance matter (Anderson and Guillory 1997; Aarts and 
Thomassen 2008; Wagner, Schneider, and Halla 2009; Dahlberg, Linde, and Holmberg 2013; 
Ruiz-Rufino 2013; Magalhães 2014), as well as the democratic culture (Almond and Verba 
1963; Fuchs and Roller 2006; Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2014), and the socio-economic status 
(Schäfer 2013) and winner-loser status of citizens (Bernauer and Vatter 2012; Curini, Jou, and 
Memoli 2012; Campbell 2013). We know that other political attitudes such as trust are linked 
to satisfaction (Zmerli, Newton, and Montero 2007), and also that satisfaction with 
democracy, sadly, does not increase general happiness (Stadelmann-Steffen and Vatter 2012).  
In the light of all this literature, is there still something left to write about satisfaction? This 
paper argues that there is, and tackles a basic question: What does dissatisfaction with 
democracy substantially mean? Does it mean that people want too much, or at least more than 
they can get? I want to understand if satisfaction with democracy is actually a coherent 
consequence of citizens considering democratic 'supply' and 'demand'. Based on the 
assumption that support for democracy consists of three attitudes - expectations from, 
evaluations of and satisfaction with democracy - I develop a spatial model to explain 
satisfaction. This model departs from the simple idea that satisfaction equals the distance 
between what 'should be' and what 'is'; between democratic expectations and democratic 
evaluations. The idea of ‘congruence’ (Almond and Verba 1963, 20) or a 'democratic deficit' 
(Norris 2011, 5) has been present in the literature since decades and refers to the assumption 
that persons whose expectations about democracy are in accordance with the (perceived) 
political realities in their country are more satisfied with democracy than those whose beliefs 
are at odds with prevailing practices. I capture this idea by modelling the distance between 
citizens' expectations from and evaluations of democracy in three different dimensions: 





light on the question why and on what grounds citizens are dissatisfied with democracy: Do 
they want more than they (can) get? Should they lower their expectations? Or is there a 
dissonance between the type of democracy they want and the one they get? These questions 
are important because they form the, often implicit, basis for a lot of the studies on 
satisfaction with democracy cited above: The notion that there is a coherent connection 
between the demands citizens make to democracy, the quality of institutions that is realized in 
their country, and their levels of satisfaction. This very basic idea is mostly overlooked or 
taken for granted, but it deserves a more systematic assessment. 
This paper starts by explaining the attitudes underlying democratic support as well as the 
three dimensions of democracy used in my analysis. Next, I present my spatial model of 
democratic support as well as its theoretical background and substantial implications. In the 
following, I present the data and operationalization, to then proceed to the empirical analysis. 
Lastly, I discuss and interpret the results.  
Dimensions of support: Expectations, evaluations and satisfaction 
As Chapter One of this dissertation has explained, I assume that it is essential to distinguish 
the attitudes that form democratic support rather than treat it as one piece. I use three attitudes 
to conceptualize support for democracy: Expectations from democracy, evaluations of 
democracy, and satisfaction with democracy. This section serves as a short recapitulation of 
these concepts and their meaning. 
Expectations from democracy describe the normative model of democracy favoured by an 
individual. Expectations, as Seyd (2014, 3) has claimed, can refer to two dimensions: The first 
sense of expectation relates to an anticipatory judgment – a belief that an actor or body will 
deliver a particular quality or outcome. The second sense relates to a normative or desirability 
judgment - a belief that a particular quality should exist or an outcome should be delivered. 
Expectations from democracy relate to that second sense, a normative ideal: How should a 
good democracy be like, and what should it do for me? What should democracy mean? 
Secondly, evaluations of democracy refer to the performance of respective democratic regime 
someone lives in. Whereas the 'objective democratic performance or democratic quality of a 
regime is an attribute that can be measured on the country-level, subjective evaluations differ 
across citizens, as they are dependent on individual characteristics such as the socio-economic 
background and individual values (Mishler and Rose 2001; van der Meer and Dekker 2011). 




They refer to the perceived system performance, and do not have to coincide with objective 
democratic performance.1 
Satisfaction with democracy, thirdly, is a general judgement on the functioning of democracy 
- that is, whether citizens are, overall, content with their national democratic system: Am I 
satisfied with what democracy has done for me lately? I define satisfaction with democracy as 
the outcome of expectations and evaluations, in other words, the difference between what 
'should be' and what actually 'is'. Section 3 will detscribe the exact relationship between 
expectations and evaluations in more detail, but first, another recapitulation on the 
multidimensional nature of support for democracy.  
Support for which kind of democracy? 
Chapter One of this dissertation has also introduced the notion that democracy is 
multidimensional, in citizens' attitudes as much as in democratic theory and empirical 
research. Using an exploratory factor analytical approach, I have identified two main 
dimensions which structure citizens' support for democracy: Liberal democracy and social 
democracy. Liberal democracy refers to democratic inputs and procedures: Fair elections, 
political freedom, party alternatives, and transparency. Social democracy, on the other hand, 
to democratic outputs: Protection against poverty and redistribution. I assume that individuals 
vary in their ideas of a 'good' democracy, and that this variance can be captured on a scale 
along two dimensions. The two dimensions also refer to two substantially different ways to 
define democracy: A procedural and a substantial approach. In a liberal version, democracy is 
seen as merely a procedure, and social justice rather as a prerequisite for or a potential 
outcome of these procedures. From a substantive perspective, social justice is seen as a 
substantial and intrinsic part of democracy. Additionally, I use direct democracy as a third 
dimensions, as it refers to a different type of democratic inputs (popular votes), and a 
different, or additional model that complements representative democracy. Support for 
democracy, thus, can take place in three dimensions - liberal, social, and direct democracy. 
Citizens, therefore, differ in their support for democracy along dimensions. While satisfaction 
with democracy is a unidimensional concept that captures the overall happiness with one's 
own democracy, expectations and evaluations are more specific, and can refer to different 
types of democracy. Chapter Two of this dissertation has shown that the democratic regime 
citizens' experience is related to their expectations from democracy: Socialization experiences 
shape the way we see democracy. This supports research by a number of authors who have 
                                                 





analysed individual attitudes towards democracy and mapped different types of democrats, or 
“democrats with adjectives” (Schedler and Sarsfield 2007). Their findings suggest that 
citizens’ beliefs which model of democracy is desirable diverge (Ferrín 2012; Hernández 
2016; Kriesi, Saris, and Moncagatta 2016). These insights are relevant for this chapter, too: If 
we want to understand the link between expectations, evaluations and satisfaction, we also 
need to take into account what kind of democracy we are talking about. Figure 1 illustrates the 
distribution of the three democratic dimensions in citizens' expectations and evaluations on 
the aggregate level. 
Figure 1: Dimensions of democracy in citizens' expectations and evaluations.  
 
Notes: The plots show minimum/maximum, first quartile to third quartile range, and  the median of the 
distribution, dots show outliers. Data source: European Social Survey (ESS 2012). N=47956. N(countries)=26. 
Weighted with ESS post-stratification and population size weights.  
We can see that dimensions matter: While expectations do not differ strongly in the three 
dimensions and are, at least at the aggregate level, consistently rather high, evaluations do 
differ - they are highest in the liberal dimensions, and lowest in the social dimension. The 
direct democratic dimension, at the same time, shows the largest variance. This points to the 
fact that citizens want different kinds of democracy, and, even more strongly, (perceive to) 
have different kinds of democracy in their countries. Accordingly, it is important to separate 
democratic dimensions when trying to understand citizens' support for democracy. If we want 
to know what causes satisfaction and dissatisfaction, we should ask which kind of democracy 




through expectations and evaluations in different dimensions of democracy. The following 
section specifies my theoretical model. 
What makes citizens (dis)satisfied? 
In this paper, I want to understand how the different attitudes that form support for democracy 
are linked. I take a rather naïve approach and assume that satisfaction with democracy is 
simply the difference between expectations from and evaluations of democracy. The main 
assumption is of course that citizens’ attitudes towards democracy are related in a systematic 
way - the difference between what 'should be' and what actually 'is' explains satisfaction. Do I 
want democracy to be liberal? Social? Direct? And do I perceive democracy to be like that in 
reality? Satisfaction with democracy is the outcome of this comparison of normative 
expectations with evaluations of the reality: Does the democracy I live in fit my yardstick(s)? 
Figure 2 from Chapter One illustrates this simple model.  
Figure 2: Support for democracy: Expectations, evaluations and satisfaction. 
 
The idea of satisfaction as an outcome of reality confronted with normative demands can be 
found in the literature on political support and political culture since several decades: The 
concept of ‘congruence’ (Almond and Verba 1963, 20) refers to the assumption that persons 
whose beliefs about democracy are in accordance with the (perceived) political realities in 
their country make more favourable evaluations of democracy than those whose beliefs are at 
odds with prevailing practices (Kornberg and Clarke 1994). This approach is also taken by 
Ferrín and Kriesi (2016b, 10), who assume that "it is the comparison between the democratic 
ideals and the actual functioning of democracy that makes for the judgment about the 
legitimacy of a democratic regime". Norris talks about a “democratic deficit”, which she 
defines as the gap between the public's aspirations for democracy and the actual performance 
of a democratic regime (Norris 2011, 5). The 'critical citizens' literature generally supposes 
that dissatisfaction is caused by a combination of high expectations and critical outlooks on 




politics amongst citizens with above-average education and political interest, leading to high 
levels of electoral and non-electoral participation (Norris 1999, 21). Dalton (2004, 66) speaks 
of a "representation gap" between citizens' preferences and government policy outputs.  
The idea of rising or changing criteria for the evaluation of democracy are also part of the 
‘crisis of democracy’ interpretation, provided for instance by Crozier, Huntington, and 
Watanuki (1975, 162): “If public demands on government spiral insatiably upward, 
satisfaction could fall even if performance remains unchanged”. Similar considerations can be 
found in the literature on political trust (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002, 55), which assumes 
that distrust arises from a sense among citizens “that something should be happening but is 
not happening” - hence, high public demands or expectations that are not met by the 
perceived outputs of the political process. Seyd (2014, 3) supposes that support for politicians 
is “held to reflect the perceived performance of politicians relative to the outcomes or forms 
of behaviour that citizens value or desire”. Curini, Jou, and Memoli (2012) use the distance 
between voters' ideological position and government policy to explain satisfaction with 
democracy.  
How to conceptualize distance 
But how can we conceptualize this idea to test it empirically? I develop a simple spatial model 
(Figure 3), to express that the distance between what someone expects a democracy to be or to 
deliver, and what they consider to be realized, equals satisfaction with democracy. In other 
words, if a citizens' expectations are not met by their evaluations of the democracy they live 
in, distance, and hence dissatisfaction, should rise. In general, spatial models refer to the 
positions of political actors, whether these are citizens, voters or politicians, in a cognitive or 
ideological space. Common spatial models in political competition for example assume that 
citizens have policy preferences while politicians compete for their support by offering policy 
packages at elections. This implies an ideal point for each citizen, characterizing their most-
preferred policy package in a given choice setting and describing increasingly less-preferred 
policies as points in some cognitive space that are increasingly far from this ideal (Laver and 
Schilperoord 2007). Hence, the critical factor here is distance.  
In my model, the two dimensions are expectations from and evaluations of democracy. If the 
two are on the same level, the distance between them is 0, like in case 1 in Figure 3. This 
should, following the assumptions from the literature, go along with high satisfaction. If 
expectations and evaluations do not match, but one exceeds the other, the distance grows. But 




Figure 3: A spatial model of expectations and evaluations. 
 
As Figure 3 also shows, there are different ways to conceptualize this notion. Using a simple 
geometric approach, distance is simply the shortest possible line between citizens' views and 
democratic policies - titled as D in the graph. Case 2 and case 3 show the distance vector D in 
two different cases - once, for a case where expectations exceed evaluations, and once with 
the opposite case of evaluations exceeding expectations. While the size of the distance is the 
same, the direction is different. 
Another approach, also shown in the figure, would be to measure the gap between 
expectations and evaluations - G -, which is the simple mathematical difference between the 
levels of the two. While this measure is even simpler, applying the spatial logic 
consequentially implies that the distance is a better measure: It represents the direct distance 
between the best possible outcome, a distance of zero, and the reality. While the gap follows a 
one-dimensional logic, the distance measure is two-dimensional, and fits better to the model I 




What does this model then imply substantially about (dis)satisfaction? The simplest possible 
approach is to assume that individual-level satisfaction equals distance: If the expectations a 
citizen holds diverge from their evaluations of the democratic reality, dissatisfaction evolves. 
Or, as Norris (2011, 5) puts it: "The most plausible potential explanations for the democratic 
deficit suggest that this phenomenon arises from some combination of growing public 
expectations […] and/or failing government performance." This leads to the following 
hypothesis: 
H1: The bigger the distance between citizens’ expectations and evaluations, the lower is their 
satisfaction with democracy. 
This simple approach further assumes that the size of the distance matters, and nothing more. 
But there are two different types of distances: Those with an expectations-surplus (someone 
expects more from a democracy than they see realized, like case 2), and those with an 
evaluations-surplus (someone's expectations are exceeded by the perceived reality, like case 
3). Are they the same? The literature cited above offers rather little insights on the potential 
effects of an evaluations-surplus distance where the 'is' exceeds the 'should be'. Referring to 
trust in politicians, Seyd (2014, 4) states that “where perceived performance exceeds 
expectations, a positive discrepancy exists that induces a positive attitude towards the object.” 
In this line of interpretation, there is no specific effect of an evaluations-surplus: As soon as 
the expectations are met, the positive effect stays the same. Ferrín and Kriesi (2016a), and 
specifically Wessels (2016, 240) argue the same by claiming that "an excess of evaluation 
over meaning means that ought is realized to 100 percent", which leads them to recode all 
such cases into a distance of zero. 
This does make sense if one assumes that democracy is something as inherently good that you 
cannot possibly have 'too much' of it. But democracy is not just about quality, and about how 
well democracy is realized - as explained in Chapter One and Two of this dissertation, 
democracy is also about different models and different ways to realize democratic principles. 
While the goal - being democratic - might be the same amongst all existing democratic 
systems, the means to get there differ. As the Democracy Barometer (Bühlmann et al. 2012, 
524) assumes, because "democracies are systems whose development is perpetually 
negotiated by political as well as societal forces, […] a variety of different democracies exist". 
This is why I take a different approach, and consider that there can be 'too much' of specific 
democratic dimensions - in other words, that an evaluation-surplus is not necessary a good 




could also argue that the (perceived) existence of a certain democratic feature which is not 
valued highly by a person could lead to negative attitudes about democracy in general. To put 
it differently: Someone who thinks that democracy should be representative and majoritarian 
might be unsatisfied when living in Switzerland, and someone who would prefer a 
consensual, proportional democracy with strong minority protection might be unhappy with 
the British model. Someone who opposes strong welfare and social redistribution could be 
deceived by Scandinavian democracies. Hence, citizens could be dissatisfied because they - 
perceivably - live in the wrong type of democratic system, or because their system delivers the 
wrong outputs. Democracy could create dissonance. This is why I will also test whether an 
evaluations-surplus has a different effect than a perfect match between expectations and 
evaluations. I do, however, think that this effect varies according to the dimensions: While the 
liberal democratic dimension is predominantly about democratic quality, and an absence of its 
realization would imply non-democraticness, the other two dimensions are more 'elective'. 
Social and direct democracy are possible democratic models, but not necessary conditions for 
democraticness. I thus assume that an evaluations-surplus matters more in these two 
dimensions than in the liberal dimension, where the notion that one cannot have too much 
democracy seems more justifiable.    
H2: Evaluations-surplus distances cause dissatisfaction in the social and direct democratic 
dimension, but not in the liberal dimension.  
Importantly, my approach also implies that levels do not matter: Whether expectations are 
low or high is not relevant for satisfaction, just how close they are to evaluations. In this I 
differ from Ferrín and Kriesi (2016a), who base their extensive book on the notion that the 
level of expectations is relevant for what they call legitimacy - the relationship between 
expectations and evaluations. Accordingly, they weight the gap between the two with the 
level of expectations (Wessels 2016, 248), and consider this the most appropriate measure. 
While there are certainly good arguments for including levels into the analysis (the realization 
of something important to a person might matter more than the realization of something non-
important), I believe that the question of distances is more interesting to explore. First, 
because it does address a notion that has been evoked in the public opinion literature 
recurrently: Is dissatisfaction a problem of too high expectations? In consequence, should 
citizens simply lower their expectations to be more satisfied? And secondly, because in the 
way I use distances - considering evaluations-surplus distances as well as expectations-surplus 




does, who, while testing for different legitimacy measures, always excludes evaluation-
surplus cases from the beginning. 
In the following, I first test for the effect of direction (evaluation-surplus vs. expectations-
surplus distances), then the effect of size (large vs. small distances), and then of size and 
direction (large vs small evaluation-surplus and expectations-surplus distances). The next 
section explains the data and operationalization I use for this analysis. 
Data: In order to test the effect of expectations and evaluations on satisfaction, I rely on the 
European Social Survey Round 6 (ESS 2012), which entails a module on citizens' 
understandings and evaluations of democracy, and covers almost 50.000 respondents in 26 
European countries.2  
Explanatory variables: The ESS 2012, as previously explained, contains a set of questions 
about citizens' expectations from democracy in general as well as their evaluations of the 
democratic reality. The expectations items start with the wording: "And now thinking about 
democracy in general: How important do you think it is for a democracy…", followed by a 
democratic attribute such as "…that national elections are free and fair?” The evaluations 
items read "Now thinking about how democracy is working in your country today, please tell 
me to what extend you think the following statement applies in [country]", followed by the 
same attribute, for instance: "National elections are free and fair”. Each statement can be 
answered on a scale from 0 (does not apply at all) to 10 (applies completely). The three 
dimensions of democracy that I use in my analysis are based on these items: Liberal and 
social democracy are additive indices of several items, and direct democracy is one item. All 
of them are (re)scaled to a 0 to 10 scale, and calculated for both expectations and evaluations. 
Each citizen, thus, has a specific position on all six scales: Liberal, social and direct 
expectations, as well as liberal, social and direct evaluations. The variables Expi and Evi 
measure expectations from and evaluations of democracy in each of the three dimensions. 
Following the spatial model explained in section 3, I first compose a variable measuring the 
gap between individuals’ expectations and evaluations in each of the three dimensions (i)3:  
Gi = Evi - Expi  
 
                                                 
2Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Ukraine and United Kingdom. 
3I distract expectations from evaluations in order to make interpretation easier, so that negative numbers indicate 





The distance D, then, is measured by4: 
Di  = 
√22  (Evi - Expi) 
I use the distance D as a main explanatory variable, but also test whether effects for the 
simple gap G are the same or differ. To find out which effect the size of the distances has, I 
also introduce a squared term of the gap as well as the distance variable (G2 and D2). 
Substantially, these variables assume that not the direction of the distance, but rather the size 
determines satisfaction. The bigger the distance (or gap) between expectations and 
evaluations, the more dissatisfied are citizens, independent of the direction of the distance.  
Further, as previously described, I also want to test which effect a combination of size and 
direction of the distance makes. To do so, I create a second version of the squared distance as 
well as gap measures, which differentiates between D2+ (G2+) and D2- ( G2-), where the 
former assembles all cases based on positive distances, and the latter the ones based on 
negative distances.5 
Additionally, I test for an interaction effect of expectations and evaluations (Ii = Expi * Evi) as 
a robustness check. An interaction between the two variables assumes that rather than the 
distance between them, evaluations matter depending on the level of expectations - 
evaluations, in other words, become relevant only when we multiply them with the 
importance someone attributes to this dimensions. This approach, which Wessels (2016, 239–
40) also uses to create a legitimacy measure from the same variables, does not directly 
involve a comparison of the two measures, but rather a weighting. Additionally, levels are 
important: High legitimacy (or, in my case, satisfaction) is only possible when both 
expectations and evaluations are high. This makes the approach different from my original 
measure which, as explained, focuses on distances instead of levels. 
Dependent variable: The ESS also includes the standard item to measure satisfaction with 
democracy (SWD), which is the main dependent variable in my analysis: "How satisfied are 
you with the way democracy is working in [country]"? As mentioned above, SWD has been 
criticized as being a less than ideal indicator because its meaning often remains unclear, both 
to researchers and to respondents in surveys: Does it measure general support for democracy 
as a principle, or regime performance? I use satisfaction as a measure of citizens' general 
happiness with their democratic experience. To make sure these results are robust, I also use 
political trust as an alternative dependent variable. As Easton has stated, political trust may be 
                                                 
4As Figure 3 illustrates, D is one side of a right-angled triangle with two equal sides, which makes G its 
hypotenuse and leads to this formula. 




defined as "the probability of getting preferred outcomes without the group doing anything to 
bring them about […]. For the regime, such trust would reveal itself as symbolic satisfaction 
with the processes by which the country is run (Easton 1975: 447). Trust can thus be seen as 
an anticipative form of 'proactive' satisfaction, and is, although not the same, a similar concept 
that should at least strongly correlate with satisfaction. I use three items measuring trust in 
different democratic institutions (trust in the national parliament, trust in courts and trust in 
political parties), out of which I create an additive index ranging from 0 to 10 and use it as a 
substitute dependent variable. These robustness tests are reported in the appendix. 
Control variables
6
: To control for socio-demographic factors on the individual-level, I use 
age, gender as well as education (in years). I further control for political interest, which has 
been proven to account for substantial individual variance in democratic satisfaction (Cutler, 
Nuesser, and Nyblade 2013; Stecker and Tausendpfund 2016), and according to the 'critical 
citizens' theory, should explain higher expectations. To account for country-level differences, 
I use a fixed-effects model, hence focusing on individual-level differences only7.  
To test for my first hypothesis (the bigger the distance, the lower is satisfaction), I first look at 
the effects of distances on satisfaction with democracy. Figure 4 shows the results: In the first 
panel, we can see that distances indeed have the predicted effects on satisfaction - the bigger 
the expectations-surplus, the lower the satisfaction. The effect size is the highest in the liberal 
dimension, followed by the social, and the lowest in the direct dimension. The second panel 
shows the same for a slightly different measure, the gap between expectations and 
evaluations. Although the effect sizes are slightly smaller, the pattern stays the same: 
Apparently, the bigger the distance or the gap between citizens' democratic expectations and 
the reality in their countries, the more they are dissatisfied, especially when this applies to 
liberal or social democracy. Wanting more democracy than one 'gets' is clearly a source of 
dissatisfaction. At the same time, distances (as well as gaps) do not explain all the individual-
level variance, but are about as big (in the case of gaps even smaller) in size as the effect of 
political interest, which I use as a control variable.  
                                                 
6See Table 2 in the appendix for descriptive statistics of all variables. 
7The standard fixed-effects model takes the following form: Yij = α + βXij + γi + ɛij, where i=1,... (for N 
individuals) and for j=1,... (for J countries). Both intercepts (α) and slopes (β) are held constant across countries. 
In my specific models, for each dimension of democracy the standard equation takes the form: SWDj = α + β1 
Expj + β2 Evi + β3 Distancei + γi + ɛij. 








Notes: Plots of regression coefficients, non-standardized. Full models see Table 2, Table 3 and Table 4 in the 
appendix. Dependent variable: Satisfaction with democracy. Data source: European Social Survey (ESS 2012). 




The fact that distances show a stronger effect than gaps, although they have a smaller 
variance8, support my assumption that they are a more appropriate measure for the 
relationship between expectations and evaluations. I use gaps as an alternative measure 
throughout the rest of the analysis nonetheless, to understand if there are further differences 
between the two approaches. In order to better understand the data, I then also test for the 
impact of expectations and evaluations separately.  
As we can see in the bottom panel, effects again differ quite a lot across dimensions of 
democracy, with comparatively strong effects of the liberal dimension, followed by the social 
and the direct dimension. Expectations seem to matter less than evaluations when it comes to 
explaining (dis)satisfaction, and are more ambiguous: While high expectations about liberal 
democracy go along with more satisfaction, higher expectations about social and direct 
democracy lead to more dissatisfaction. Hence, high expectations towards democracy are not 
genuinely a cause for dissatisfaction with democracy. Rather, holding high liberal democratic 
expectations leads to higher levels of satisfaction, even after controlling for socio-
demographic criteria as well as for democratic evaluations. High demands on democracy in 
the social or direct dimension, however, decrease satisfaction. The effect of evaluations on the 
other hand is genuinely positive, implying that good evaluations of their own democracy 
matter for citizens’ levels of satisfaction. Again, the effects differ considerably depending on 
the dimension of democracy, with the biggest effect sizes for the liberal dimension of 
democracy, smaller effects for the social dimension, and very small effects for the direct 
dimension. Replacing satisfaction with democracy by political trust as a robustness test leads 
to consistent results, as additional models in Tables 2 to 4 in the appendix show. 
Next, I include the squared distance term (as well as the squared gap term) to see whether it is 
the size of the distance rather than just its direction that matters. I assumed that not just 
expectation-surplus, but also evaluation-surplus distances have a negative effect on 
satisfaction, and that this effect takes place in the social and direct dimension rather than in 
the liberal one. As the quadratic prediction plots in Figure 5 show, the distance variable (left 
column) indeed has a curvilinear effect on the level of satisfaction with democracy: Negative 
values (hence, expectation-surpluses) lead to lower levels of satisfaction. Values around zero - 
hence, expectations which are met by evaluations - produce the highest levels of satisfaction.  
                                                 
8See Table 2 in the appendix - the range of values as well as the standard deviation in each of the three 




Figure 5: Quadratic prediction plots for the effects of distances and gaps on SWD. 
   
 
 
Notes: Dependent variable: Satisfaction with democracy. Quadratic prediction plots. (Left column: distances, 
right column: gaps). Full models see Table 3 and Table 4 in the appendix. Data source: European Social Survey 
(ESS 2012). Weighted with ESS post-stratification and population size weights. 
Yet, the curve flattens again when values become higher than zero, implying that evaluation-
surplus distances tend to make citizens more dissatisfied, too. The same pattern can be seen in 




not differ from the distance plots. Substantially, this means that not high expectations per se, 
but rather the combination of expectations which are perceived to be not met by the reality 
lead to dissatisfaction. At the same time, also a surplus of evaluations leads to less 
satisfaction, pointing to the fact that democracy can also be 'too much' or 'the wrong type of 
democracy'. Interestingly, this effect is least pronounced in the liberal dimension of 
democracy, where evaluation-surplus distances do not seem to matter as much as in the other 
two dimensions. Apparently, features of liberal democracy like competition, freedom and 
transparency are considered as essential by most European citizens, and cannot be 
implemented 'too strongly'. That is different in the two other dimensions - social and direct 
democracy - where the curve shows a stronger turn. These results, supporting hypothesis H2, 
suggest that procedural criteria of liberal democracy are indeed about democratic quality - 
about 'good' or 'bad', and are not optional. Democratic models, however, are: Input 
dimensions like direct participation and substantial output criteria like social justice can work 
in both directions. If someone does not want democracy to be strong on these dimensions, 
seeing them fulfilled in reality causes dissatisfaction, just like wanting these qualities in a 
democracy but not having them realized.  
At the same time, when looking at the actual distribution of cases on this curve (Figure 6 in 
the appendix), we can also see that most cases - citizens - are to be found on the left side of 
the graph, hence, have an expectations-surplus distance. Cases of evaluation-surpluses, and 
thus of the wrong model of democracy, are more rare than those of expectations exceeding 
evaluations. Given the fact that, as described above, high democratic expectations are, at least 
in the liberal dimension, associated with more satisfaction, we can assume that the cause for 
dissatisfaction here rather lies in the low democratic expectations than in the high evaluations. 
In the social and direct dimension, however, high expectations are actually associated with 
lower satisfaction – in this case, the dissatisfaction might actually be caused by the 
(perceived) realization of direct or social democratic principles which are not valued highly. 
Lastly, I also tested for a combination of size and direction by using the D2+ and D2- 
variables, where the former assembles all cases based on positive distances, and the latter the 
ones based on negative distances. Table 5 in the appendix shows that both variables have a 
negative effect on satisfaction in all three dimensions, meaning that both distance and size 
matter. The D2+ variable, however, is only significant in the direct democratic dimension, and 
not in the other two. This might be due to the very small N in this group, which is below 400, 
and thus only 1 percent of my original sample. Given the small number of respondents who 




with caution. However, the fact that negative effects prevail also for this type of distances 
supports my previous results about the effect of size, and hypothesis H2. The gap measure, if 
coded in the same way, shows very similar results, as Table 5 also displays.9 
In sum, why are citizens dissatisfied with democracy? They are dissatisfied because they do 
not get what they want. This result, simple as it may be, has not been tested systematically yet 
in the public opinion literature. Using a spatial model of democratic demand and supply, this 
paper shows that satisfaction with democracy is indeed consistently related to the discrepancy 
between what 'should be' and what 'is'. In the first part of my analysis, I show that the distance 
between expectations and evaluations matters, as bigger distances decrease citizens’ 
satisfaction in all three dimensions of democracy. The same holds true when using the gap 
measure instead. So, dissatisfaction can be caused by expectations that are not met by the 
democratic reality. Accordingly, the notion that there is a coherent relationship between the 
demands citizens make to democracy, the quality of institutions that is realized in their 
country, and their levels of satisfaction is right. This is good news from a methodological 
perspective, given that this assumption is the explicit or implicit base for much of the 
literature that aims at explaining satisfaction with democracy with differing levels of 
institutional quality across countries. Does this mean that citizens want 'too much', as Crozier, 
Huntington, and Watanuki (1975) warned several decades ago? Should they lower their 
expectations? On the one hand, that would potentially decrease the distance between the 
'ought' and the 'is' of existing democracies.  
On the other hand, looking at expectations and evaluations separately shows that there is 
actually little evidence for the 'critical citizens' claim that high expectations are a strong cause 
of dissatisfaction: Holding high standards concerning liberal democracy actually makes 
citizens more satisfied. Wanting high democratic quality in a liberal sense, in terms of 
competition, transparency, accountability and pluralism, leads to more satisfaction with its 
functioning in general. Yet, this mechanism does not work when it comes to the social 
dimension of democracy - the question whether democracy should also be responsible for 
                                                 
9Additionally, a robustness test using the interaction term of expectations and evaluations instead of the distance 
measure (see Table 7 in the appendix) shows that that the interaction effect is particularly strong in the liberal 
dimension (Figure 7 in the appendix). This point to the fact that in the liberal dimension, the level of 
expectations affects the strength of the effect evaluations have on satisfaction - the higher the expectations, the 
stronger the effect. In the other two dimensions, the effects are also positive, but less strong. These results 
underline the finding that liberal democracy is about quality, of which one cannot have too much. This 
dimension is highly supported by most people, and its effect on satisfaction depends on the importance citizens 
attribute to it. 




providing its citizens with social security and ensure a certain level of economic equality - as 
well as direct participation, where high expectations decrease satisfaction. If anything, 
citizens should lower their expectations concerning 'optional' democratic dimensions that go 
beyond liberal democratic standards. Wanting 'less democracy', or a less good democracy, is 
clearly not a way to increase satisfaction. 
This important distinction between dimensions of democracy when it comes to their effects on 
satisfaction can also be seen in the second part of my analysis: When testing for the effects of 
size in addition to the direction of distances, I find that not just expectation-surplus distances 
matter, but also evaluation-surplus distances - citizens do get dissatisfied if their democracy 
realizes too much of a dimensions they do not support. Yet, this is only the fact for the social 
and direct dimension, which are 'optional' models of democracy that some citizens want and 
some do not. Democratic quality in liberal democratic terms, however, can never be realized 
too strongly. Moreover, these results support the finding that the distance between 
expectations and evaluations is a useful measure to conceptualize the relationship between 
citizens' democratic attitudes. The use of a spatial model, borrowed from the political 
competition literature, turns out to be a valuable contribution to the research on satisfaction 
with democracy. The fact that the distance measure worked even better in explaining 
satisfaction than the (simpler) gap measure implies that the spatial model is an appropriate 
way to conceptualize support for democracy. 
Generally, these results suggest that we should be careful to assume that dissatisfaction is 
mainly an expression of rising demands to the democratic system. While 'wanting too much' 
can be a source of dissatisfaction, it is not about wanting too much democracy, but about 
wanting a different democracy. As the previous chapters of this dissertation have already 
elaborated, democracy is a multidimensional construct, also in the minds of citizens. This 
obviously also affects satisfaction: When asking respondents how satisfied they are with 
democracy, the answer is a product of different considerations, and of different aspects of 
democracy being weighted differently. While they might be happy with some aspects of 
democracy, they are lacking others, or even feel that some dimensions of democracy should 
be less strong. This also gives some insights on what SWD as an indicator means: It offers 
merely an aggregate version of different attitudes mixed together. This does not mean that one 
should not use it - it obviously is linked to expectations and evaluations in a consistent way. 
Yet, to really understand why a person is satisfied or not, one should consider a more 
multidimensional approach to democracy, and a more detailed analysis of the attitudes 




of democracy) is certainly a good example of diversifying the items measuring democratic 
support.  
There are of course limitations to the analysis done here: I look uniquely at the individual 
level, and do not analyse country-level differences. This is because I am interested in the 
relationship between different attitudes towards democracy on the individual level - what does 
satisfaction with democracy mean to citizens? However, after establishing that the 
relationship between expectations, evaluations and satisfaction is indeed coherent and 
understanding better how to measure it, an important next step is to find out which groups of 
people are dissatisfied on what grounds, and how that varies across countries. This is what I 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of all variables. 
 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Explanatory variables 
Expectations “liberal” 45374 8.448662 1.513478 0 10 
Evaluations “liberal” 43756 6.729267 1.923673 0 10 
Distance “liberal” 42630 -1.202241 1.505557 -7.071 4.808 
Distance “liberal” (squared) 42630 3.712032 6.74521 0 50 
Gap “liberal” 42630 -1.700225 2.12918 -10 6.8 
Gap “liberal” (squared) 42630 7.424065 13.49042 0 100 
Expectations “social” 46812 8.424645 1.855974 0 10 
Evaluations “social” 46172 4.009865 2.705728 0 10 
Distance “social” 45498 -3.11415 2.462902 -7.071 6.717 
Distance “social” (squared) 45498 15.76368 16.39676 0 50 
Gap “social” 45498 -4.404073 3.483069 -10 9.5 
Gap “social” (squared) 45498 31.52736 32.79353 0 100 
Expectations “direct” 46647 8.29213 2.014664 0 10 
Evaluations “direct” 45716 5.037842 3.145245 0 10 
Distance “direct” 45069 -2.288224 2.504804 -7.071 7.071 
Distance “direct” (squared) 45069 11.50987 15.069 0 50 
Gap “direct” 45069 -3.236038 3.542327 -10 10 
Gap “direct” (squared) 45069 23.01975 30.138 0 100 
Dependent variables 
Satisfaction with democracy (SWD) 46692 5.232395 2.551885 0 10 
Trust in the parliament 47179 3.997435 2.66601 0 10 
Trust in political parties 47258 3.270452 2.414969 0 10 
Trust in the legal system 47124 4.800611 2.805074 0 10 
Control variables 
Gender (1=male) 48369 .4592611 .4983427 0 1 
Education (years) 48386 12.52027 3.90489 0 20 
Age (years) 48275 48.76151 18.57574 15 103 
Political interest (1=high) 48194 .4457194 .49705 0 1 







Table 2: Explaining satisfaction with democracy (Model 1, expectations and evaluations). 
 
 Model 1 Model 1b 
 Satisfaction with democracy Political trust  
(robustness test) 
Expectations “liberal” 0.122*** 0.0295*** 
 (14.63) (3.99) 
Evaluations “liberal” 0.345*** 0.228*** 
 (49.30) (36.50) 
Expectations “social” -0.0755*** -0.0387*** 
 (-12.07) (-6.97) 
Evaluations “social” 0.232*** 0.214*** 
 (46.31) (48.01) 
Expectations “direct” -0.0727*** -0.0842*** 
 (-12.32) (-16.03) 
Evaluations “direct” 0.0306*** 0.0168*** 
 (7.44) (4.59) 
Gender (male) -0.0319 -0.132*** 
 (-1.61) (-7.47) 
Education (years) 0.0155*** 0.0321*** 
 (5.38) (12.51) 
Age -0.00408*** -0.00527*** 
 (-7.10) (-10.27) 
Political interest 0.166*** 0.564*** 
 (7.72) (29.53) 
Constant 2.005*** 2.029*** 
 (24.18) (27.49) 
N Level 1 40288 39839 
N Level 2 26 26 
AIC 168239.2 156626.7 
BIC 168333.8 156721.2 






p<0.001. Data source: 









Table 3: Explaining satisfaction with democracy (Model 2, distances). 
 
 (Model 2) (Model 2a) (Model 2b) 






Distance “liberal” 0.259*** 0.0183 0.0421*** 
 (28.68) (1.30) (3.45) 
Distance “social” 0.221*** 0.0302* 0.0295** 
 (39.11) (2.70) (3.05) 
Distance “direct” 0.0668*** -0.0128 0.0518*** 
 (12.49) (-1.38) (11.23) 
Distance “liberal” (squared)  -0.0589*** -0.0387*** 
  (-19.59) (-15.00) 
Distance “social” (squared)  -0.0333*** -0.0292*** 
  (-19.29) (-19.75) 
Distance “direct” (squared)  -0.0138*** -0.0108*** 
  (-9.08) (-8.15) 
Gender (male) 0.00747 0.0418* -0.0932*** 
 (0.36) (2.03) (-5.20) 
Education (years) 0.0336*** 0.0284*** 0.0383*** 
 (11.25) (9.63) (14.88) 
Age -0.00188** -0.00169** -0.00389*** 
 (-3.10) (-2.84) (-7.45) 
Political interest 0.380*** 0.357*** 0.677*** 
 (17.04) (16.23) (35.21) 
Constant 5.581*** 3.767*** 3.053*** 
 (88.96) (46.11) (41.16) 
N Level 1 40288 40288 39839 
N Level 2 26 26 26 
AIC 172481.9 171274.7 158084.4 
BIC 172550.7 171369.4 158179.0 






p<0.001. Data source: 







Table 4: Explaining satisfaction with democracy (Model 3, gaps). 
 
 (Model 3) (Model 3a) (Model 3b) 






Gap “liberal” 0.183*** 0.0129 0.0387*** 
 (28.68) (1.30) (4.46) 
Gap “social” 0.156*** 0.0213* 0.0291*** 
 (39.11) (2.70) (4.22) 
Gap “direct” 0.0472*** 0.00902 0.00141 
 (12.49) (1.38) (0.25) 
Gap “liberal” (squared)  -0.0295*** -0.0172*** 
  (-19.59) (-13.09) 
Gap “social” (squared)  -0.0167*** -0.0134*** 
  (-19.29) (-17.74) 
Gap “direct” (squared)  -0.00690*** -0.00541*** 
  (-9.08) (-8.15) 
Gender (male) 0.00747 0.0418* -0.0866*** 
 (0.36) (2.03) (-4.83) 
Education (years) 0.0336*** 0.0284*** 0.0384*** 
 (11.25) (9.63) (14.90) 
Age -0.00188** -0.00169** -0.00380*** 
 (-3.10) (-2.84) (-7.28) 
Political interest 0.380*** 0.357*** 0.679*** 
 (17.04) (16.23) (35.36) 
Constant 5.909*** 5.792*** 4.369*** 
 (105.20) (104.27) (89.86) 
N Level 1 40288 40288 39839 
N Level 2 26 26 26 
AIC 172481.9 171274.7 158084.4 
BIC 172550.7 171369.4 158179.0 






p<0.001. Data source: 










Notes: Quadratic prediction plots. (Left column: distances, right column: gaps). Full models see Table 3 and 
Table 4 in the appendix. Data source: European Social Survey (ESS 2012). Weighted with ESS post-






Table 5: Explaining satisfaction with democracy (Model 4, positive and negative distances 
and gaps). 
 
 (Model 4a) (Model 4b) (Model 4c) (Model 4d) 








Dist. “liberal” (+ squared) -0.0594    
 (-1.33)    
Dist. “social” (+ squared) -0.0163    
 (-1.38)    
Dist. “direct” (+ squared)  -0.0416*    
 (-1.81)    
Dist. “liberal” (- squared)  -0.0598***   
  (-29.05)   
Dist. “social” (- squared)  -0.0376***   
  (-35.52)   
Dist. “direct” (- squared)  -0.0138***   
  (-13.45)   
Gap “liberal” (+ squared)   -0.0297  
   (-1.33)  
Gap “social” (+ squared)    -0.0115  
   (-1.38)  
Gap “direct” (+ squared)   -0.0208*  
   (-1.81)  
Gap “liberal” (- squared)     -0.0299*** 
    (-29.05) 
Gap “social” (- squared)     -0.0188*** 
    (-35.52) 
Gap “direct” (- squared)    -0.00691*** 
    (-13.45) 
Gender (male) 0.524* -0.00604 0.524* -0.00604 
 (2.45) (-0.23) (2.45) (-0.23) 
Education (years) 0.0414 0.0242*** 0.0414 0.0242*** 
 (1.29) (6.29) (1.29) (6.29) 
Age -0.000258 -0.00266*** -0.000258 -0.00266*** 
 (-0.05) (-3.33) (-0.05) (-3.33) 
Political interest 0.451 0.291*** 0.451 0.291*** 
 (1.94) (10.15) (1.94) (10.15) 
Constant 5.150*** 5.807*** 5.150*** 5.807*** 
 (9.71) (78.80) (9.71) (78.80) 
N Level 1 372 23475 372 23475 
N Level 2 26 26 26 26 
AIC 1567.8 99503.8 1567.8 99503.8 
BIC 1536.4 99439.3 1536.4 99439.3 






p<0.001. Data source: 





Table 6: Explaining satisfaction with democracy (Model 5, interaction effects). 
 
 (Model 5) (Model 5b) 
 Satisfaction with democracy Political trust  
(robustness test) 
Expectations “liberal” 0.0753*** 0.0223 
 (3.50) (1.17) 
Evaluations “liberal” 0.274*** 0.217*** 
 (9.06) (8.02) 
Interaction “liberal” 0.00781* 0.00128 
 (2.31) (0.42) 
Expectations “social” -0.0975*** -0.0408*** 
 (-8.96) (-4.23) 
Evaluations “social” 0.180*** 0.209*** 
 (8.85) (11.60) 
Interaction “social” 0.00593* 0.000541 
 (2.63) (0.27) 
Expectations “direct” -0.0910*** -0.0788*** 
 (-9.94) (-9.66) 
Evaluations “direct” -0.0107 0.0279* 
 (-0.70) (2.06) 
Interaction  “direct” 0.00474* -0.00129 
 (2.78) (-0.85) 
Gender (male) -0.0305 -0.132*** 
 (-1.54) (-7.47) 
Education (years) 0.0154*** 0.0321*** 
 (5.35) (12.52) 
Age -0.00419*** -0.00527*** 
 (-7.28) (-10.26) 
Political interest 0.165*** 0.564*** 
 (7.68) (29.52) 
Constant 2.785*** 2.061*** 
 (14.80) (12.33) 
N Level 1 40288 39839 
N Level 2 26 26 
AIC 168215.2 156631.8 
BIC 168335.7 156752.1 






p<0.001. Data source: 















Notes: Average marginal effects for interaction terms in Table 6. Data source: European Social Survey (ESS 









Chapter Four: Why perceived deprivation matters: Social status and 







Why do losers like democracy less than winners? The fact that social status has an impact on 
satisfaction with democracy is, while empirically established, often overlooked in the 
literature. This paper analyses the effects of subjective and objective social status on citizens' 
expectations from democracy and evaluations democracy. I argue that relative deprivation, 
defined as the notion of being left behind in society and disadvantaged by social inequality, 
systematically affects the way citizens judge their own democracy: The lower their status, the 
more they support substantive over procedural democracy, and the more critical they see their 
own democracies. Using data for 26 countries from the European Social Survey 6, I test 
whether citizens’ attitudes towards democracy are affected by perceived deprivation as well 
as objective socio-economic status. Results show that a low status leads citizens to value 
democratic dimensions differently - they prefer social justice over liberal criteria. 
Additionally, low status citizens also evaluate the performance of their own democratic 
system in all dimensions significantly more critical than their higher status counterparts. 
These two effects combined create a bigger 'distance' between low-status citizens' 
expectations and evaluations, especially in the social dimension, causing them to be more 
prone to democratic dissatisfaction. I further find differences across countries: Citizens in 
former communist countries and countries affected by the Eurocrisis generally have higher 
expectations from democracy, while simultaneously evaluating their own democratic systems 
more negatively. In Western Europe, on the other hand, social status affects citizens' attitudes 





Citizens, as the previous chapters of this dissertation have established, vary in their position 
on scales of democracy. They can expect democracy to be more or less liberal, social, or 
direct and find these dimension more or less implemented in their own democracy. 
Dissatisfaction, then, can be described as a function of what democracy should be and what it 
actually is: Citizens want more democracy, or they want a different democracy - one that is 
more or less liberal, social or direct. These findings prompt more questions: Which groups of 
people are dissatisfied on what grounds? And how does that vary across countries?  
This chapter wants to find answers to these questions by analysing how citizens' social status 
matters for their democratic expectations and evaluations. Why should we look at status to 
explain individual-level differences in democratic support? The question of social status - or 
social class, as it has been called traditionally - is an old one: Lipset and Rokkan (1967) 
believed that the class-cleavage was essential in determining political behaviour, and while it 
was long considered as a factor with declining importance (Knutsen 2007, 457–58), factors 
like income, education and occupation (summarized as socio-economic status) are still 
commonly used to explain political behaviour such as turnout (Leighley and Nagler 1992; 
Kasara and Suryanarayan 2015), political participation (Quintelier and Hooghe 2013) or vote 
choice (Werts, Scheepers, and Lubbers 2012), and have been shown to account for 
substantive variance. As Ceka and Magalhães (2016, 92) have observed, the fact that people 
with higher status tend to support democracy more than their low-status counterparts "has 
often passed unremarked". Some authors, however, have analysed the relationship between 
socio-economic status and democratic support: Schäfer (2013) for example finds that 
satisfaction with democracy is higher for people with higher education and incomes, and that 
country-level inequality additionally lowers satisfaction. Carlin (2006) argues that education 
and income increase diffuse support for democracy and values of self-expression. But this 
evidence that 'losers do not like democracy' (Anderson et al. 2005) does not explain why 
exactly that is the case, which is what the following chapter wants to do.  
I assume that the status position of citizens influences their expectations from and evaluations 
of democracy. Theoretically, I take two steps: First, does status explain which democratic 
dimensions people want more, and which ones they miss more? And secondly, in which 
countries does deprivation matter more, in in which less? I define social status as the relative 
position in society (compared to other citizens), which is a subjective measure, but also test 





income, education and occupation. For my analysis, I use data for 26 countries from the 
European Social Survey 6. I also take into account the country-level variance by testing these 
effects across different groups of European democracies: I assume that social status matters 
more in post-communist countries and countries affected by the Eurocrisis. This chapter start 
by stating my hypotheses on the effects of social status, and their differences across countries. 
Next, I explain how I conceptualize social status, and proceed to the empirical analysis. 
Lastly, I discuss and interpret the results. 
Procedure vs. substance: How status affects democratic attitudes  
As the previous chapters of this dissertation have established, I use a threefold concept of 
support for democracy, based on expectations from democracy, evaluations of democracy, 
and satisfaction with democracy. Chapter One found that democracy is a multidimensional 
construct in citizens' attitudes, which is not just about more or less, or about good or bad 
democracy. Rather, democracy has different dimensions, and citizens vary in their position on 
these dimensions. The structure of this democratic space is the same across citizens and 
countries: Liberal democracy and social democracy build the two main dimensions. 
Additionally, I also use direct democracy as a third dimension. Citizens then vary in their 
position on these scales: They can expect democracy to be more or less liberal, social, or 
direct and find these dimension more or less implemented in their own democracy. Chapter 
Two has analysed how regime-specific socialization experiences affect citizens' expectations. 
Chapter Three, then, has shown that these three attitudes are linked to each other in a 
meaningful way: The distance between what citizens want democracy to be (expectations) 
and what they see realized in their own countries (evaluations) determines their levels of 
satisfaction. Dissatisfaction, in other words, can be described as a function of what democracy 
should be and what it actually is: Citizens want more democracy, or they want a different 
democracy - one that is more or less liberal, social or direct. Hence, there are different causes 
for dissatisfaction. This finding prompts more questions: Which groups of people are 
dissatisfied on what grounds? And how does that vary across countries? This chapter wants to 
answer these questions by analysing how citizens' status matters for their democratic 
expectations and evaluations.  
My first argument is that social status influences what citizens want from a democracy: 
Procedural or substantial fairness. Why would status matter for that? Social dominance 
theory, which tries to understand how group-based social hierarchy is formed and maintained, 




suggests that there are behavioural asymmetries between dominant and subordinate groups. 
The social, psychological and ideological forces that help sustain group dominance work 
better for people in dominant than in subordinate groups, making them more prone to 
support these forces (Pratto, Sidanius, and Levin 2006, 280). Subordinate groups, in 
consequence, are more likely to reject the status quo, while privileged groups who benefit 
from this status quo strive to preserve it (Turner and Reynolds 2003, 201). Ceka and 
Magalhães (2016) confer this argument to democratic attitudes, arguing that high-status 
citizens should be more likely to support democracy in its current liberal, procedural form 
than low-status citizens, as their social privilege make them profit from this status quo. Low-
status citizens, on the other hand, feel that they do not profit from the liberal democratic 
reality, and should be more likely to want a change of the democratic system (ibid.: 93ff). A 
similar argument has been made by Aarts, Thomassen, and van Ham (2014), who claim that 
citizens with a low socio-economic status are more negatively affected by globalization while 
simultaneously being less represented by parties, which makes them more dissatisfied with 
democratic procedures. While the idea that more education and income make citizens more 
supportive and convinced of liberal democratic and emancipative values is an established part 
of modernization theory (cf. Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Welzel 2013), the difference is that 
social dominance theory is about the relative level of resources, or status, in a society. 
Modernization theory claims that, independently of context, more material and cognitive 
resources lead people to embrace liberal democracy. Social dominance theory claims that a 
relatively higher status compared to those in the same society makes dominant groups 
embrace the political status quo, which, in the case of established democracies, happens to be 
a liberal one (Ceka and Magalhães 2016, 94).  
This notion also refers to the concept of relative deprivation (i.e. Merton 1938; Gurr 1970), 
claiming that rather than absolute poverty or deprivation, it is the feeling of having an 
unfavourable social position and being deprived of status, money or other valuable societal 
assets compared to others that sparks people's discontent and makes them push for social 
change (Pettigrew 2002, 352). A relatively lower social status, accordingly, should go along 
with a desire to change the political status quo - liberal democracy. It should also make 
citizens more motivated to change that status to a more fair one: Being at the (perceived) 
lower end of the social hierarchy should lead to more support for substantial aspects of 
democracy, while dominant groups oppose ideas of more social justice, as this would most 
likely mean a redistribution to their disadvantage (Ceka and Magalhães 2016, 95). This is in 




socio-economic status (Gilens 2005; Dion and Birchfield 2010). When it comes to democratic 
preferences, then, status should determine whether citizens support procedural fairness of 
democracy, or focus on substantial social justice as an outcome. Indeed, analysing democratic 
support in sub-Saharan Africa, Bratton (2006) finds that while poor people are dissatisfied 
with the quality of democratic institutions in their countries, they prefer to bypass formal 
democratic channels and use informal, often clientelist channels to address their economic 
grievances.  
Based on this theoretical background, I expect perceived deprivation - the notion of being left 
behind in society and disadvantaged by social inequality - to play an important role for 
democratic support. I expect a high status to increase support for liberal and procedural 
elements, and lower status to go along with favouring substantial, output aspects of 
democracy, as Figure 1 illustrates:  
Figure 1: The effect of social status on democratic expectations. 
 
This leads to the following hypotheses: 
H1: The higher citizens' perceived status, the higher their support for procedural democracy.  
H2: The lower citizens' perceived status, the higher their support for substantial democracy. 
Moreover, I expect that the perceived social position also affects the way citizens evaluate 
their own democracy. The resource model of political participation (Verba, Schlozman, and 




increases as socio-economic resources grow. The most crucial determinant of political activity 
is resources - money, time and civic skills (Blais 2007, 631). High-status citizens are thus 
better able to use social institutions, and possess the resources to defend their interests, so that 
they are more likely to also be political winners. This increases their trust in political 
institutions compared to losers, who lack education, resources, and networks to influence, 
understand and profit from societal and political institutions, and hence do not trust them to 
operate in their favour. This is confirmed by the literature on social and political trust: Zmerli 
and Newton (2011, 85) find that low social status and low education are generally associated 
with lower social and political trust, and that 'winners' are more trusting than 'losers'. 
Interestingly, their results also show that citizens perceived status as a societal winner or loser 
matters for their levels of trust, not their ascribed status. As Mishler and Rose (2001, 54) have 
stated, effects of national political and economic performance on individual levels of political 
trust "are indirect and mediated at the micro level by an individual’s […] perceptions". 
Hence, individual perceptions seem to play an important role in generating political trust by 
channelling and mediating the impact of macro-level conditions (cf. Zmerli, Newton, and 
Montero 2007). These perceptions could also contribute to forming citizens evaluations of 
one's own democratic system: High-status citizens who possess resources have had more 
positive experiences with democracy, and are more likely to feel their interests represented. 
Further, they know better how to use existing political institutions, making them more likely 
to find them working well and to their advantage than low-status citizens. Concretely, I 
suppose that a perceived low social status leads citizens to systematically evaluate their own 
democracy more critically than citizens with a perceived high status do: 
H3: The lower citizens perceived status, the more negative are citizens' evaluations of their 
own democracy. 
In conclusion, this would also mean that the distance between citizens' expectations and 
evaluations should be bigger for citizens with a low position in society, especially for the 
social dimension; democracy as substance. 
Relative deprivation in Europe: Where do the dissatisfied live? 
Secondly, I want to know if the causes of dissatisfaction differ across countries. The second 
chapter of this dissertation has shown that regime-specific socialization affects democratic 
expectations, providing supports for findings on country-level differences in democratic 
support by other authors (Hernández 2016; Kriesi, Saris, and Moncagatta 2016). But how 




people live? First of all, as described in Chapter Two, we know that differing socialization 
experiences in post-authoritarian countries impact citizens democratic attitudes: In countries 
democratized in the 'third wave' starting in the 1970s (Huntington 1991) the concept of 
democracy was often linked to the idea of economic reforms and development in order to 
catch up with Western Europe and North America. This connection between economic 
wellbeing and democracy, according to Bochsler and Hänni (2015), led citizens of third wave 
countries to see political rights and better economic life conditions as two sides of the same 
medal, leading to a more performance-based support for democracy. Economic prosperity is 
especially important in these countries because it signals the degree to which elites do deliver 
as promised (Keman 2014). Magalhães (2017) makes the argument that in younger 
democracies with less developed institutions, economic outcomes are generally more 
important for legitimacy, and citizens tend to base their democratic support on performance.  
Liberal democracies, on the other hand, ideally dispose of a more procedural legitimacy, 
where the perceived fairness of rules leads to support for democracy independently of outputs 
(Gilley 2006). The more established a democracy is, the more advanced should its level of 
procedural support be (Huang, Chang, and Chu 2008). Accordingly, citizens of post-
authoritarian democracies should be more likely to take social and economic output criteria of 
a democracy into account, and to be critical of the liberal 'status quo', especially if they feel 
deprived of a societal status they felt they were promised by (or that they held before) 
democratization. While this theory applies to all former authoritarian countries, Chapter One 
and Two have shown that post-communist countries often differ most strongly from their 
Western European counterparts, while citizens from former authoritarian countries in 
Southern Europe do not show strong differences in their democratic attitudes. Additionally, as 
Chapter Two has explained in more detail, socialization differed quiet strongly in communist 
countries as compared to liberal democracies, focusing on (and gaining legitimacy through) 
outputs in from of social and economic wellbeing rather than procedural fairness. Based on 
this, I focus on post-communist countries in this analysis, and assume that living in these 
countries makes the aforementioned effects of perceived relative deprivation on democratic 
support stronger: 
H4: Living in former communist countries reinforces the positive effect of status on support 
for procedural democracy.  
H5: Living in former communist countries reinforces the negative effect of status on support 




H6: Living in former communist countries reinforces the negative effect of status on 
democratic evaluations. 
In addition, the data I use has been collected in 2012, and thus at the height of the Eurozone 
crisis. Given the broad political and economic repercussions for the affected countries and 
their democratic systems, one could assume that citizens of crisis-struck countries differ in 
their attitudes. First of all, the economic crisis has certainly created more economic 'losers', 
and sharpened the difference between higher and lower status citizens. Further, the crisis has 
also shifted the political focus on social and economic factors rather than democratic 
procedures. Some countries were even objected to severe limitations of their democratic 
autonomy by international institutions (and several changed their government as a direct 
result, such as Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal and Ireland), which could have led to more 
critical perspective on democracy amongst its citizens, especially those on the lower end of 
the social strata. Pennings (2017) argues that especially in times of economic crisis, support 
for democracy is  conditional on the functioning of social welfare and safeguarding of income 
levels. Citizens living in countries hit strongly by the Eurozone crisis and the following 
austerity measures, where social welfare and wages were cut and unemployment rose, should 
thus focus more on substantial than on procedural aspects of democracy than others.  
H7: Living in Eurozone crisis countries reinforces the positive effect of status on support for 
procedural democracy.  
H8: Living in Eurozone crisis countries reinforces the negative effect of status on support for 
substantive democracy.  
H9: Living in Eurozone crisis countries reinforces the negative effect of status on democratic 
evaluations. 
To test my hypothesis, I use the European Social Survey Round 6 data (ESS 2012) described 
in the previous chapters for individual-level data. For data on the country-level, I use the 
Democracy Barometer (Merkel et al. 2016) and the Standardized World Income Inequality 
Database (Solt 2016). See Table  1 in the appendix for descriptive statistics of all variables. 
Dependent variables: As operationalized in the previous chapters, I use the additive indices 
from the ESS 2012, measuring expectations from as well as evaluations of democracy for 
liberal, social and direct democracy on a scale from 0 to 10. Procedural democracy is 
measured by the liberal democratic dimension, while substantial democracy is measured by 




the social democratic dimension. Direct democracy, the third dimension used throughout this 
thesis, would rather fall under procedural than substantive democracy. I test the same models 
with this third dimension as a robustness test, and report the results in the appendix.  
Explanatory variables: As described in the previous section, I am interested in the effects of 
social status from a perceived deprivation perspective: I want to know which impact citizens 
perceived status compared to other citizens has on their democratic support. Socio-economic 
status is traditionally measured with three indicators: Education, income, and occupation. 
These indicators, however, measure absolute rather than relative deprivation (or status) - they 
are about levels. Yet, as Chapter Three has established, I focus on distances rather than on 
levels in explaining support. Consequently, I am more interested in the relative than the 
absolute position in society, and on individual perceptions rather than 'objective' status. This 
is why I use respondents' self-identified status as a main explanatory variable: Their place in 
society, measured on an 11-point scale (0=bottom of the society, 10=top of the society).1 This 
question is a newer version and replacement of the traditional social class self-assessment and 
is the most adequate indicator for perceived status the ESS 2012 offers.  
To assure that I do not miss on the potential effects of objective socio-economic status, I also 
test the same models with the traditional socio-economic status indicators. The three 
indicators are the total net household income, measured in deciles (1= first decile, 10 = 10th 
decile), education (in years) as well as occupation (9=professional and technical occupations, 
8=higher administrator occupations, 7=clerical occupations, 6=sales occupations, 5=service 
occupations, 4=skilled worker, 3=semi-skilled worker, 2=unskilled worker, 1=farm worker).             
Country groups: Based on the hypotheses listed in Section 3, stating that effects might differ 
in former communist countries, I code 11 countries (Albania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Eastern Germany, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine) as post-
communist countries. I also assume that being affected by the Eurozone crisis and its 
following austerity measures and government changes increases the effects of social status. 
Accordingly, I code Cyprus, Ireland, Italy, Spain and Portugal as Eurocrisis countries - all 
countries which have had interventions by the ECB and IMF, the implementation of austerity 
measures, and government changes as a result of the crisis. 
Control variables: On the individual level, I control for gender and age. On the country level, 
controls depend on the model: In models with social democracy as a dependent variable, I use 
the Gini coefficient as well as e the level of redistribution by the state (Solt 2016) to capture 
                                                 
1The exact wording of the question is: "There are people who tend to be towards the top of our society and 
people who tend to be towards the bottom. On this card there is a scale that runs from top to bottom. Where 




differences in wealth distribution and social welfare that could systematically affect citizens' 
attitudes towards social justice. Further, I use the age of democracy (Marshall and Gurr 2016) 
and democratic quality (Merkel et al. 2016) in the models that test for the effect of former 
communist countries and Euro crisis countries, to account for their effects on support for that 
I found in Chapter Two.  
Individual-level effects 
To start, I analyse the effects of subjective as well as objective status on citizens' expectations 
from democracy. Figure 2 shows the individual level results of a multilevel regression model 
as coefficient plots.  
Figure 2: Effects of subjective and objective status on expectations from democracy. 
 
Notes: Plots of regression coefficients, non-standardized. Full models see Table 2 and Table 3 in the appendix. 
Data source: European Social Survey (ESS 2012). Weighted with ESS post-stratification and population size 
weights.  
We can see that subjective status - citizens' self-assigned place in society - has the expected 
effects: The higher the perceived status, the higher are liberal democratic expectations, and 
the lower social democratic expectations. This confirms hypotheses H1 and H2: A low social 
status goes along with higher substantial democratic expectations, and a high status with 





economic status income, education, and occupation shows similar results: All three variables 
have a positive effect on liberal democratic expectations, and a negative effect on social 
democratic expectations. Yet, the effects of perceived status are bigger than those of objective 
socio-economic status. An additional model testing the effects of status on direct democratic 
expectations as robustness tests (Table 4 in the appendix) shows that, interestingly, direct 
democracy follows the same pattern as social democracy, and is stronger supported by those 
with lower status. Lastly, we can see a strong effect of the control variable gender: Men 
support liberal democracy more strongly, while women rather support social democracy2. 
Next, I look at how citizens' evaluations of democracy are affected by status. Figure 3 shows 
the coefficient plots for the models using democratic evaluations as a dependent variable.  
Figure 3: Effects of subjective and objective status on evaluations of democracy. 
 
Notes: Plots of regression coefficients, non-standardized. Full models see Table 5 and Table 6 in the appendix. 
Data source: European Social Survey (ESS 2012). Weighted with ESS post-stratification and population size 
weights. 
Subjective status measured by the place in society has a strong and positive effect on both 
liberal and social evaluations, supporting hypothesis H3: The higher citizens' status, the better 
their evaluations of their own democracy. Objective socio-economic status shows more mixed 
results: Income and occupation have a positive, though smaller, effect on evaluations, while 
                                                 
2This finding can actually be explained by social dominance theory as well, as gender is another factor creating a 
hierarchy in society, where women have a systematically lower status position than men (Pratto, Sidanius, and 




education has a mixed effect. Gender, again, is a strong predictor, with men evaluating their 
own democracies better than women. The model with direct democracy as a dependent 
variable (Table 7 in the appendix) again supports the results for subjective status, which has a 
positive effect on evaluations, but shows negative effects for education and occupation, giving 
again a less clear picture for objective status. 
Country-level effects 
So far, the individual level hypotheses have been confirmed, showing that social status - 
especially perceived status - affects the way citizens view and evaluate democracy. But how 
do these effects differ across country groups? I start again with expectations from democracy: 
Hypotheses H4, H5, H7 and H8 assumed that living in post-communist and Eurocrisis 
countries reinforces the effects of status on democratic expectations, meaning that citizens of 
both these country groups should have a stronger positive effect of status on liberal 
democratic expectations, and a stronger negative effect of status on social democratic 
expectations. To test these hypotheses, I introduce a cross-level interaction term between the 
country group (Post-communist countries, Eurocrisis countries, and 'the rest' - Western 
European countries) and subjective status (citizens' place in society). The full models are in 
the appendix (Models 3 and 4 in Table 2 and 3). To illustrate the interaction effects better, 
Figure 4 shows marginal effect plots.  






Notes: Average marginal effects for interaction terms from Table 2 and Table 3 in the appendix. Other variables 
are held constant at their mean. Spikes represent 95% confidence intervals. Data sources: European Social 
Survey (ESS 2012), Democracy Barometer (Merkel et al. 2016), SWIID (Solt 2016), Polity IV (Marshall and 
Gurr 2016).Weighted with ESS post-stratification and population size weights. 
In the left panel, we can see that there are indeed significant differences between country 
groups in the strength of the effect of status on liberal democratic expectations. They are, 




expectations is weaker in both post-communist and Eurocrisis countries, and stronger in the 
remaining Western European countries. In the right panel, we see the same pattern: The 
negative effect of status on social democratic expectations is strongest in Western Europe, 
weaker in post-communist countries and not significant in crisis-struck countries. This proves 
all four hypotheses wrong.  
To understand the interaction of macro and micro level variables better, I also plotted the 
predicted levels of expectations in both dimensions across the three country groups, which are 
depicted in Figure 5. They show again that the slope of the effects of status on expectations 
(positive on liberal democratic expectations and negative on social democratic expectations) 
is steeper in the 'remainder category' of Western European countries. At the same time, we 
can also see that the levels of expectations in both dimensions, but especially in the social 
dimension, are higher in both post-communist and Eurocrisis countries. Most notably, citizens 
in Eurocrisis countries have substantially higher levels of social expectations, as the right 
panel shows.  






Notes: Predicted margins of place in society and country group on the level of expectations from democracy. 
Other variables are held constant at their mean. Full models see Table 2 and Table 3 in the appendix. Data 
sources: European Social Survey (ESS 2012), Democracy Barometer (Merkel et al. 2016), SWIID (Solt 2016), 
Polity IV (Marshall and Gurr 2016).Weighted with ESS post-stratification and population size weights. 
Next, I look at the effects of the same cross-level interaction on evaluations of democracy. In 
hypotheses H6 and H9, I assumed that the positive effect of social status on evaluations in all 
dimensions of democracy - the higher someone's status, the better their evaluations of 
democracy - is stronger for citizens of post-communist and Eurocrisis countries than for 
others.  Again, I illustrate the effects using marginal effect plots. Figure 6 shows the plots of 
the marginal effects of subjective status measured by place in society in three country groups 




Figure 6: Marginal effects of subjective status on democratic evaluations across country 
groups.    
  
 
Notes: Average marginal effects for interaction terms from Table 5 and Table 6 in the appendix. Other variables 
are held constant at their mean. Spikes represent 95% confidence intervals. Data sources: European Social 
Survey (ESS 2012), Democracy Barometer (Merkel et al. 2016), SWIID (Solt 2016), Polity IV (Marshall and 
Gurr 2016).Weighted with ESS post-stratification and population size weights. 
We can 
We can see that, again, the hypotheses cannot be fully confirmed: The left panel shows that 
the positive effect of status on liberal democratic expectations is indeed stronger in post-
communist countries, but substantially weaker in Eurocrisis countries. The right panel shows 
that the positive effects of status on social democratic evaluations are significantly weaker in 
both post-communist and Eurocrisis countries. This partly confirms H6 - the effects of status 
are stronger in post-communist countries, but only for liberal, not for social expectations - and 
contradicts H9 completely, as Eurocrisis countries showed weaker effects of status on 
evaluations than all others. As previously, I plot the predicted levels of democratic evaluations 
according to status in both dimensions for all three country groups in Figure 7. 
We can see a similar pattern again: As the marginal effects plots have confirmed, the slopes of 
the positive effect of status are generally steepest for Western Europe, and less steep for the 
other two country groups, especially for Eurocrisis countries. At the same time, we can also 
see that levels differ: In the case of evaluations, the levels of liberal, and even more strongly 
social expectations, are consistently lower in post-communist as well as Eurocrisis countries. 
In other words, while the combined effect of status and country group is stronger in Western 
Europe, there is a direct and negative effect of the country-level on evaluations in post-









Notes: Predicted margins of place in society and country group on the level of evaluations of democracy. Other 
variables are held constant at their mean. Full models see Table 5 and Table 6 in the appendix. Data sources: 
European Social Survey (ESS 2012), Democracy Barometer (Merkel et al. 2016), SWIID (Solt 2016), Polity IV 
(Marshall and Gurr 2016).Weighted with ESS post-stratification and population size weights. 
Lastly, additional models using direct democratic expectations and evaluations as a dependent 
variable for robustness tests (Model 4 in Table 4 and Table 7 in the appendix) confirm the 
previous results: The negative effect of status on direct democratic expectations and the 
positive effect on direct democratic evaluations are less strong in both post-communist and 
Eurocrisis countries. Levels of direct democratic expectations, like social democratic 
evaluations, are generally higher in these country groups. Interestingly though, as Table 7 
shows, direct democratic evaluations are substantially higher in both post-communist and 
Eurocrisis countries as well. Apparently, Southern and Eastern European citizens (perceive to) 
have more direct participation opportunities. 
What can we learn from these results? To start with, the assumption that social status is 
systematically linked to citizens' expectations from and evaluations of democracy is 
confirmed. While the finding that status affects citizens support for democracy is not new, as 
Section 3 has discussed, my analysis sheds some light on the reasons why this is the case: 
First, a social status influences the demands that citizens make to their democracies. A low 
social status causes them to prefer substantial over procedural democracy, to value outputs in 
the form of social justice more strongly than liberal democratic criteria. This confirms the 
expectations derived from social dominance theory, where the status quo of liberal democracy 
is more strongly supported by those in high status positions. Secondly, status also 
systematically affects how citizens evaluate democracy: The higher their status, the more 
positively people judge the functioning of their own democracy, both in procedural and in 




substantial terms. Democratic quality, thus, is not an objective measure, but depends on 
citizens' position in society. High-status citizens have more positive experiences with 
democracy than their lower-status counterparts.  
Most importantly, my arguments based on relative deprivation theory claiming that subjective 
status - the perceived position we hold in society compared to others around us - matters for 
democratic support were confirmed. Perceived deprivation is indeed a strong predictor of 
attitudes towards democracy. While objective deprivation, measured by socio-economic 
status, has the same effects, subjective status has a stronger explanatory power, especially 
when it comes to democratic evaluations. The feeling of having an unfavourable social 
position, as relative deprivation theory suggests, makes citizens more prone to support 
substance over procedure, and more likely to see their own democracy in a critical light. 
While the individual level results were in line with the theoretical expectations, the country-
level results were more surprising: Contrary to what I assumed, social status actually matters 
less in post-communist countries and countries affected by the Eurocrisis. The effect of status 
on both expectations and evaluations is strongest in the remaining Western European 
countries. At the same time, I also found that levels of expectations, especially social 
democratic expectations, were generally higher in post-communist and Eurocrisis countries, 
while expectations were substantially lower. Accordingly, there are two different effects: On 
the one hand, confirming results from Chapter Two, citizens in general have higher social 
democratic expectations in former communist countries, but also in countries affected by the 
crisis. These expectations are then also more likely to be disappointed by the democratic 
reality in their countries, which they evaluate substantially more critical than people in 
Western Europe do. On the other hand, social status matters more for citizens of Western 
European democracies, where democratic expectations and evaluations differ more strongly 
depending on perceived deprivation.  
This brings us back to the question posed in the beginning of this chapter: Which groups of 
people are dissatisfied on what grounds? And how does that vary across countries? Given that 
Chapter Three has established a link between distances and dissatisfaction, we know more 
now: First of all, the common finding that low status also goes along with lower levels of 
satisfaction with democracy (Carlin 2006; Schäfer 2013) can be explained by higher 
substantial democratic expectations, and lower evaluations in both dimensions. These two 
factors combined lead to a bigger distance between low-status citizens' expectations and 
evaluations, especially in the social dimension, causing them to be more prone to democratic 




dissatisfaction in Europe is not necessarily a sign of people being against democracy as a 
principle, but rather of being unhappy with the outcomes it provides. Interestingly, this effect 
is most pronounced in established, Western democracies, supporting the idea that developed 
countries are moving towards a "two-thirds democracy" (Petring and Merkel 2011), in which 
the less well-off part of society is exceedingly excluded from the public and political sphere. 
Variance across countries, then, is also a matter of levels: While social status is less important 
for democratic attitudes in former communist and Eurocrisis countries, the levels of attitudes 
differ: Citizens in Southern and Eastern Europe have higher expectations from democracy, 
while simultaneously evaluating their own democratic systems more negatively, which leaves 
them with bigger distances than the average citizen in Western Europe - again, this effect is 
most pronounced in the social dimension of democracy.  
Accordingly, the cause for dissatisfaction does not necessarily seem to be a lack of (liberal) 
democratic quality. Unsatisfied citizens rather find that democratic mechanisms and 
institutions do not produce the output they expect it to: Social justice and redistribution, which 
is especially important for those on the lower end of the social strata. This is even more 
relevant in the (mostly younger) democracies in Eastern and Southern Europe, which have not 
only been more affected by the Eurocrisis but also tend to have a lower quality of democratic 
institutions and welfare states in general. Secondly, these results point to the importance of 
perceptions for democratic support: Apparently, perceived deprivation - feeling excluded and 
left behind by society, and seeing individual economic circumstances as insufficient - strongly 
affects how Europeans judge macro-level conditions. Democracy, in other words, is not the 
same for all its citizens, but is evaluated differently according to one's status.  
At the same time, the fact that more than 'objectively measured' deprivation it is rather 
perceived deprivation that matters is another interesting result. Perceived relative deprivation, 
no matter if objectively justified or not, is a real driving force of individual political attitudes. 
This reminds of Honneths (2004) social recognition theory, claiming that social justice it is 
not (just) about the classic elimination of inequality, but also about the avoidance of 
'humiliation' or 'disrespect', and that social injustice is measured in the withholding of some 
kind of recognition that individuals strive for. Of course one could ask if this dissatisfaction is 
actually still about democracy itself, or if it is rather about socio-economic grievances that 
bias citizens' views on democracy, but are beyond its reach or responsibility. The answer 
eventually depends on one's definition of democracy - is democracy a procedure or a 
substance? Apparently, as this chapter has shown, for quite a lot of citizens democracy is 




citizens tend to live in Southern and Eastern Europe, and on the (perceived) lower end of the 
social strata in Western Europe. 
If there is a way for established democracies to address their dissatisfaction, it would thus be 
via an improvement of social justice, and a focus on democratic outputs rather than 
procedures. Further, the importance of individual grievances should not be underestimated - 
perceived status, which is not necessarily the same as ascribed status, affects citizens' political 
views and behaviour. The issue of (real, relative or perceived) deprivation in European 
populations is a serious problem that liberal democracies should tackle if they want to persist 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of all variables used in the analysis. 
 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Individual-level variables (explanatory) 
Place in society (10=top) 47391 5.437087 1.847648 0 10 
Households total income (10= 10th decentil) 39187 5.118381 2.830176 1 10 
Education (years) 48386 12.52027 3.90489 0 20 
Occupation 41134 4.117907 2.478067 1 9 
Gender (1=male) 48369 .4592611 .4983427 0 1 
Age (years) 48275 48.76151 18.57574 15 103 
Individual-level variables (dependent) 
Expectations liberal democracy 45374 8.448662 1.513478 0 10 
Evaluations liberal democracy 43756 6.729267 1.923673 0 10 
Expectations social democracy 46812 8.424645 1.855974 0 10 
Evaluations social democracy 46172 4.009865 2.705728 0 10 
Expectations direct democracy 46647 8.29213 2.014664 0 10 
Evaluations direct democracy 45716 5.037842 3.145245 0 10 
Country-level variables      
Gini inequality index (0=equal) 26 29.16775 4.082261 21.917 36.544 
Reduction in income inequality in % 26 32.41536 12.80693 7.6427 51.218 
Age of democracy (years) 26 53.30069 36.76969 15 164 
Democratic quality 26 58.01453 8.143321 42.835 72.583 
Notes: Data sources: European Social Survey (ESS 2012), Democracy Barometer (Merkel et al. 2016), SWIID 






Table 2: Effects of status on liberal democratic expectations.  
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Individual-level variables 
Place in society 0.0763***  0.0981*** 0.0796*** 
 (0.00416)  (0.00571) (0.00457) 
Gender (male) 0.131*** 0.129*** 0.132*** 0.132*** 
 (0.0139) (0.0156) (0.0143) (0.0139) 
Age 0.00304*** 0.00771*** 0.00263*** 0.00306*** 
 (0.000383) (0.000468) (0.000396) (0.000383) 
Household total income  0.0279***   
  (0.00307)   
Education (years)  0.0579***   
  (0.00240)   
Occupation  0.0363***   
  (0.00352)   
Country groups: Direct effects  
Post-communist    0.0868 0.616*** 
   (0.301) (0.178) 
Crisis country   0.229 0.590* 
   (0.250) (0.219) 
Country groups: Interaction with place in society (Baseline: Western Europe)  
Post-communist     -0.0640*** 
    (0.00887) 
Crisis country    -0.0765*** 
    (0.0134) 
Country-level variables     
Regime Durability   -0.00322  
   (0.00297)  
Democratic quality   0.00462  
   (0.0137)  
Constant 7.849*** 7.051*** 7.629*** 7.488*** 
 (0.0826) (0.0904) (0.914) (0.125) 
Var (Constant) -0.946*** -0.907*** -1.083*** -0.942*** 
 (0.140) (0.140) (0.146) (0.141) 
Var (Residual) 0.380*** 0.324*** 0.387*** 0.379*** 
 (0.00335) (0.00395) (0.00342) (0.00335) 
N Level 1 26 26 26 26 
N Level 2 44608 32042 42842 44608 
AIC 160587.5 111858.8 154890.9 160528.3 
BIC 160639.7 111925.8 154977.5 160615.3 
Chi2 473.2 1372.5 462.1 541.2 






p<0.001. Data sources: European Social Survey (ESS 2012), Democracy Barometer (Merkel et al. 2016), 








Table 3: Effects of status on social democratic expectations.  
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Individual-level variables 
Place in society -0.0629***  -0.0654*** -0.0812*** 
 (0.00494)  (0.00513) (0.00752) 
Gender (male) -0.204*** -0.192*** -0.204*** -0.204*** 
 (0.0167) (0.0193) (0.0172) (0.0167) 
Age 0.00609*** 0.00521*** 0.00578*** 0.00618*** 
 (0.000455) (0.000577) (0.000469) (0.000457) 
Household total income  -0.0446***   
  (0.00382)   
Education (years)  -0.0110***   
  (0.00297)   
Occupation  -0.0261***   
  (0.00438)   
Country groups: Direct effects  
Post-communist    0.0808 0.313* 
   (0.356) (0.123) 
Crisis country   0.438 0.394* 
   (0.289) (0.238) 
Country groups: Interaction with place in society (Baseline: Western Europe)  
Post-communist     0.0243* 
    (0.0105) 
Crisis country    0.0631*** 
    (0.0159) 
Country-level variables     
Regime Durability   -0.00363  
   (0.00368)  
Democratic quality   -0.00232  
   (0.0185)  
Gini Household Income   -0.00876  
   (0.0249)  
% Redistribution   -0.0122  
   (0.0107)  
Constant 8.616*** 8.799*** 9.527*** 8.419*** 
 (0.108) (0.110) (1.473) (0.137) 
Var (Constant) -0.659*** -0.714*** -0.978*** -0.870*** 
 (0.140) (0.140) (0.146) (0.141) 
Var (Residual) 0.573*** 0.551*** 0.582*** 0.573*** 
 (0.00330) (0.00390) (0.00337) (0.00330) 
N Level 1 26 26 26 26 
N Level 2 45928 32828 44111 45928 
AIC 183103.2 129494.7 176648.8 183086.2 
BIC 183155.6 129561.9 176753.1 183173.5 
Chi2 534.8 632.8 514.9 563.5 






p<0.001. Data sources: European Social Survey (ESS 2012), Democracy Barometer (Merkel et al. 2016), 







Table 4: Robustness test: Effects of status on direct democratic expectations.  
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Individual-level variables 
Place in society -0.0125*  -0.0112* -0.0275*** 
 (0.00549)  (0.00567) (0.00832) 
Gender (male) -0.104*** -0.124*** -0.102*** -0.104*** 
 (0.0185) (0.0215) (0.0189) (0.0185) 
Age 0.000263 -0.00100 0.0000390 0.000212 
 (0.000506) (0.000643) (0.000520) (0.000506) 
Household total income  -0.0131**   
  (0.00424)   
Education (years)  -0.0143***   
  (0.00331)   
Occupation  -0.00980*   
  (0.00486)   
Country groups: Direct effects  
Post-communist    0.586 0.260 
   (0.319) (0.187) 
Crisis country   0.569* 0.384* 
   (0.266) (0.230) 
Country groups: Interaction with place in society (Baseline: Western Europe)  
Post-communist     0.0300* 
    (0.0117) 
Crisis country    0.0161* 
    (0.0106) 
Country-level variables     
Regime Durability   0.00513  
   (0.00315)  
Democratic quality   -0.00760  
   (0.0146)  
Constant 8.425*** 8.738*** 8.220*** 8.257*** 
 (0.0987) (0.108) (0.971) (0.134) 
Var (Constant) -0.788*** -0.783*** -1.026*** -0.918*** 
 (0.140) (0.141) (0.147) (0.141) 
Var (Residual) 0.674*** 0.657*** 0.678*** 0.674*** 
 (0.00331) (0.00391) (0.00337) (0.00331) 
N Level 1 26 26 26 26 
N Level 2 45770 32719 43964 45770 
AIC 191753.6 135945.6 184504.8 191748.3 
BIC 191806.0 136012.7 184591.8 191835.7 
Chi2 38.15 92.06 44.48 52.39 






p<0.001. Data sources: European Social Survey (ESS 2012), Democracy Barometer (Merkel et al. 2016), 








Table 5: Effects of status on liberal democratic evaluations.  
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Individual-level variables 
Place in society 0.160***  0.159*** 0.153*** 
 (0.00485)  (0.00497) (0.00734) 
Gender (male) 0.126*** 0.143*** 0.142*** 0.143*** 
 (0.0162) (0.0187) (0.0164) (0.0164) 
Age 0.00721*** 0.00884*** 0.00738*** 0.00758*** 
 (0.000447) (0.000561) (0.000453) (0.000455) 
Household total income  0.0549***   
  (0.00368)   
Education (years)  0.00681*   
  (0.00287)   
Occupation  0.0114*   
  (0.00422)   
Country groups: Direct effect  
Post-communist    -0.440 -0.750* 
   (0.418) (0.404) 
Crisis country   -0.153 -0.138 
   (0.348) (0.338) 
Country groups: Interaction with place in society (Baseline: Western Europe)  
Post-communist     0.0391*** 
    (0.0106) 
Crisis country    -0.0855*** 
    (0.0157) 
Country-level variables     
Regime Durability   -0.00162  
   (0.00413)  
Democratic quality   0.0682***  
   (0.0191)  
Constant 5.399*** 5.813*** 1.733 2.010+ 
 (0.163) (0.177) (1.273) (1.219) 
Var (Constant) -0.209 -0.148 -0.751*** -0.794*** 
 (0.139) (0.139) (0.146) (0.146) 
Var (Residual) 0.513*** 0.492*** 0.507*** 0.506*** 
 (0.00341) (0.00401) (0.00348) (0.00348) 
N Level 1 26 26 26 26 
N Level 2 43103 31174 41392 41392 
AIC 166678.4 119300.7 159536.6 159478.1 
BIC 166730.4 119367.5 159622.9 159581.7 
Chi2 1346.1 517.5 1368.2 1438.7 






p<0.001. Data sources: European Social Survey (ESS 2012), Democracy Barometer (Merkel et al. 2016), 








Table 6: Effects of status on social democratic evaluations. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Individual-level variables 
Place in society 0.214***  0.212*** 0.248*** 
 (0.00640)  (0.00654) (0.00986) 
Gender (male) 0.176*** 0.168*** 0.181*** 0.182*** 
 (0.0216) (0.0255) (0.0219) (0.0219) 
Age -0.000817 0.000118 -0.000876 -0.000771 
 (0.000591) (0.000764) (0.000603) (0.000591) 
Household total income  0.0524***   
  (0.00504)   
Education (years)  -0.0137***   
  (0.00392)   
Occupation  0.0196***   
  (0.00578)   
Country groups: Direct effect  
Post-communist    -1.027* -0.804* 
   (0.391) (0.363) 
Crisis country   -0.650* -0.338 
   (0.317) (0.297) 
Country groups: Interaction with place in society (Baseline: Western Europe)  
Post-communist     -0.0564*** 
    (0.0140) 
Crisis country    -0.0847*** 
    (0.0204) 
Country-level variables     
Regime Durability   0.0111*  
   (0.00404)  
Democratic quality   0.0361  
   (0.0203)  
Gini Household Income   -0.0781**  
   (0.0273)  
% Redistribution   0.00618  
   (0.0118)  
Constant 2.799*** 3.750*** 2.707 2.497 
 (0.254) (0.278) (1.616) (1.470) 
Var (Constant) 0.238 0.317* -0.887*** -0.985*** 
 (0.139) (0.139) (0.147) (0.149) 
Var (Residual) 0.824*** 0.824*** 0.819*** 0.818*** 
 (0.00332) (0.00392) (0.00339) (0.00339) 
N Level 1 26 26 26 26 
N Level 2 45343 32497 43560 43560 
AIC 203583.8 145926.1 195056.2 195035.3 
BIC 203636.2 145993.3 195160.3 195156.9 
Chi2 1211.7 190.2 1405.3 1485.7 






p<0.001. Data sources: European Social Survey (ESS 2012), Democracy Barometer (Merkel et al. 2016), 






Table 7: Robustness test: Effects of status on direct democratic evaluations.  
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Individual-level variables 
Place in society 0.145***  0.143*** 0.101*** 
 (0.00810)  (0.00828) (0.0124) 
Gender (male) -0.0993*** -0.0926** -0.0917*** -0.0910*** 
 (0.0272) (0.0322) (0.0276) (0.0276) 
Age 0.00613*** 0.00295** 0.00688*** 0.00616*** 
 (0.000748) (0.000965) (0.000762) (0.000748) 
Household total income  0.0100   
  (0.00635)   
Education (years)  -0.0608***   
  (0.00496)   
Occupation  -0.0259***   
  (0.00728)   
Country groups: Direct effects  
Post-communist    2.215*** 1.655* 
   (0.658) (0.661) 
Crisis country   1.265* 1.277* 
   (0.548) (0.553) 
Country groups: Interaction with place in society (Baseline: Western Europe)  
Post-communist     -0.101*** 
    (0.0177) 
Crisis country    -0.0120 
    (0.0262) 
Country-level variables     
Regime Durability   0.0225***  
   (0.00650)  
Democratic quality   0.122***  
   (0.0300)  
Constant 4.060*** 5.834*** -5.350* -5.086* 
 (0.243) (0.269) (2.001) (1.993) 
Var (Constant) 0.181 0.256 -0.299* -0.303* 
 (0.139) (0.139) (0.146) (0.146) 
Var (Residual) 1.053*** 1.053*** 1.047*** 1.047*** 
 (0.00334) (0.00394) (0.00340) (0.00340) 
N Level 1 26 26 26 26 
N Level 2 44918 32223 43155 43155 
AIC 222252.8 159441.4 213003.4 212968.4 
BIC 222305.1 159508.5 213090.1 213072.5 
Chi2 381.7 276.8 405.9 445.6 






p<0.001. Data sources: European Social Survey (ESS 2012), Democracy Barometer (Merkel et al. 2016), 
Polity IV (Marshall and Gurr 2016). Weighted with ESS post-stratification and population size weights. 
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